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This research investigates the antecedents and consequences of relational capabilities in 
the context of strategic alliance projects between MNE subsidiaries and local suppliers in 
the Thai manufacturing sector. The need to understand the relational capabilities 
approach is recognised in management literature, especially the ambiguous effects of the 
relational and economic dimensions, on relational capabilities in cross-cultural alliance 
projects. In particular, academics have highlighted the importance of relational 
capabilities, trust and transaction cost factors in that they play important roles in 
determining alliance success, especially in the context of cross-cultural alliances. A 
theoretical framework is developed which, first, explores the antecedents and barriers of 
relational capabilities and second, examines the multiple mediation effect of these on the 
link between inter-organizational conditions and alliance performance. 
The research design is aligned with quantitative methodology. The theoretical 
frameworks were tested using the data obtained from 156 strategic alliance projects 
between MNE subsidiaries and local suppliers in the Thai manufacturing sector with 
hierarchical regression analysis and the bootstrapping technique. The empirical results 
indicate that inter-personal trust, inter-organizational trust and asset specificity are 
antecedents of relational capabilities, while HR distance between alliance partners is not 
a barrier of these capabilities. Moreover, the empirical outcomes in relation to the indirect 
effect of the relational and economic dimensions on alliance performance through 
knowledge sharing routines and complementary capability are supported. However, the 
remaining hypotheses pertaining to the expectation that effective governance 
mechanisms are mediators on those relationships are rejected. This is explained by the 
fact that trust-based relationships are so deeply embedded in the Thai manufacturing 
sector that they predominate over such mechanisms.  
The contribution of this research is twofold: first, in terms of academic advancement, it 
combines the arguments of trust and TCE to provide a holistic view in explaining 
antecedents and consequences of relational capabilities. Second, in terms of practical 
contribution, it improves the understanding of practitioners both purchasing managers of 
MNE subsidiaries and sales managers, regarding the alignment of trust and asset 








This study analyses the antecedents and consequences of relational capabilities in 
strategic alliance projects between MNE subsidiaries and local suppliers by adopting 
three approaches, including relational capabilities, trust and transaction cost economics 
(TCE), to develop the theoretical framework. This chapter introduces the fundamental 
concepts of the research and sets out the structure of the study. The remainder of the 
chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.2 describes the research motivation and 
presents the problem statement in the context of strategic alliance projects between MNE 
subsidiaries and local suppliers. Section 1.3 discusses the academic and practical 
significance of this research, whilst Section 1.4 describes the aims and objectives. Section 
1.5 presents the structure of the thesis and finally, Section 1.6 contains the chapter 
summary. 
1.2 Research motivation 
A strategic alliance between business partners is an important strategy to compete and 
grow in the uncertainty of today’s global business (Kale and Singh, 2009). In particular, 
it is a fast and flexible way to access complementary resources and skills that reside in 
other companies (Dyer et al., 2001). Moreover, a strategic alliance is a source of 
sustainable value for everyone involved (Peng, 2009). For example, Cisco Systems Inc., 
a global leader of the telecommunication industry, has used strategic alliances with key 
global IT leaders, such as Microsoft, IBM, and Accenture, as part of the growth strategy 
for their firm over the last decade (Dyer and Kale, 2007). Nevertheless, a recent study by 
McKinsey & Company found that only half of all strategic alliances yield returns above 
the cost of capital (Kaplan et al., 2010). Even though their failure rate is high, the number 
of alliances being formed is growing because they have the potential to create value (Dyer 
et al., 2001; Ireland et al., 2002; Lunnan and Haugland, 2008). Consequently, the search 
for the drivers of alliance performance has become a critical issue to both practitioners 
and scholars (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Koka and Prescott, 2002; Schilke and Goerzen, 




non-substitutable organizational capabilities and resources are a key source of inter-firm 
performance differences (Barney, 1991; Dosi, Nelson, and Winter, 2000; Nelson, 1991; 
Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984).   
Strategic management scholars have paid particular attention to explaining why some 
firms succeed in strategic alliances, but their opinions are still inconsistent. The alliance 
literature has provided tools for evaluating value creation and appropriation at the dyad 
or network level. From previous studies, alliance performance is a central focus for 
strategic alliance management (Peng, 2009) and three main factors that may influence it 
have been put forward: (1) equity (Dhanaraj and Beamish, 2004; Barden et al., 2005), (2) 
learning and experience (Meyer, 2007) and (3) firms’ nationalities (Sirmon and Lane, 
2004). In addition, it has been contended that a company requires robust experience and 
know-how from previous alliances in order to build a proficient and successfully 
managed business (Simonin, 1997; Kale et al., 2001).  
Despite the importance of understanding alliance performance, alliance management 
capabilities research has received less attention than other areas. Consequently, there is 
limited understanding in the literature of where capabilities come from or what kinds of 
investment in money, time, and managerial effort is required in building them in order to 
leverage alliance performance. Dyer and Kale (2007) called for detailed study on the 
exact contents and antecedents of relational capabilities. Hence, in recent years scholars 
have devoted a lot of attention to studying alliance management capability and 
understanding how ﬁrms beneﬁt from it (Kale et al., 2002; Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007; 
Schreiner, Kale and Corsten, 2009; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010). Most have found the 
existence of alliance capabilities from a firm’s prior alliance experience or from a higher 
level of performance between firms (see e.g. Anand and Khanna, 2000; Zollo and Reuer, 
2003; Heimeriks, 2004), but operationalization of relational capabilities and their 
constructs remains contested. That is, they have only provided a partial solution to 
providing an explanation for the persistent differences in alliance performance between 
firms.  
In order to better understand why some firms persistently outperform competitors in 
terms of alliance performance, another stream of research has emerged that is distinct 




performance at the inter-firm level (e.g. Simonin, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kale et 
al., 2000). The need to complement early alliance research that centered on inter-firm 
antecedents of alliance performance is also evident from Ireland et al. (2002), who 
recently underscored the need for firms to concentrate on both content and process 
elements simultaneously in order to enhance alliance performance. In their view, it is 
insufficient to understand the critical issues at the dyadic level without addressing the 
specific inter-organizational dimensions that underlie successful alliance management at 
the alliance project level. Other studies, such as Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007 and 
Schilke and Goerzen, 2010, have confirmed the need to pay attention to the role of inter-
firm factors in order to provide a better understanding of the antecedents of alliance 
performance. That is, these authors take the view that inter-organizational factors are of 
key importance to come to a better understanding of the factors involved in enhancing a 
firm’s alliance performance.  
Peng (2009) pointed out that alliance capabilities are intangible resources and capabilities 
that are harder to observe and more difficult, or sometimes impossible to quantify when 
compared to tangible ones. Yet, it is widely acknowledged that they must be present 
together with tangible resources and capabilities in order to generate firms’ competitive 
advantage. In order to unpack them, Luo (2002) and Krishnan et al. (2006) combined the 
TCE and relational exchange perspectives and changed the focus from predicting make 
or buy to other intermediate outcomes like inventory turnover, buyer control, and a 
supplier’s delivery performance. In addition, Doz (1996) used longitudinal multi-industry 
data and his results were consistent for both the relational and economic perspectives, 
thus indicating the importance of incorporating both streams of thought in understanding 
inter-organizational ties. Despite these efforts, however, the understanding of the 
antecedents of alliance capabilities that generate from inter-organizational conditions 
remains quite limited. This thesis therefore provided an important opportunity to advance 
the understanding of resources and capabilities focusing on inter organizational 
relationship management and developing the concept of alliance management based on 
the relational capabilities approach in order to contribute to alliance management studies 
and recommend strategy to scholars and alliance managers. The following subsections 
explain the motivation for this researcher to adopt a relational capabilities approach as 




1.2.1 Relational capabilities approach 
The relational view (Dyer and Singh, 1998) complements the RBV by arguing that critical 
resources may extend firm boundaries and consequently that firms earn relational rents, 
which are jointly generated by alliance partners. That is, relational capabilities are seen 
as important sources of inter-organizational competitive advantage of alliance firms. 
Relational capabilities refer to firms’ capacity purposefully to create, extend, or modify 
their resources and routines, augmented to include the resources and capabilities of the 
alliance partners (Dyer and Kale, 2007). From this perspective, firms need to dedicate 
their own time and effort, in the form of specific organizational routines in order to build 
relational capabilities in the collaboration (Kale et al., 2002). In general, the relational 
capabilities approach is an emerging theory explaining the inter-organizational 
management of strategic alliances (Pagano, 2009). Building on the extant literature, this 
researcher views alliance management capability as a multidimensional construct 
comprising skills that address three main aspects in managing a given alliance: 
knowledge sharing routines, complementary capability, and effective governance 
mechanisms (Dyer and Kale, 2007). More specifically, relational resources tend to be 
intangible, relatively rare, hard to measure, difficult for rivals to replicate and therefore 
cannot be nurtured (Srivastava, Fahey and Christensen, 2001). Such resources and 
capabilities are by definition not available to competitors in the factor markets and 
therefore can provide competitive advantage (Schroeder, Bates and Junttila, 2002). The 
challenge for managers is to develop relational capabilities that enable them to connect 
their resources to their alliance partners both at the individual (Fang et al., 2008) and 
organizational level (Gulati, 2000; Dyer and Kale, 2007). Examining the relationship 
between these levels may facilitate a better understanding of the inter-organizational 
relationship management in the form of relational capabilities development in terms of 
its strategic impact.  
The relational capabilities approach is a strategy of alliance management that emphasizes 
the modification of organizational routines in order to have better integration with 
alliance partners and higher alliance performance (Dyer and Kale, 2007; Pagano, 2009). 
For instance, the joint venture between Pfizer and Warner Lambert in 1996 achieved 
success, because the alliance partners applied relational capabilities in their collaboration 




encouraged collaborative behaviours at the individual level by creating a list of 
behavioural protocols that were not stated in the formal agreement of the alliance. 
Although 70% of companies have developed formal management systems for at least 
some of their alliances, fewer than 10% have established set initiatives to promote 
relational behaviours (Hughes and Weiss, 2007). Hence, many alliance managers still 
need to acquire relationship management skills to modify their resources and capabilities 
in order to enhance alliance performance and promote competitive advantage over 
competitors.  
To date, the relational capabilities concept has some limitations, in particular, regarding 
understanding of their antecedents, which hence opens up a new research avenue. 
Regarding these, extant literature has shown that previous alliance success is a source of 
alliance management capability (Dyer and Kale, 2007). Moreover, companies that 
achieve their alliance goals tend to dedicate organizational routines to manage 
collaborations (Kale et al., 2002) and the alliance management functions should focus on 
the deployment of tacit knowledge that a company learns from their alliances (Kale et al., 
2001; Heimeriks, 2004; Kale and Singh, 2007; Schreiner et al., 2009; Nielsen and 
Nielsen, 2009). As a result of these findings, strategic scholars have called for research 
to consider additional conditions for relational capabilities that have as yet not been 
identified. Moreover, previous studies have adopted the relational capabilities approach 
to examine alliance management between alliance partners and buyer–supplier 
relationships (Arz and Brush, 2000; Dyer and Chu, 2003; Lavie, 2006; Paulraj et al., 
2008; Mesquita et al., 2008). However, these empirical studies have provided an 
inconsistent view of the interaction among relational variables and what is more none has 
considered the identified variables in simultaneous examinations. Therefore, additional 
studies are required to investigate the effect of a full and robust set of relational 
capabilities parameters on relational rents.  
The extant research has examined the role of both economic and relational dimensions in 
strategic alliance management. Regarding which, economists tend to focus on using asset 
specificity to facilitate exchange by preventing opportunism (Shelanski and Klein, 1995), 
while with the relational view the concentration is on trust and resources as well as the 
capabilities to promote collaborative exchanges in dyadic relationships. Few studies, 




building. Hence, in this researcher’s view taking account of both the economic and 
relational dimensions will promote inter-dependence and commitment to positive 
outcomes of the alliances, because it is believed that they work together to enhance 
relational capabilities. In addition, the links between the competence of individuals and 
organization performance as well as between the competence of organizations and 
network performance are matters of importance (Cox, 1994), but they not clearly 
understood. In particular, important questions still remain unanswered regarding which 
aspects of trust and transaction cost factors are relevant to such relational capabilities, 
how they can be measured, and how they are related to other key constructs.  
Regarding the relational dimension, sharing proprietary resources and capabilities in 
strategic alliances, under a pure resource-based perspective, would place the firm at 
significant risk of leakage to the partner and spill over to competitors (Gulati, 2000). 
Thus, this research is aimed at uncovering the conditions under which firms promote the 
risky actions and behaviours of sharing resources and capabilities with their alliance 
partners. Furthermore, the relational capabilities approach overlooks the influence of 
transaction cost factors that can cause risk for collaborations owing to the uncertainty 
from business partners’ opportunistic behaviours (Mayer et al., 1995; Lui et al., 2006). 
Economic constraints, as suggested by TCE, are positively related to the quality of 
relationships between the alliance partners because of the lock-in situation (Young-
Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999). For instance, Inkpen and Currall (1998), Joshi  and Stump 
(1999), and Subramani and Venkatraman (2003) found a positive relationship between 
asset specificity and the quality of inter-organizational relationships in that cooperative 
behaviours play a role as a safeguard to prevent these investments from being 
opportunistically exploited by the supplier. However, some research has found a negative 
relationship between asset specificity and alliance performance, being explained as that 
investments are not easily redeployable and alliance partners are at risk if their suppliers 
behave opportunistically, (Artz, 1999; Suh and Kwon, 2006). Hence, it is important to 







1.2.2 Research settings 
The study offers some important insights into the relational capabilities approach in the 
context of strategic alliance projects between MNE subsidiaries and local suppliers in the 
Thai manufacturing sector. Previous studies found that alliance experiences and alliance 
functions are antecedents of relational capabilities in the context of alliance portfolios 
(Kale et al., 2000; Hong and Rothermel, 2005; Dyer and Kale, 2007). However, the 
antecedents of relational capabilities at the dyadic relationship level have been 
overlooked. Moreover, strategic alliance research that has investigated these alliances at 
the project level has helped to uncover the reasons why projects have failed or been 
successful (Ariño et al., 2005). An increasing number of firms use projects to achieve 
strategic and operational objectives and to adapt to a rapidly changing technological and 
market environment. For these firms, learning through and from projects is increasingly 
important to competitive success. However, previous research has emphasized the 
difficulties that firms face when they attempt to capture the learning gained through 
projects and transfer it to their wider organizations (e.g. DeFillippi 2001; Keegan and 
Turner 2001). Furthermore, empirical research focusing on strategic alliances at the 
project level allows the researcher to study the role of the individual. Previously, the 
management field has also suffered from a lack of research spanning individual 
behaviours and organizational processes, i.e. there has been a lack of integration of 
individual behaviours in their organizational context (Cox, 1994; Ariño et al., 2005; Felin 
et al., 2012). Therefore, part of the aim of this thesis is to carry out an empirical study 
that focuses on relational capabilities in the context of strategic alliance projects. More 
specifically, this strategic alliance projects study provides a detailed look at the purpose 
served by specific relationships between buyers and suppliers, thereby offering a guide 
to firms and project managers in relation to successful strategic alliance management.   
In addition, the importance of managing cross-cultural alliances is reflected in the 
extensive literature on this topic, which has focused primarily on the structuring of cross-
border partnerships. For example, a number of studies have examined the rationale for 
international partnerships, including joint ventures and international strategic alliances 
(Sirmon and Lane, 2004; Krishnan et al., 2006), and cross-border marketing partnership 
(Aulakh et al., 1996; Ling-yee and Ogunmokun, 2001; Skarmeas et al., 2002). Because 




achieving the required standards in terms of cost, quality and delivery, MNEs are 
increasingly being pushed to implement effective international supplier management 
practices in order to align their strategic and performance objectives with those of the 
local suppliers. Such efforts might require the development of specific relational 
capabilities (Pagano, 2009). Moreover, it is possible to establish strategic alliances with 
suppliers, namely upstream vertical alliances, as exemplified by the Japanese Kiretsu 
networks (Peng, 2009) and the deeper relationship between airlines and Rolls-Royce 
(Peng and Meyer, 2011). Strategic alliances between buyers and suppliers transform the 
relationship from market-oriented to a relationship-oriented by sharing resources and 
capabilities (Dyer, 1996; Dyer, 1997). These collaborations usually rely on a smaller 
number of key suppliers that are awarded long-term contracts instead of dealing with a 
large number of suppliers that are awarded contracts in the form of an arm’s length 
transaction. 
Since firms rarely have adequate resources to compete effectively, especially MNE 
subsidiaries that operate in global markets, they access those needed through formal and 
informal relationships with other firms (Hitt et al., 2002). Moreover, MNE subsidiaries 
are increasingly encouraged to implement effective cross-cultural supplier management 
practices in order to align supplier's activities to their strategic and performance 
objectives in host countries (Ling-yee and Ogunmokun, 2001). Such efforts might require 
the development of speciﬁc “relational capabilities”, which comprise organizational 
solutions, procedures and competences concerning both the intra and inter-organizational 
dimensions (Goerzen, 2005). Nevertheless, in the relational capabilities literature the 
MNE manufacturers and local suppliers’ relationship remains under explored. In addition 
to factors considered in the literature on relational capabilities in domestic contexts, the 
relationships between MNE subsidiaries and their suppliers in transnational contexts are 
constrained by human resource distance between the MNE and the local firm (Estrin, 
Baghdasaryan and Meyer, 2009). This effect potentially negatively affects the 
development of trust and the other constructs in the model. This study provides important 
insight into the relational capabilities between MNE subsidiaries and their local suppliers 
in the host country in order to understand the interaction between MNEs and the local 
environment. Furthermore, the researcher views cross-cultural task development in a 




environment. In sum, this study demonstrates organizational and individual views of 
relational capabilities in the context of strategic alliance projects between MNE 
subsidiaries and local suppliers in the Thai manufacturing sector.  
1.3 Research significance  
This research is significant in light of the limited understanding of the relational 
capabilities approach in the context of cross-cultural alliance projects. To address the 
literature gaps, the researcher integrates two perspectives, trust and TCE, into the 
theoretical framework, which is because the crafting of relational capabilities requires 
drawing from multiple theories since no single theory can explain all the elements of 
alliance management capabilities. These perspectives can uncover exchange hazards and 
so are often used strategically to enhance value and capability development (Argyres and 
Mayer, 2007). The important issues are which aspects of trust and TCE are relevant to 
such relational capabilities and how they can be measured. It also will be interesting to 
conceptualize a broader alliance level capability to manage an alliance that not only 
includes the capabilities to manage strategic alliances, but also includes other factors 
needed to handle the formation and governance aspects in a focal alliance. Hence, this 
research considers three influential factors in the literature, relational capabilities, trust 
and transaction cost, as sources of firms’ superior resources and capabilities that can help 
enhance alliance performance.  
In recent years, increasing research attention has been focused on alliance development 
processes, especially with regards to how the initial alliance conditions or antecedents 
can impact on outcomes. For instance, Das and Teng (2002) argued that the initial 
negotiation stage among prospective partner firms is unique to strategic alliances. Also, 
the interactions between an alliance and its environment are much more complicated than 
in the case of single organizations as there are at least two firms involved. Importantly, 
the dynamics of alliance conditions that influence the unfolding of these processes across 
stages is associated with the co-evolution of the alliance and the partner firms. During 
which, managers must deal with multiple dimensions of their relationships, including 
individual and organizational levels of analysis, in their decisions regarding both 
interdependence and risk on whether to rely on trust as a complement to or a substitute 




Furthermore, if the development of capabilities requires deliberate and sustained 
investment of financial and managerial resources, both of which have alternative uses, it 
becomes important to understand the costs and benefits of such investments. In other 
words, different capabilities may entail different financial and managerial costs and yield 
dissimilar performance benefits. This thesis aims to address this gap by reporting research 
pertaining to the extension of the relational capabilities approach. The focus of the 
analysis is on the inter-organizational conditions fostering or blocking relational 
capabilities in strategic alliance projects, and on the impact of these conditions on alliance 
performance.  This researcher believes that a more comprehensive conception of 
developmental processes is critical for an adequate understanding of strategic alliances. 
This recognition has, in turn, led to the emphasis being placed in the current investigation 
on where and how these capabilities emerge and how they influence firm performance. 
This research, by considering how the initial conditions and characteristics of strategic 
alliances among firms or antecedents influence relational capabilities and alliance 
outcomes seeks to fill a gap in the extant literature. Based on several empirical studies, 
Das and Teng (2002) uncovered four inter-organizational factors that have been shown 
to influence partner selection and subsequent alliance performance, including trust, 
commitment, complementarity and value or financial payoff. For this research two inter-
organizational factors are selected, namely relational and economic dimensions, which 
have been consistently identified as being important to cooperative capabilities and 
alliance performance (e.g. Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999; Inkpen and Currall, 1998; 
Joshi and Stump, 1999; Dyer and Chu, 2003; Suh et al., 2006), to examine empirically 
their impact on relational capabilities and this performance. By pursuing the matter 
discussed above, not only will this offer a better descriptive understanding of relational 
capabilities approach, but also elucidate prescriptive implications for alliance research 
and management practice. The following paragraph explains the importance of relational 
and economic dimensions in strategic alliance management. 
First, trust in an economic exchange is an aspect of social capital that pertains to a firm’s 
relationship with other companies that have important resources. More specifically, 
Ireland et al. (2009) suggested that a trust-based relationship must be developed in 
alliance management. Many scholars have argued that risk, or having something invested, 




in alliances will be present and trust necessary, in settings where alliance partners make 
transaction-specific investments (Dyer and Chu, 2003) and where there is the possibility 
of opportunistic behaviours from alliance partners. Trust is defined as the willingness to 
take risk when faced with vulnerability owing alliance partners’ potential opportunistic 
behaviours and other threatening actions (Mayer et al., 1995; Das and Teng, 1998; 
Abrams et al., 2003; Schoorman et al., 2007). It is considered an important factor that can 
lower transaction costs between alliance partners (Artz and Brush, 2000; Dyer and Chu, 
2000; Dyer and Chu, 2003) in that a high trust environment boosts the convenience of 
working with business partners, which lowers opportunistic behaviours by alliance 
partners (Dyer and Chu, 2000; Child & Möllering, 2003; Peng, 2009), facilitates firm 
capabilities (Yli-Renko et al., 2001; Paulraj et al., 2008; Nelson and Nelson, 2009) and 
enhances alliance performance (Aulakh et al., 1996; Dyer and Chu, 2003; Krishnan et al., 
2006). Previous research suggests that alliance successes and failures can be attributed to 
lack of trust (Ariño and De la Torre, 1998; Peng, 2009). Realizing its importance, 
practitioners and researchers have recently paid attention to understanding trust in several 
forms, viewing this as an important management task (Hosmer, 1995; Parkhe, 1998; Chua 
et al., 2008).  
In addition, researchers have argued that alliance management capabilities occur at multi-
levels since individuals play important roles in initiating and operating alliance routines 
and capabilities that subsequently have an impact for the whole firm. According to Cox 
(1994), the links between the competence of individuals and organization performance 
as well as between the competence of organizations and alliance performance are salient 
matters, but as yet are not particularly well understood. Moreover, there is a growing 
body of work that has sought to incorporate the insights of individual factors, such as 
cognition and emotions, into the nature and sources of strategic decision making 
(Hodgkinson and Healey, 2011), for it is held those of managers can have a signiﬁcant 
impact on whether or not a firm’s relational capabilities enhances alliance performance. 
Some research on trust in strategic alliances also indicates that at both the individual and 
inter-organizational levels it influences the quality of inter-organizational relationships 
(Doney and Cannon, 1997) and alliance performance (Zaheer et al., 1998; Nicholson et 
al., 2001). However, Currall and Inkpen (2002) have called for greater clarity of 




Second, economic hostage behaviour between alliance partners is another factor that can 
have an influence on various aspects of alliance management, such as mode of 
governance and cooperative behaviours (Williamson, 1991; Dyer and Singh, 1998). Since 
this can be considered as a source (e.g. Subramani and Venkatraman, 2003; Inkpen and 
Currall, 1998; Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999; Joshi and Stump, 1999) or a barrier 
to relational exchange, the debate regarding its impact on alliances remains ongoing (e.g. 
Artz, 1999; Dyer and Chu, 2000; Lunnan and Haugland, 2008).  
Some previous studies have adopted transaction cost economics (TCE) to explain 
strategic decisions relating to the economic hostage nature of any transactions. That is, 
TCE focuses on transactions (i.e. transfers of goods or services) and the costs that occur 
when completing transactions by one organizational form (e.g. market, hybrid, hierarchy) 
rather than free choice (Williamson, 1985). According to David and Han (2004),  with 
TCE it is predicted that under high asset specificity and high uncertainty the firm will 
embrace a highly integrated channel. That is, TCE assumes that decision makers are 
marginally rational and that at least some people or ﬁrms in any setting will be 
opportunistic (Shervani, Frazier and Challagalla, 2007). Furthermore, transaction cost 
factors can have impact on alliance performance. For example, Krishnan et al. (2006) 
found that behavioural and environmental uncertainty moderates the trust-performance 
relationship in strategic alliances.  
Transaction cost has repeatedly been shown havean influence strategic alliances since a 
distinctive characteristic of them is that partners have to take risks with the uncertainty 
arising from each other’s behaviour, both of which normally evolve from two transaction 
cost factors. First, a certain level of asset speciﬁcity and HR distance is in inter-
organizational relationships is needed to support the exchange, namely, internal 
uncertainty or performance ambiguity, and external uncertainty, respectively (Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 1995). Second, managing uncertainty through various strategic 
arrangements has been noted as a key issue in organizational design (Beckman et al., 
2004). Regarding which, researchers such as Monteverde and Teece (1982) and Masten 
(1984), who used the transaction cost framework, have traditionally examined the impact 
of asset specificity or uncertainty on the decision to make or buy, without directly 




to realize the potential gains from alliance involvement has to identify the factors that 
determine these coordination costs in strategic alliances (Pilling and Zhang, 1992).  
1.4 Research aims and objectives 
The main objective of this study is to identify the antecedents and outcomes of relational 
capabilities in order to engender a deeper understanding of strategic alliance 
management. In this researcher’s opinion, this cannot be achieved without a systematic 
examination of trust and TCE factors using a relational capabilities approach, it is their 
effective combination that jointly increases the odds for successful strategic alliances. To 
this end, the empirical research framework for this study integrates trust, TCE and 
relational capabilities into the investigation of strategic alliance management, the testing 
of which seeks to address the following research questions: 
1. What are the antecedents of relational capabilities in cross-cultural alliance 
projects? 
2. What is the role of relational capabilities in strategic alliance management to 
achieve alliance performance in cross-cultural alliance projects? 
In this study, the researcher examines trust and relational capabilities by adopting Dyer 
and Kale (2007) approach to buyer-supplier alliances of MNE subsidiaries and the 
context is MNEs in the Thai manufacturing sector, because social capital has been widely 
elicited as being a success factor of doing business in Asia at both the organizational and 
personal levels (Kasuga et al., 2005; Kohpaiboon, 2010). Since Asian economies have 
had high investment opportunities for the last two decades (Beinhocker et al., 2009), 
MNEs of all origins increasingly need to understand relational oriented management of 
Asian business in order to gain competitive advantages in this market. Hence, it 
anticipated that the research results will help MNEs to gain valuable insights in the 
collaborative management in cross-cultural business environments. Moreover, the 
findings of this research are expected to have important implications for the design of 
alliance management strategies of the firms, especially in the cross–cultural business 
context. In sum, it is predicted that firms that dedicate time and effort to building 




context of cross-cultural alliances between MNE subsidiaries and local suppliers in the 
Thai manufacturing sector.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis  
This thesis is divided into seven chapters, the contents and composition of which are 
illustrated in Figure 1.1. In addition to this introductory chapter, the remaining ones serve 
the following purposes. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review – reviews the literature on alliances according to three 
approaches: relational capabilities, trust and TCE. More specifically, extensive literature 
on supply chain management, alliance projects between MNE subsidiaries and local 
suppliers in the Thai manufacturing sector is discussed in this chapter. The chapter ends 
with consideration of the key themes and issues, which need to be taken into account in 
devising and operationalising the theoretical framework.  
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework – a number of hypotheses are proposed based on the 
antecedents and barriers of relational capabilities. These hypotheses are developed 
through detailed discussion of the potential mediation effects of relational capabilities on 
the relationship between inter-organizational factors, namely the relational and economic 
dimensions, and their impact on alliance performance.  
Chapter 4: Research Methodology – discusses the research philosophy and methods used 
to address the research questions and objectives. The chapter provides explanation and 
justification regarding the selected research strategy and design. Furthermore, the data 
collection techniques are shown to be appropriate for addressing the research questions. 
Finally, the operational measures of the dependent, independent and control variables are 
presented. 
Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis – presents the statistical analysis of the data collected 
during the research process. The chapter discusses the techniques used for preliminary 
data preparation as well as the confirmatory factor analysis and bivariate correlation that 
are also employed to test the research hypotheses. Subsequently, the findings of the 
mediation analysis are presented and discussed.  
Chapter 6: Discussion – interprets the results obtained during the data analysis phase. In 




settings is assessed. In addition the effect of the control variables on the results obtained 
is discussed.  
Chapter 7: Conclusion and Reflection - presents the theoretical and practical 
contributions of this research. Finally, the research limitations are considered and 
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2.1 Introduction  
An alliance is a strategy of acquiring resources and capabilities from business partners in 
order to increase competitiveness and share the risk of the investment (Helfat et al., 2007). 
However, there is rich evidence of the failure of alliances. A recent study by McKinsey 
& Company found that only half of all strategic alliances yield returns above the cost of 
the capital input (Kaplan et al., 2010). Hence, strategic management scholars have studied 
the theories that can explain and predict the phenomenon together with the managerial 
implications for business. The relational view is another perspective in the strategic 
alliance literature, which was introduced by Dyer (Dyer, 1996; Dyer, 1997; Dyer and 
Singh, 1998) and suggests that firms apply this in order to manage inter-organizational 
coordination and achieve success. In the last two decades here has been a substantial 
increase in research devoted to understanding strategic alliances, however, there are few 
studies specifying conditions that are appropriate for alliance managers to apply a 
relational approach in inter-organizational management.  
This chapter reviews the literature on strategic alliance management and the related 
empirical evidence, which are then drawn upon to develop the theoretical framework and 
hypothesis of the current study. In particular it discusses the differences between early 
alliance research, which was mainly concerned with the role of multi-levels of trust and 
transaction cost, and the more recent alliance research that has been concerned with 
relational capabilities. The remainder of this chapter discusses the theories underlying 
this study as well as the gaps in the literature, which the theoretical framework drawn up 
for this research aims to address. This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 
discusses the strategic alliance literature, whilst Section 2.3 probes the theoretical 
perspectives and presents the relational capabilities in strategic alliances. Section 2.4 
describes empirical studies based on the supply chain management literature and Section 
2.5 discusses unit of analysis, namely, strategic alliances at the project level. Section 2.6 
discusses research setting, namely, the Thai manufacturing sector and finally, Section 2.7 




2.2 Strategic alliance literature 
In the last two decades scholars have studied strategic alliances regarding corporations 
around the world who have applied this strategy in the expectation of creating value 
(Inkpen, 2009). This section explains the strategic alliance motivations and related 
theories, the alliance management process as well as the gaps in the literature.   
2.2.1 The strategic alliance definitions 
There are several of strategic alliances definitions from previous studies. From the 
organizational perspective, they are collaborative organizational arrangements that 
involve the use of resources and/or governance structures by more than one existing 
organization (Inkpen, 2009). That is, a strategic alliance between two or more 
independent firms pertains to the exchange, sharing, or co-development of resources or 
capabilities to achieve mutually relevant benefits (Gulati, 1995) and to gain competitive 
advantage (Hitt el al., 2005; Culpan, 2009; Schreiner, Kale and Corsten, 2009). There are 
three developmental stages of such an alliance (Kale and Singh, 2009) and researchers 
have devised different theories to explain each of these stages as will become apparent in 
this literature review. In the formation stage, there is the selection of an appropriate 
partner and negotiation of terms and conditions of the agreement. During the operation 
stage, the firm and the partner have to implement all the agreements regarding the alliance 
using the governance mechanisms to monitor and control the on-going process. Any party 
that is not satisfied with the alliance may terminate the agreement at this stage. In the last 
stage, the alliance outcome becomes tangible and can be evaluated at both the firm and 
dyadic levels (Dyer et al., 2001).  
2.2.2 Alliance mode choices 
Strategic alliances are unlike simple buy-sell arrangements, for they involve short-term 
mutual dependence, shared managerial control, and/or continuing contributions of 
technology and products (Monczka, Petersen, Handfield, and Ragatz, 1998). That is, 
although the partners remain independent entities, they possess the feature of mutual 
interdependence, which involves some form of sharing control and management (Inkpen, 
2009). In general, there are two broad types of strategic alliance formation: equity-based 




extremely high level of inter-organizational interaction, while the second, which remains 
simply contractual for such matter as technical training of buyers involves much lower 
levels of cooperation (Inkpen 2009). In addition, alliances can be specified in sub-forms, 
including joint ventures, R&D partnerships, affiliation in research consortia, franchising, 
contractual agreements, management/marketing service agreements, know-how licensing 
contracts and technical training (Culpan, 2009).The different possible domains of inter-
firm linkages are shown in Figure 2.1 (Kale and Singh, 2009), with the potential range 
for strategic alliances spanning non-traditional contracts, equity arrangements with no 
new entity created, and non-subsidiary joint ventures.  
Figure 2.1 Scope of Inter-firm relationships 
 
Source: Kale and Singh (2009) 
This research focuses on buyer-supplier strategic alliance projects, which refers to an 
agreement between the two organizations to cooperate in either equity or non-equity 
forms. This buyer-supplier relationship is a process, whereby the two organizations form 
strong and extensive social, economic, service, and technical ties over time, with the 
intent of lowering total costs and/or increasing value, thereby achieving mutual gains 
(Cravens et al., 1993). In this research, the researcher adopts the strategic alliance 
definition from previous research (Gulati, 1998; Luo, 2000; Ireland et al., 2002; Lavie, 




the buyer and supplier that involves the exchange or sharing resources or engaging in the 
co-development of supply chain activities and technologies.  
2.3 Theoretical perspectives 
To date, scholars have based their theoretical and empirical explanations of strategic 
alliance motivations or factors driving the alliance formation on three main strategic 
management theories: transaction cost economics (TCE), the resource based view (RBV) 
and social exchange theory (Inkpen, 2009). Relational capabilities is another approach 
that focuses on the firm’s routine modification as a source of relational rents in strategic 
alliances (Dyer and Kale, 2007). This review considers these three main theoretical 
perspectives from the point of view alliance success and hence, what they can contribute 
to the relational capabilities approach.  
2.3.1 Relational capabilities approach 
As mentioned earlier, the relational capabilities approach has been developed from 
several theoretical perspectives. That is, Dyer and Kale (2007) integrated the concepts of 
RBV, dynamic capabilities, the capabilities approach (Nelson and Winter, 1982) and the 
relational view (Dyer and Singh, 1998) to form the perspective of relational capabilities 
in strategic alliances. Hence, it is essential to probe the roots of the relational capabilities 
approach before including other theoretical positions have contributions to make to this 
more recent theory. 
1) Resource based view (RBV) 
The resource-based view of the firm (RBV) emphasizes its idiosyncratic resources (e.g. 
Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959), especially those that reside within organizations. Most 
conspicuous among these resources are those that are valuable, scarce, imperfectly 
tradable, and hard to imitate (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Reed and DeFllippi, 1990). 
With this view, firms are characterised by their tendency to accumulate surplus resources, 
physical, human and organisational. In other words, under RBV the firm is regarded as a 
bundle of resources and their attributes significantly affect its competitive advantage and, 
by implication, its performance (Barney, 1986, 1991; Penrose, 1959; Peteraf, 1993). 




performing a certain task, can act as an important bargaining tool when undertaking inter-
firm collaboration (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  
The primary benefit of an alliance with the RBV stance is access to previously 
unavailable resources and the joint development of new resources (Ireland, 2002). A 
resource bundle might include, for example, the integration of cutting edge technological 
resources held by one partner with another firm’s complementary resources like access 
to and knowledge of specific markets (Stuart, 2000). That is, under this lens the firm is 
viewed as a bundle of resources and capabilities that can be utilized to realize sustainable 
economic rents. Economic rents, in this setting, derive from asymmetry in initial resource 
endowments, resource scarcity, limited transferability of resources, imperfect 
substitutability, and appropriability (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). Moreover, resources 
are converted into final products or services by using a wide range of other firm assets 
and bonding mechanisms, such as technology, management information systems, 
incentive systems, trust between management and labour (Lee, Lee & Pennings, 2001).  
2) Routines and capabilities 
Routines and capabilities have emerged as central constructs in a host of ﬁelds in 
management research. For example, they have played a prominent role in the analysis of 
organizational and competitive heterogeneity. According to Winter (2000), an 
organizational capability is ‘a high level routine (or collection of routines) that, together 
with its implementing input ﬂows, confers upon an organization’s management a set of 
decision options for producing signiﬁcant outputs of a particular type’. This deﬁnition 
casts learning, experience, resources, and routines as inputs to capabilities. For example, 
routines can also be capabilities, whereas inputs, such as experiences and resources may 
contribute to capabilities, which are associated with putting resources (and other inputs) 
into action (Dosi et al., 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Winter, 2003; Felin et al., 
2012).  
Unlike resources, routines and capabilities are based on developing, carrying, and 
exchanging information through the firm's human capital.  Capabilities, in contrast to 
resources, refer to a firm's capacity to deploy these, usually in combination, using 
organizational processes, to affect a desired outcome (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). As 




provide enhanced productivity of its resources, as well as strategic flexibility and 
protection for its final product or service. Teece et al. (1997) propose similar distinctions 
between resources and capabilities, arguing that sustainable competitive advantage 
involves not only what assets a firm owns, but also how the firm integrates and transforms 
these through appropriate capabilities, since they are difficult to acquire and imitate.  
Thus, capabilities are different from resources as they enable firms to create economic 
rent more effectively than rivals by enhancing the productivity of their resources. 
Moreover, organizational abilities tend to absorb, integrate, and transform internal and 
external resources into sustainable competitive advantages that, in turn, drive superior 
performance (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Sirmon et al., 2007; Lu et al., 2010). 
There are inconsistent definitions of organizational capabilities among scholars. For 
instance, Foss (1996) conceptualises higher-order capabilities as non-proprietary and 
intangible assets that are shared among a group of firms, and may yield rents to 
incumbents even in the absence of explicit coordination. Examples of such higher-order 
capabilities may include, for example, standards, knowledge-sharing in R&D networks, 
collective invention, and shared behavioural norms. Kogut and Zander (1992) introduced 
the notion of competitive capabilities, which refers to the set of organizing processes and 
principles a firm uses to deploy its resources to achieve strategic objectives. That is, by 
shaping the ways in which knowledge, skill, and expertise are coordinated and 
communicated within a firm, capabilities fundamentally determine what the firm can do 
(Zander and Kogut, 1995). Another identified form of capability, dynamic capability, 
involves the ‘capacity of an organization to purposefully create, extend or modify’ its 
products or service offerings, the processes for generating and/or delivering these, and/or 
its customer markets (Helfat et al., 2007; Winter, 2003), as is explained in more detail 
next. 
3) Dynamic capabilities (DC) 
Dynamic capabilities refer to the (inimitable) capacity firms possess for shaping, 
reshaping, configuring and reconfiguring their asset base so as to respond to changing 
technologies and markets (Augier and Teece, 2007). They can usefully be thought of as 
belonging to three clusters of activities: sensing, seizing and transforming (Teece, 1997; 




technologies change, although some will be stronger than others in performing these tasks 
(Hetfat et al., 2007; Augier and Teece, 2009). Sensing is an inherently entrepreneurial set 
of capabilities that involve exploring technological and market opportunities, and 
listening to customers, along with scanning the other elements of the business 
environment. Seizing capabilities includes designing business models to satisfy 
customers and capture value. They also refer to securing access to capital and the 
necessary human resources. Transforming capabilities are needed most obviously when 
radical new opportunities are to be addressed. These capabilities aim to maintain 
competitiveness through enhancing, combining, protecting, and, when necessary, 
reconﬁguring the business enterprise’s intangible and tangible assets (Teece, 1997; 
Teece, 2007). However, the empirical work in this area is novel and requires further 
exploration to measure those capabilities that are still somewhat ambiguous (Newbert, 
2007; Culpan, 2009). The generalization or context specifics of dynamic capabilities also 
need to be proved by strategy scholars (Ambrosini and Bowman, 2009). In recent years, 
the strategic alliance is another business context where scholars have adopted a dynamic 
capabilities approach as an explanation. Regarding this, as firms have become 
increasingly reliant on external growth mechanisms, alliance capabilities are more needed 
to create the conditions for long term success. Moreover, a firm will benefit from 
acquiring heterogeneous resources at the multinational level in the form of a large stock 
of new ones, market understanding, supplier relationship and government ties (Helfat et 
al., 2007).  
Researchers have devoted a lot of attention to the study of alliance management 
capabilities and understanding how firms benefit from them (Schreiner et al., 2009). 
These capabilities are embedded in organizational routines, which are repetitive activities 
that a firm develops in order to deploy its resources in alliances (Heimeriks and Duysters, 
2007). There are two aspects of alliance management capability that when aligned 
correctly can capture value from strategic alliances: intra-organizational and inter-
organizational. First, in order to achieve alliance goals at the firm level, firms need to 
dedicate the organizational routines as an alliance function (Ireland et al., 2002). That is, 
a mandate for an internal dedicated alliance management function refers to coordinating 
all alliance–related activities within the organization, i.e. its processes and teaching 




throughout the company (Dyer et al., 2001; Kale and Singh, 2009). Second, the firm must 
also dedicate an alliance function to manage coordination between partners. Much of the 
alliance research from this perspective is concerned with how to manage the collaborative 
process and maximize value creation (Inkpen, 2009). Regarding which, it is held that 
effective inter-organizational alliance management requires integration of partners’ 
cultures and the skills of the human capital involved within the alliance (Ireland et al., 
2002).  
The intra-organizational management literature focuses on RBV and DC to increase the 
level of resources and capabilities of the firms themselves by enhancing absorptive 
capacity and utilizing acquired know-how, whereas that pertaining to the inter-
organizational emphasizes the relational view aimed at finding a solution that works 
effectively with alliance partners. This research is aimed at extending the second stream 
of research on the relational view by focusing on relational capabilities of firms in inter-
organizational management. Hence, the following section contains a literature review on 
the relational view and relational capabilities in strategic alliances in order to understand 
these concepts in more depth as well as to identify the gaps in the extant works.  
4) Alliance management capabilities approach 
The alliance management capabilities approach draws upon the RBV concept of 
organizational routines and capabilities to explain strategic alliance management. Under 
this lens, the ability to manage effectively inter-firm alliances is considered a source of 
competitive advantage to firms (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002), which in 
other work is broadly referred to as alliance capability (Anand and Khanna, 2000). If the 
capability to manage alliances is heterogeneously distributed across firms and difficult to 
imitate, then a firm’s alliance management capability has the potential to create a firm-
level competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Ireland et al., 2002). 
Alliance management is a critical strategic domain that allows the organization to alter 
its resource base. However, the management of alliances is a difficult organizational 
activity due to the complexities and uncertainties inherent in managing projects across 
organizational boundaries. It is not surprising, therefore, that most alliances fail or do not 
live up to expectations (Kogut, 1989). Yet, the ability to manage alliances effectively has 




build and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments in order to create innovative forms of competitive advantage (Teece et al., 
1997). How to achieve superior alliance management and thus contribute to firm-level 
competitive advantage has become a key concern for strategic scholars in recent years 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998; Ireland et al., 2002). Expanding on the core ideas in evolutionary 
economics, Zollo (1998) and Kale and Singh (1999) argue that firm capabilities are 
developed on the basis of incremental learning and fine-tuning of relevant day-to-day 
activities in the firm. Other researchers have suggested that organizational capabilities 
can also be developed by replacing or supplementing such incremental learning by 
higher-order learning activities or establishing clear principles through which individual 
and group knowledge is structured and coordinated within the firm.  
Researchers have contrasting views on the definitions of alliance management 
capabilities. Rothaermel & Deeds (2006), for example, define them as a firm’s ability to 
manage multiple alliances effectively. Whilst Schileke and Goerzen (2010) developed 
alliance management capability as a second-order construct to capture the degree to 
which organizations possess relevant management routines that can enable them to 
manage effectively their portfolio of strategic alliances. More specifically, they 
conceptualize alliance management capability as a second-order construct pertaining to 
the organizational routines of inter-organizational coordination, alliance portfolio 
coordination, inter-organizational learning, alliance proactiveness, and alliance 
transformation. Similarly, according to Makadok (2001) and Thomke and Kuemmerle 
(2002), an alliance capability is a higher-order resource, which is difficult to obtain or 
imitate and has the potential to enhance the performance of the firm’s alliance portfolio. 
Some authors propose the integrative concept of “cooperative competency”, which 
depends on the degree of trust, communication and coordination of a specific relationship 
among different organisational units (Sivadas and Dwyer, 2000). Earlier researchers refer 
to these organizing principles as the firm's 'combinative capabilities' (Zander and Kogut, 
1995) or 'architectural competence' (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). Essentially, they 
comprise organizational processes that are used to integrate and coordinate knowledge 
and activities across various people and subunits within the firm. These integrative 
mechanisms act as an important locus of firm learning, by enabling generation and 




parts of the firm (Pisano, 1994). Schreiner, Kale and Corsten (2009) suggested that (1) 
this essentially involves the knowledge/skills to address key issues that arise in managing 
any individual inter-firm collaboration after it has been set up, (2) they get reflected at 
the level of a particular alliance in a firm, and (3) they are mainly embodied in the 
practices and behaviours of individuals that are involved in managing that alliance on an 
on-going basis. Alliance management capabilities can be considered as firms’ internal 
capabilities which point to skills for the transformation of inputs into outputs, while 
corporate social capital pertains to the availability of channels for securing inputs and 
disposing of outputs as well as to the possibility of identifying and developing more 
rewarding opportunities (Burt, 1992; Pennings et al., 1998). Hence, internal capabilities 
help firms to accumulate social capital, as potential partners are more willing to 
collaborate with the firms having a higher level of internal capabilities (Lee, Lee, 
Pennings, 2001). 
5) Relational view  
The relational management approach was first identified in strategic alliances between 
organizations in the automotive industry. That is, the research of the collaboration 
between world-class automakers and their first-tier suppliers, conducted by J.H. Dyer and 
colleagues in 1990s, led to the development of relational view theoretical stance. From 
these studies, Dyer and Singh (1998) introduced the relational view concept, which 
focuses on the importance of the (dis)advantage of inter-firm alliance and the network of 
relationships in which the firm is embedded. The relational view places a premium on 
transaction cost factors and behavioural phenomena; including asset specificity, effective 
governance, complementary resource endowments and knowledge sharing routines as the 
drivers of relational rents (Dyer and Singh, 1998). This four foundations of this view are 
as follows:  
5.1) Relation-specific assets 
A firm often invests in firm relationship asset specificity in order to enhance its 
uniqueness and competitive advantage (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993). The specialization 
of assets is a necessary condition for rent, and strategic assets by their very nature are 
specialized (Dyer, 1996). The terms relationship-specific asset refers to those of a partner 




1996; Li et al., 2010). Such customization would create some barriers to imitation by 
competitors and would be aimed at transferring associated knowledge to partners (Helfat 
et al., 2007). There are four types of asset specificity: (1) site specificity (2) physical asset 
specificity (3) dedicated asset and (4) human asset specificity (Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Simonin, 1999).  
5.2) Inter-organizational knowledge sharing routines 
Knowledge sharing routines are a very important source of new ideas to a firm alliance 
with strategic partners. The firm’s knowledge base in a business context includes 
technological competences, knowledge of customer need and supplier capabilities 
(Teece, 1998). An organization either creates information and knowledge or acquires it 
from various internal and external sources. Moreover, firms can derive significant 
benefits from consciously, proactively, and aggressively managing their explicit and 
implicit knowledge. Knowledge sharing is defined as partner specific absorptive capacity 
and is an incentive to encourage transparency as well as discouraging free riding (Dyer 
and Singh, 1998). 
5.3) Complementary resource endowments 
Complementary resources are viewed as a driver of strategic partnerships and in 
particular, firms search for partners having specialized resources that are not readily 
available from others.  Complementary capabilities imply the possibility of synergy when 
their resources are pooled together, thereby enhancing the likelihood of alliance 
formation (Chung at al., 2000). Firms frequently search for partners with resources they 
lack and thus, their resource profile plays an important role in any alliance formation.  
5.4) Effective governance 
Effective governance plays a key role in the creation of the effectiveness in the 
collaboration cycle because it is the way to monitor and manage an ongoing collaboration 
(Simonin, 1997). Well designed and well enforced alliance governance systems provide 
the legally or institutionally bound framework guiding the course of the cooperation. In 
general, there are two classes of governance used by alliance partners: third–party 
enforcement of agreements (e.g. legal contracts) and self-enforcing agreements (Dyer and 




The relational view of strategic alliance management provides better understanding than 
the earlier theories of how relational competencies enable firms to gain and sustain 
collaborative advantage. This, however, neglects the fact that the firm is also influenced 
by a rapidly changing environment. In other words, this approach cannot capture the 
dynamics of partners’ behaviour and interaction over the course of their alliance (Lavie, 
Haunschild and Khanna, 2012). Thus, strategic scholars have integrated the dynamic 
capabilities approach with a relational view to focus on associated organizational process 
that can enable firms to access the resources and capabilities of others through strategic 
alliances, namely, a relational capabilities approach. Furthermore, while the relational 
view has been theorized as pertaining to the key features of the inter-organizational ties 
that facilitate the acquisition of competitive capabilities, this researcher posits that these 
mechanisms provide an incomplete explanation, because they do not fully address the 
partially tacit nature of the knowledge that underlies competitive capabilities.  
6) Relational capabilities approach 
Relational capabilities is found to correlate well with ongoing alliance management and 
take the form of superior screening functions, better integration and improved 
evolutionary fitness, thus leading to higher alliance performance. Scholars have 
introduced the concepts of “relational capability” (Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999; 
Capaldo, 2007; Kale and Singh, 2007), “alliance capability” (Kale, Dyer & Singh, 2002: 
Heimeriks, 2004; Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007) and “alliance competency” (Zajac, 
1998) as the internal attributes of a firm shaping the performance of joint activities with 
external partners. They define relational capabilities by emphasizing the characteristics 
of organizational routines and capabilities as adopted from RBV theory. Consequently, 
the common definition of relational capabilities is the ability and routines of a firm to 
manage cooperative activity between organizations. That is, a firm’s relational 
capabilities are embedded in organizational routines, which are repetitive activities that a 
firm develops in order to deploy its resources in alliances (Helfat and Peteraf, 2003; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 2003; Heimeriks and Duysters (2007). 
Dyer and Kale (2007) have extended the relational view by adopting a dynamic 
capabilities approach. They noted that relational capabilities are a precondition for firms 




(2000) definition of dynamic capabilities and consistent with Helfat et al. (2007), 
relational capabilities can be considered a type of dynamic capability with the capacity 
to create, extend, or modify purposefully the firm’s resource base, which is then 
augmented to include the resources of its alliance partners. Consistent with the work of 
previous authors (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006; Zollo & 
Winter, 2002), in this study it is contended that relational capabilities is a distinct form 
of dynamic capability. From this perspective, these mechanisms are related to the alliance 
management process and are structured into three main elements: complementary 
capability, inter-firm knowledge sharing routines and effective governance (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; Dyer and Kale, 2007). A firm’s high degree of complementary resources 
and capabilities with its alliance partners will bring more benefit to its performance in a 
dynamic environment. That is, these both contribute to ongoing alliance performance by 
stimulating higher quality and more novel inventions (Lin et al., 2009).  
Although complementary to the relational view, this view differs somewhat in terms of 
the firm’s strategic behaviours and actions. For, whilst the relational view emphasizes 
resources and capabilities that a firm dedicates to achieve relational rents within a static 
picture, relational capabilities imply to a set of specific organizational routines that 
represent a firm’s capacity to utilize resources and capabilities from the collaboration 
with business partners. Since the relational capabilities approach was obtained from the 
relational view and the dynamic capabilities framework, in embodies similar 
characteristics as both these perspectives. Specifically, these capabilities emphasize the 
importance of coordination, learning, and reconfiguration routines. Regarding which, 
coordination routines are aimed at allocating resources, assigning tasks, and 
synchronizing activities, whilst learning routines pertain to the process of generating new 
knowledge and building new thinking. The relational capabilities approach advances the 
relational view in that it refers to the tangible routines and mechanisms at the operational 
level rather than the strategic aspect at the managerial level.  
According to Dyer and Kale (2007), the four drivers of alliance success are similar to 
those of the relational view, but these scholars have incorporated RBV and a dynamic 
capabilities approach to develop the traditional perspective. That is, the four foundations 
of relational capabilities include, asset specificity, knowledge sharing routines, 




of strategic alliances is sharing resources and capabilities between alliance partners, the 
relational capabilities approach suggests that firms need to integrate these four 
foundations in order to achieve successful outcomes. That is, firms have to customize 
their associated resources and capabilities so as to manage alliance activities effectively. 
In terms of physical resources, firms have to invest in intangible and tangible asset 
specificity to facilitate alliance projects. Regarding intangible resources and capabilities, 
firms need to dedicate their routines to facilitate alliance projects, i.e. they need to exploit 
their complementary capability, knowledge sharing routines and effective governance 
mechanisms.  
6.1) Asset specificity 
With the traditional view, asset specificity was regarded as property-based investment. 
However, recently, scholars have included intangible assets as one form of specificity in 
strategic alliances. Regarding which, Subramani and Venkatraman (2003) classified it 
into three types of inter-organizational relationships: business process specificity (the 
degree to which the critical business processes of one firm are specific to the requirements 
of the other), domain knowledge specificity (an organization's ability to access and 
deploy a specific body of prior knowledge) and physical asset specificity (the specific 
investments in the form of tangible assets such as plant and machinery and in location 
choices that are advantageous in working with a specific business partner). 
Relationship specific assets also are distinguished into knowledge-based and property-
based assets (Das and Teng, 2000; Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009). Knowledge-based ones 
are a firm’s intangible know-how and skills, whereas property-based assets are legal 
properties owned by firms including physical resources (e.g. buildings, infrastructure), 
financial capital, capital investments in customized machinery, tool dies, operating and 
procedure system, etc (Heide and John, 1990; Dyer and Chu, 2003).  
6.2) Knowledge sharing routines 
Under the RBV and dynamic capabilities perspective, the acquisition of collective 
production know-how is defined as the implementation of a broader set of capabilities 
involving far-reaching organizational and technological adaptations inherent in advanced 




technique). In these circumstances, the firm can learn at a faster rate than competitors and 
also has a positive relationship with firm-level alliance success (Kale and Singh, 2007; 
Paulraj et al., 2008).  
6.3) Complementary capability 
Complementary capability refers to that of being able to identify and evaluate potential 
complementarities in other firms, and thus how to benefit from such strategic resources 
(Dyer and Kale, 2007). In order to utilize the complementary resources from strategic 
partners, firms need to have an ongoing activity of screening for alliance partners by 
dedicating resources specifically to this end (ibid).That is, strategic alliances provide 
opportunities for strategic renewal, if firms are able to verify those potential alliance 
partners with capabilities that differ markedly from its existing skills (Heide and John, 
1990; Makri et al., 2010). By pooling and exchanging their resources and capabilities 
with those of other companies, firms can initiate projects that they could not have 
successfully completed alone and hence, add value to each other (Sarkar et al., 2001; Das 
and Teng, 2003; Bjorkman et al., 2007).  
6.4) Effective governance mechanisms 
Effective governance mechanisms refers to the capacity of the firm to assign an 
appropriate mix of formal and informal safeguards to govern the partnering relationship 
(Dyer and Kale, 2007). According to Luo (2008), there are two key templates of alliance 
governance: (1) stipulated contractual codifications and (2) formalized and routinized 
control principles, procedures, rules, norms, practices and policies. Examples involving 
both include establishing teams, task forces, and committees, direct managerial contact 
through trips, meetings, the transfer of managers, mechanism for shared decision making 
and formal systems for conflict resolution that rely on two-way communication and joint 
problem solving (Hoetker and Mellwigt, 2009).  
Like other approaches, the relational capabilities concept has some limitations and hence 
needs to be developed further. Previous studies (e.g. Kale et al., 2000; Heimeriks, 2004) 
have suggested that the firm’s resource-based factors, such as alliance experiences and 
alliance functions, are sources of relational capabilities in strategic alliances. Therefore, 




capabilities that have as yet not been identified. Moreover, the extant research has 
examined the role of economic and relational dimensions in strategic alliance 
management. Regarding which, economists tend to focus on using asset specificity to 
facilitate exchange by preventing opportunism (Shelanski and Klein, 1995), while with 
the relational view the concentration is on trust and resources as well as the capabilities 
to promote collaborative exchanges in dyadic relationships. Few studies, however, have 
effectively integrated these two dimensions on relational capabilities building. That is, in 
this researcher’s view taking account of both the economic and relational dimensions will 
promote inter-dependence and commitment to positive outcomes of the alliances, because 
they work together to enhance relational capabilities. In addition, previous research has 
shown than there is tremendous uncertainty surrounding strategic alliances (Zaheer, et 
al., 1998) and according to the transaction cost perspective, cultural distance is a key 
concern regarding cross-cultural collaboration. In relation to this, Brouthers and 
Brouthers (2000) have argued that cultural context includes investment risks associated 
with different host countries’ institutional systems, as well as market attractiveness. In 
general, uncertainty from cultural differences between alliance partners can be a barrier 
to relational capabilities in strategic alliances. This study involves extending the relational 
capabilities conceptual framework found in the literature in relation strategic alliances by 
investigating the first research question: What are the antecedents of relational 
capabilities in cross-cultural alliance projects? In particular, it is proposed that inter-
organizational trust, interpersonal trust, asset specificity and HR distance are antecedents 
of capabilities.  
Regarding the second research question, previous empirical studies adopting a relational 
capabilities approach have provided inconsistent findings regarding the interaction 
among relational variables as well as there being a lack of a concordant view on the nature 
of relational capabilities. As a result how these alliances interact is still a matter of 
contestation. Under Dyer and Kale’s (2007) deﬁnition of relational capabilities, a firm is 
likely to implement complementary competencies, specialized investments, knowledge 
exchange processes, and various governance modes to create alliance advantages. 
However, these authors do not specify how these factors interrelate to build these 
advantages. For example, Lu et al. (2010) found the relationship between relational 




Paulraj et al. (2008) argued that communication capability is a mediator of the link 
between a firm’s resources and capabilities (i.e. asset specificity, complementary 
capability and network governance) and buyer-supplier performance. However, it is 
contended here that the chosen relational variables from previous studies were incomplete 
as they did not analyze the effect of relationship capabilities on relational rents, 
simultaneously. Therefore, additional studies are required to investigate the effect of a 
full set of relational capabilities parameters on relational rents.  
Additional variables need to be taken into account when adopting a relational approach 
including trust, similarity between partners, social capital and embeddedness, IT and 
communication, network governance and conflict management, etc. (Saxton, 1997; Kale 
et al., 2000; Paularj et al., 2008) In this research, the aim is investigate to of the 
aforementioned aspects of relational capabilities, namely trust and asset specificity to 
probe the second research question: What is the role of relational capabilities in strategic 
alliance management to achieve alliance performance in cross-cultural alliance 
projects? Regarding relational matters, as conﬁdence in a partner’s goodwill increases, 
there is closer cooperation, a more open information exchange, and a deeper commitment 
between the partners (Lui & Ngo, 2004). That is, trust is likely to promote positive 
attitudes regarding the facilitation of communication and the sharing of information. 
From the economic point of view, asset specificity helps to ensure an alliance is ongoing. 
This researcher posits that firms that have higher relational and economic constraints need 
to be able to apply relational capabilities to manage strategic alliance projects. This is 
because, they have an indirect effect on alliance performance through the mediating 
effects of relational capabilities and hence, they perform better than others in strategic 
alliances. Next, the literature pertaining to trust and asset specificity is reviewed. 
  2.3.2 The concept of trust 
The concept of social capital was originally used in community studies to describe 
relational resources embedded within personal ties in the community and it since been 
applied in a wide range of intra- and inter-organization studies (Yli-Renko et al., 2001). 
There are three dimensions of social capital theory: cognitive, structural and relational 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). The cognitive dimension refers to the resources providing 




structural dimension pertains to the structural configuration, diversity, centrality and 
boundary-spanning roles of network participants. Finally, the relational dimension refers 
to the personal relationships people have developed with each other through a history of 
interactions and thus leading to relations of trust, obligation and reciprocity (e.g. the 
relationship established through previous interaction). In this study, the relational 
dimension in social capital theory, namely trust, will be highlighted as the factor that 
influences relational capabilities in strategic alliances.    
To be more precise, the concept of trust is a particularly important aspect of relational 
quality in alliances, because it increases transparency, lowers transaction cost, facilitates 
disputed resolutions and lowers investment risk (Das and Teng, 1998). Like in personal 
relationships, business partners need to build inter-organizational trust in their networks 
in order to reduce uncertainty and transaction costs. Earlier literature defines trust as one 
party’s confidence that the other in the exchange relationship will not exploit its 
vulnerabilities (Doney et al., 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998; Dyer and Chu, 2000; Krishnan 
et al., 2006; Nielsen and Nielsen, 2009). That is, with trust, it can be expected that an 
exchange partner will not engage in opportunistic behaviour, despite there being short 
term incentives and uncertainty about long-term rewards.  
1) Trust literature in different research settings 
The definition of trust in the literature varies across different disciplines and according to 
different context (Fichman, 1997). Regarding the former,  economists tend to view trust 
as either calculative (Williamson, 1993; Sako and Helper, 1998) or institutional (North, 
1990), whereas sociologists see it terms of socially  embedded  properties  of relationships  
among  people  (Granovetter,  1985) or institutions  (Zucker,  1986). In terms of context, 
the majority of the trust literature pertains to that at the national level in the US (e.g. 
Zaheer et al., 1998), although inter-organizational trust has also been studied in the 
Netherlands (Nooteboom et al., 1997; Neilson and Nielson, 2009), Canada (Smith and 
Barclay, 1997), China (Coote et al., 2003), and the United Kingdom (Mollering, 2002). 
Some studies have had a more international research focus, however, such as Aulakh et 
al. (1996), who included firms from across Asia. Trust between trading partners may 
vary, not only in terms of the attributes of transaction, but also with the trading 




regulation, professionalization, networks and corporate culture are said to form a relevant 
set of attributes in which a bilateral relationship may be embedded (Granovetter, 1985).  
Nevertheless, as implied above, the factors that are most salient regarding trust are 
dependent on the particular context. For example, Park and Ungson (1997) argued that 
Asian firms, as result of their collectivist mentality, may believe that building in-groups 
of firms is the most effective means of reducing in–group or out-group opportunism. 
Having invested in cultivating in-group relationships, as evidenced in their alliances with 
US firms, Japanese firms may be more reluctant to dissolve joint ventures because 
Japanese firms have the sense of group identification and collective responsibility, 
loyalty, and a sense of reciprocal obligation. These goodwill attitude toward in-group 
members facilitate cooperation, attenuate opportunism, and resolve disputes between 
venture partners. Notably, Sako (1992) provides evidence that Japanese companies are 
more predisposed to trusting their trading partners than are British companies, which is 
in part due to the prevailing business norms which are determined by societal-level 
cultural values. 
Sako and Helper (1998) compare the concept of trust in Japanese and US firms, finding 
that the conceptualization was more complex for the Japanese suppliers than for the US 
citizens, and that the overall level of trust was higher in Japan. Dyer and Chu (2000) stress 
in their study that supplier trust is highly correlated with stable and consistent buyer 
processes and routines, which represent commitment towards long-term interactions. 
They also found that the absolute level of supplier trust differed by country, with Japanese 
supplier–buyer relations characterized by relatively high levels of trust compared to their 
Korean and US counterparts and they suggested that this was due to differences in the 
institutional environment.  
On the other hand, Western firms, based on their individualistic tradition, may be more 
comfortable in undertaking arm’s-length transactions with stand-alone entities, since they 
do not assume that in-group status itself safeguards against opportunism. Such an 
assumption may reduce a firm’s incentive to organize or maintain costly in-groups of 
firms (i.e. alliances), even with domestic partners (Park and Ungson, 1997). Furthermore, 
empirical comparative research between Britain and Germany has shown that trust-based 




legal, political and social institutions rather than the individual level of interaction (Lane 
and Bachmann, 1996). 
2) Process-based and institutional based trust 
Zucker (1986) introduced two types of trust, namely, process-based and institutional-
based. The former refers to that arising out of long-standing relationships, or which is 
‘characteristic-based’, that is to say, resting on common family, ethnic or religious 
characteristics, whilst the needs to be supported, in modern economies, by a form of trust 
which is rooted in stable institutions. That is, this system of trust (Lane and Bachmann, 
1995) operates when it is tied to formal, societal structures, which have an existence 
separate from the immediate material preferences, motivation and actions of individuals. 
Institutional forms, therefore, are not reducible to rational choice considerations, but play 
an independent role in structuring individual agency.  
The concepts of process based and institutional based trust are the dominant view in 
relation to the inter-firm relationships in the context of European regions, especially 
Germany and the UK. That is, in these contexts, the institutional environment looks for 
'the foundations of trust in the social order' and law is one important mechanism for 
dealing with the essential riskiness of trust, such as legal arrangements which lend special 
assurance to particular expectations, thus making them sanctionable and thereby 
lessening the risk of conferring trust (Luhmann, 1979). However, Lane and Bachmann 
(1996) carried out a comparative study of Germany and the United Kingdom and found 
that long-term relations with customers and suppliers are the rule in former, but not in the 
latter.  Moreover, German managers not only show a stronger commitment to long-term 
relationships, but are also significantly more likely to enter into long-term contracts. By 
contrast, British firms indicated that they favour short-term repeat contracts, because of 
the flexibility they provide. However, firms from both countries expressed a strong 
preference for a process-based mode of trust creation, putting particular value on the 
continuity of personal contact. Nonetheless, only in Germany is there a solid structural 
basis exist for long-established personal ties, for the British industrial order impedes the 
development of process based trust, hence reducing the chances of individual efforts in 
this direction. Moreover, such institutionalization and actual observance of legal and 




of strong intermediary organizations which aid implementation and recognition, 
particularly if members have contributed to the process of norm creation. Finally, German 
inclusive trade associations play an important role in this respect, while British 
fragmented ones have more difficulty in undertaking such tasks, although there is some 
variation between them (ibid).  
3) Contract, Competence and Goodwill trust 
Sako (1992) created a typology of trust which has three different levels: contractual trust, 
competence trust and goodwill trust. Competence trust focuses on the other party’s 
capability to do what it promises, while goodwill trust is genuinely interested in people 
or groups of the other partner's welfare and motivated to take initiatives for mutual benefit 
while eliminating unfair advantage taking (Doney and Cannon, 1997; Sako and Helpers, 
1998). Sako describes it as the partners' willingness to take initiatives (or exercise 
discretion), to exploit new opportunities over and above what was explicitly promised. 
The important point is that while the roles of contractual and competence trust are 
specified within existing technical and contractual relationships between trading partners, 
the role of goodwill trust extends beyond existing relations and includes the transfer of 
new ideas and new technology. Thus, while contractual and competence trust mainly 
benefit operational efficiency, goodwill trust also contributes to the dynamic efficiency 
of productive systems (Burchell and Wilkinson, 1997).  
Contractual trust and competence trust have been studied in the European context. For 
example, Burchell and Wilkinson (1997) studied these in relation to Germany, Italy and 
the UK. They elicited that trust was seen as being able to depend on other firms to be 
honest, reliable, open, fair, cooperative and to keep their word whether given 
contractually or otherwise. In addition, in the process of building and maintaining trust 
the respondents identified the importance of establishing or investigating reputation, 
experience of performance, personal contacts and long-term relationships. In Italy, the 
belief that one's word is one's bond, supported by the convention within business 
communities that the failure to live up to these expectations brings to an end business 
relationships, provides the context in which business relationships are generated based 
on trust. In Germany, contracting is strengthened by, among other things, the statutory 




issued by the Trade Associations (Lane and Bachmann, 1995), which forms the 
framework in which long-term trusting relationships between trading partners develop. 
In this environment, any firm will respond to a risk of breakdown of trust by looking for 
greater contractual protection. By contrast , in Britain, where inter-firm relations are 
embedded neither in a business culture with strong beliefs in fair trading nor in strong 
legal and institutional regulation, trust generation and maintenance depends more 
exclusively on individual relationships developed over a long period.  
Obligational collaborations in the context of Germany and United Kingdom, based on 
goodwill trust, are relatively rare (Lane and Bachmann, 1996). In contrast, some studies 
have suggested that goodwill trust is critical for long-term commitment and sustainable 
partnership in the Asian context. Chua et al. (2008) argued that trust lies at the heart of 
successful long-term intercultural business relationships. They found that affective trust 
(or goodwill trust), generated from feelings of emotional closeness, empathy and rapport, 
is important for capturing the confidence of Chinese executives. One salutary lesson 
regarding this was reported by Chua (2012) from an interview with an American 
executive of an engineering consulting company in China who had embarked upon trust 
building with a Chinese counterpart. Realizing the importance of trust in the Chinese 
business environment, he focused on building competence trust by developing the 
technical capability, but did not nurture goodwill trust, viewing it as too complex and 
time consuming to develop. As a result, conflict developed owing to different working 
styles, and finally their business contract was terminated. Given this outcome, this 
research aims to focus on goodwill trust in order to better understand the other partner's 
behaviours, at the firm and individual level, and find ways to build effective business 
relationships from a benevolent perspective.  
4) Personal trust and collective trust 
Trust at the personal level has been studied in various contexts as with that at the firm 
level. From European scholars’ perspective, inter-personal trust is based on close, long-
term relations, a sharing of goals and expectations and the suppression of short-term self-
seeking. Moreover, it is related to social networks in the sense that information sources 
are from the group of directly and indirectly (friend of a friend) known people. When 




network other than the trustee, this acquaintance acts as a go-between and becomes the 
target of trust (Nooteboom, 2002). Inter-personal trust plays an important role in inter-
firm collaborations in some European contexts. In the cases of Germany and Italy, it was 
found that the factors that influence inter-personal trust are institutional support and the 
social environment, respectively. In particular, personal relationships were found to be a 
major factor when choosing and maintaining the information and support exchange 
linkage in the context of a German electronic installation company (Welter and Kautonen, 
2005). However, the cooperation in this context emerged due to the supporting role of an 
institution in the form of the local guild (division of the Chamber of Crafts) through which 
people got to know each other. That is, collective trust supplied by the guild provided a 
platform for personal trust to emerge. One entrepreneur stated that “personal chemistry” 
and “keeping confidence” were his most important criteria when choosing these partners. 
He also added that if confidence is broken, then cooperation would cease.  
The importance of personal ties in Italian industrial districts is revealed in a study by 
Ottati (1994). He found that the shared social environment is the principal feature of such 
people who are living in one naturally and historically bounded area, whereby they tend 
to have a common culture and frequent direct face-to-face contact, which allows them to 
get to know each other and hence, build trust. In particular, it is relationships of trust 
between agents which make transactions, such as informal credit possible. In this vein, 
trust is a pre-condition for concluding transactions which are potentially profitable but 
subject to a high risk of opportunism. In particular, trust based on personal reputation 
assumes features of a true, although intangible, capital, which is both capable of 
producing future gains and fostering economic development. Also, Lazerson (1988) 
elicited that a closed network of trusted people is important for partner selection in Italian 
industrial district. He found that while firms in this context preserved the intimate work 
relation between owner and employee, they often required the selection of new partners 
to manage them; the necessity of “having someone there” as two partners of a firm 
expressed it. This strategy it is argued preserves the advantages that Italian small firms 
enjoy in terms of state support, labour-market flexibility, and organizational efficiencies.  
In addition, inter-personal trust is a success factor of doing business in Asian countries, 
especially China, where personal ties or “guanxi” is necessary in business exchange. 




the West. First, the Chinese concept can be distinguished from personal relationships in 
the West by its focus on reciprocation of favours in an unequal sense (Yi & Ellis, 2000), 
whereby one person gives a favour and the other person must repay it, but increase the 
value of that received in the process. Second, Chinese guanxi always involves the 
cultivation of long-term personal relationships through rituals, such as gift-giving and 
wining-and-dining, for the purpose of obtaining some goods and services (Yang, 1994), 
while personal networking in the West does not necessarily involve these forms of 
exchange. Third, guanxi is utilitarian rather than emotional (Luo, 1997); it is based 
entirely on the exchange of favours, not on emotional attachment (such as friendship). 
Thus, guanxi does not necessarily involve friendship. According to Hwang (1987), that 
between buyers and suppliers is typically connected by “instrumental” or “mixed” ties 
used as tools for the exchange of goods and services, and relationship maintenance (Chen, 

















Table 2.1 Different types of trust and definitions 
Authors Types of trust Definition Research 
settings 
Sako (1992), Sako 
(1998), Möllering 
(2002) 
1) Goodwill trust The expectation that a partner 





2) Competence trust The expectation that 





The willingness to depend on 
other firms to be honest, 
reliable, open, fair, cooperative 
and to keep their word whether 
given contractually or 
otherwise. 
UK 
Zaheer et al. (1998) 1) Inter-
organizational trust 
The extent of trust placed 
in the partner organization by the 
members of a focal 
organization 
US 
2) Inter-personal trust The extent 
of a boundary-spanning agent’s 
trust in her counterpart 
in the partner organization 
US 
Zucker (1986), 







The subjective belief with which 
organizational members 
collectively assess that 
favourable conditions are in 
place, which are conducive to 
transaction success. 
Germany 
2) Process-based trust The type of trust that is 
dependent on past transactions, 
repeated purchases (e.g. 
reputation), or expected future 
exchanges (e.g. gift-giving) 
UK 
Ottati (1994) Collective trust Capital in which the business 
community invests and which 
creates an environment where 





Hwang (1987), Luo 
(1997), Chua et al. 
(2008) 
Guanxi  A web of connections to secure 




Having reviewed the main dimensions of trust, the aim in this thesis is to study trust in 
strategic alliances at the inter-personal and inter-organizational levels. More specifically, 
this is to be probed in the context where there is lack of institutional support, namely, 
Asian countries, with their societies embedded in collectivism. In addition, personal 




societal arrangements illustrate that scholars need to identify the specific types of trust 
that are valued in their research settings. Thus, given the focal context, this research 
focuses on goodwill trust at the firm and personal levels in Thailand.  
5) Inter-organizational trust and interpersonal trust definitions 
Working together often involves interdependence, and people must therefore depend on 
others in various ways to achieve their personal and organizational goals (Mayer et al., 
1995). A  phenomenon  as  complex  as  trust  requires theoretical underpinning and a 
research  methodology  that  can capture its  many  facets  and  levels. In the literature, 
trust has been defined with the emphasis being placed on different aspects owing to the 
variation in the research settings. However, a widely accepted common general definition 
of trust is the willingness to take risks with the opposite parties. For instance, Rousseau 
et al. (1998) defined it as a psychological state comprising of the intention to accept 
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of other 
individuals, dyads and firms. Moreover, interpersonal and interorganizational trust 
operate quite differently within relational exchange. Thus, scholars have suggested that 
trust should be tested at different levels, because of the different characteristics and types 
of risk are involved, in particular, regarding the firm and personal levels. According to 
Nguyen et al. (2005), inter-organizational trust involves the cognitive assessment of the 
partner’s organizational capabilities, management integrity and interdependence. Inter-
personal trust, however, involves both cognitive assessments and emotional attachment 
between contact persons. Furthermore, Currall and Inkpen (2002) noted that there are 
different types of risk in joint ventures that have different impacts at the individual, group 
and firm levels. For example, there is the risk that an alliance partner lacks the skills 
necessary to achieve a mutual outcome and the risk of them opportunistically 
appropriating the firm’s knowledge. From this discussion, it becomes apparent that 
researchers need to employ a multiple level approach in order to examine trust 
corresponding to different level of unit of analysis.  
 The micro-macro links in inter-organizational relations, namely, inter-organizational 
trust and interpersonal trust, are another area of social capital theory that scholars have 
studied (Zaheer et al., 1998; Rousseau et al., 1998). However, most of the empirical 




contended by some that the measures used appy to both levels (Young-Ybarra and 
Wiersema, 1999). However, it may not be appropriate to study inter-organizational trust 
and inter-personal trust using similar measures drawn from data provided by key 
informants (Seppanen et al., 2007). Hence, it is posited here that trust should be 
conceptualized and measured differently at the inter-organizational and interpersonal 
levels in order to avoid the potential problem of misspecification, thereby enhancing the 
methodological rigour of empirical work on trust in strategic alliances (Currall and 
Inkpen, 2002).  
The definition of trust adopted for this research is the willingness of the firm to undertake 
risk and vulnerability regarding the alliance partners’ opportunistic behaviour and other 
actions. Further, the definition of inter-personal trust and inter-organizational trust 
employed draws upon that of Zaheer et al. (1998). That is, the term interpersonal trust 
refers to the extent of a buyer’s representative trust in her counterpart in the supplier 
organization, whereas inter-organizational trust is deﬁned as the extent of trust placed in 
the supplier organization by the members of another.  
2.3.3 Transaction cost economics (TCE)  
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is one of the leading theoretical perspectives in 
management and organization research (David and Han, 2004). TCE refers to 
consideration of the transaction cost involved in economic exchanges and their 
minimization. A transaction cost is defined as a cost incurred in making an economic 
exchange (Culpan, 2009) and include: search and information costs, bargaining costs, 
contract costs and governance costs (Dyer, 1997). TCE focuses on transactions (i.e. 
transfer of goods or services) and the costs incurred when completing these by one 
organizational form rather than another, from amongst: market, hybrid, hierarchy 
choices. (Williamson, 1975). Under TCE, the goal of the ﬁrm is to choose the 
organizational form that minimizes transaction costs, the key determinants of which are: 







1) Asset specificity 
Asset speciﬁcity is a key construct in inter-ﬁrm cooperation research, which Williamson 
(1985: 45) deﬁnes as the “durable investments that are undertaken in support of particular 
transactions, the opportunity cost of which investments is much lower in best alternative 
uses or by alternative users should the original transaction be prematurely terminated.” 
Alliance partners invest in speciﬁc assets for a partnership out of task needs and goodwill. 
As asset speciﬁcity is a non-redeploy commitment with little value outside a speciﬁc 
transaction, it is an important managerial decision that ultimately affects partnership 
performance. The relationship between asset specificity and partnership performance 
under the TCE optic is that the specific assets invested in a partnership increase the 
hazards of opportunism and hence transaction costs (Heide and Stump,1995; 
Parkhe,1993). Consequently, firms select an appropriate governance structure for the 
partnership so as to reduce the hazards of opportunism based on the level of asset 
specificity (David and Han, 2004). That is, partnership performance will be maximized 
when opportunistic behaviour on asset specificity is reduced (Lui, Wong, Lui, 2009).  
2) Frequency  
Low frequency transactions are likely to be organized through market interactions or with 
the help of any general governance mechanism available in the community. When parties 
interact frequently, it may be more economical to design a governance mechanism that is 
specifically adapted to the situation at hand and thus, internalization of transactions by 
the firm is only efficient for recurrent ones. For low-frequency transactions, the firm will 
prefer to bear the risk associated with opportunism and uncertainty, rather than support 
the cost of creating a new governance mechanism or expanding an existing one 
(Williamson, 1985; Aubert et al., 1996).  
3) Uncertainty  
When asset specificity is low, market governance should be preferred whatever the 
degree of uncertainty, since continuity matters little and new transaction arrangements 
can easily be arranged by both parties (Williamson, 1985). Uncertainty in TCE arises 
either when the relevant contingencies surrounding an exchange are too unpredictable to 




verified (behavioural uncertainty) (Parkhe, 1993; Geyskens, Steenkamp, Kumar, 2006). 
Moreover, TCE predicts that when there is nontrivial asset specificity and as 
environmental uncertainty increases, the hierarchy is more efficient than the market, and 
the latter is more efficient than hybrid forms of governance (Williamson 1991). 
Furthermore, Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990) and McNaughton (2002) argued that there 
are two forms of environmental uncertainty to be considered in the international 
environment: volatility (environmental uncertainty) and diversity (behavioural 
uncertainty). These authors argue that greater unpredictability in the environment 
surrounding a transaction leads to greater channel integration, whereas greater diversity 
regarding this leads to less channel integration. The findings of their studies provide some 
support for these claims, thus leading to the conlusion that the external environment in 
an international context has additional complexity that is less manageable than any that 
exists in a domestic setting (Rindfleisch and Heide 1997).  
4) Bounded rationality 
The second assumption of TCE is that decision makers are limited by bounded rationality, 
i.e. the limited capacity of the human mind that prevents decision makers from 
developing objective and rational solutions to complex problems (Simon 1957). In other 
words economic agents have limited information and hence an unpredictable future (Das 
and Teng, 2000). If bounded rationality did not exist, all economic activity could be 
eﬃciently organized by contracts. TCE not only assumes that decision makers are 
boundedly rational, but also that some people or ﬁrms in any setting will be opportunistic 
(Shervani, Frazier and Challagalla, 2007). A bounded rationality view (Simon, 1979) can 
nonetheless predict some overriding biases. Hence, Williamson's arguments are not only 
inapplicable to most decision-making situations in firms but, if so applied, are also likely 
to adversely affect their performance (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). In sum, as a 
consequence, transactional mechanisms are derived from economic rationality and 
emphasize governing relationships through monitoring and incentive-based structures 
(Liu et al., 2009). 
5) Opportunism in TCE 
In TCE theory, opportunism refers to “calculated efforts [by an exchange agent] to 




exchange party. That is, opportunism refers to the behavioural assumption that economic 
agents are primarily oriented toward their own personal interests and will disregard the 
those of their partners if they can get away with it. Therefore, appropriate governance 
mechanisms are needed to protect the alliance from these potential transaction cost factors 
(Das and Teng, 2000). Some examples of self-seeking interest behaviour, which can be 
pursued with guile (Williamson, 1985), include lying, stealing, or violating agreements 
and is of particular concern when one of the parties to the transaction has invested assets 
specific to the relationship with little or no value outside that specific transaction 
(Williamson 1991). In such instances, firms are faced with the safeguarding problem, 
whereby assets become vulnerable to exploitation and the partner making these 
investments becomes weak in their defence against opportunism, because it cannot resort 
to the market and thus escape the opportunistic behaviour within the relationship 
(Williamson 1975, 1985).  
The presence of opportunism increases transaction costs. Ex ante, opportunism is 
associated with greater costs of initiating and writing extensive contingent-claims 
contracts intended to curb guileful behaviour of an exchange, whereas ex post it imposes 
additional transaction costs in the form of monitoring, modifying, and enforcing the terms 
of the exchange contract (Williamson, 1985). Under the TCE model, it is also argued that 
high levels of asset specificity are most efficiently managed in a hierarchical form of 
governance, whilst low levels are most efficiently managed in the market, and 
intermediate levels are best dealt with using a hybrid form of governance (Williamson 
1991).  
6) TCE in strategic alliances literature 
TCE has been used to guide a variety of empirical research investigations, into such as 
joint ventures and strategic alliances (David and Han, 2004). For instance, it has been 
found that there are levels of asset speciﬁcity and contextual backgrounds of inter-
organizational relationships required to support the exchange, internal uncertainty or 
performance ambiguity, and external uncertainty (Williamson, 1988; Zaheer and 
Venkatraman, 2007). Moreover, all economic activity revolves around a transaction, 
which is simply some form of exchange of a good or service between two or more 




alliances in order to understand the effects on these factors on alliance management and 
performance.  Transaction cost factors in alliance literature pertain to three main forms, 
namely: asset specificity, uncertainty and opportunistic behaviours (David and Han, 
2004). From a TCE perspective, strategic alliances are considered to be arrangements that 
minimize such TCs for firms by working with business partners, with alliance transaction 
costs including those concerned with negotiating and writing contingent contracts, 
monitoring partner performance relative to the contract and dealing with the breaches of 
contractual commitments (Gulati, 1995; Ireland et al., 2002). Further, under the TCE 
perspective alliances are more efficient than markets or hierarchies when they minimize 
the firm’s transaction costs (Jarillo, 1988). Thus, successful alliances are the product of 
organizing a firm’s boundary-spanning activities to minimize the sum of its transaction 
and production costs (Barringer and Harrison, 2000).  
Numerous researchers have criticized the TCE perspective of alliances for its singular 
focus on partner opportunism and its advocating the use of contractual agreements or 
equity to resolve this (Kale et al., 2000). Consequently, this approach fails to capture an 
important element in alliance partnerships, namely, the inter-partner relationships or 
relational capabilities and management. Previous research has shown than there is 
tremendous uncertainty surrounding strategic alliances (Zaheer, et al., 1998). In 
particular, in cross-cultural collaboration studies, cultural distance is one source of 
uncertainty. Regarding which, according to Brouthers and Brouthers (2000), the cultural 
context includes investment risks associated with different host countries’ institutional 
systems, as well as market attractiveness and uncertainty from cultural differences 
between alliance partners, all of which can impact on trust and alliance performance (Luo, 
2002). 
 2.3.4 Compatibility of theories 
The capacity to bring multiple and often competing perspectives to bear on important 
organizational phenomena is one of the appealing qualities of strategic management 
research. A growing body of literature now exists in the area of inter-organizational 
relationships (Casson, 1998; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Poppo and Zenger, 1998).  Indeed, 
some consider strategic management's status as a pluralistic arena for examining complex 




TCE are two perspectives on organizations that have gained attention in recent years in 
that they have made valuable contributions to understanding strategic alliances, because 
both these theories offer rich and powerful explanations for inter-organizational 
collaborations. The purpose of this work is to examine how relational capabilities and 
TCE differ and to take a steps towards reconciling these so as to help managers in the 
strategic decision making process. The comparative theories can be classified into the 
independent, conflict and complementary views. 
1) Independent view 
Proponents of this literature – sometimes referred to as the relational view – propose it is 
a means of understanding how firms can gain and sustain competitive advantage. For 
example, Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that it is possible for organizations to combine 
resources in unique ways across organizational boundaries to obtain an advantage over 
their competitors. The relational view has evolved from the limitations of TCE in relation 
to potential governance structures and as an extension to the RBV. Subsequently, as 
mentioned above, the relational capabilities approach was developed from the relational 
view and dynamic capabilities approach by introducing a set of organizational routines 
that, if employed in distinctive ways, can create relational rents (Dyer and Kale, 2007). 
In sum the relational capabilities approach includes complementary capability, 
knowledge sharing routines and effective governance mechanisms, tasked with acquiring 
resources and capabilities from business partners in order to learn and create value from 
the collaboration.  
The relational capabilities approach, as yet, has not generated empirical predictions as 
with TCE, only ex-post explanations (Argyres, 1996). For instance, it has been elicited 
that learning from an alliance partner may lead to negative outcomes for the partner 
whose knowledge has been appropriated (Lorange, 1997), but that strategic alliances may 
help a firm absorb or learn some critical information or capability from its partner. 
Moreover, they also increase the likelihood of unilaterally or disproportionately losing 
one’s own core capability or skill to the partner (Kale et al., 2000) and such asymmetrical 
learning may result in the creation of a new or stronger competitor. Thus, firms are faced 
with the challenging task of managing the balance between trying to learn and trying to 
protect. Oxley and Sampson (2004) considered the choice of alliance scope as an 




assets. Their results suggested that partnering firms narrow the scope of their alliance 
activities in response to competitive threats and the fear of knowledge leakage.  
2) Conflict view 
In addition to the independent view, the relationship between the relational capabilities 
approach and TCE can be conflictive. As detailed in this thesis, however, some resource-
poor firms confront a dilemma in that the relational capabilities approach points them 
towards cooperation, whereas TCE discourages cooperation because of the threat of 
partner opportunism in inter-firm relationships. Hence, managers may confront a 
dilemma when resource constraints point them towards inter-firm cooperation in 
situations where this is not an efficient response to exchange conditions.  
In contrast to the TCE perspective, collaboration should be employed to minimize the 
cost of governing the activity (Madhok, 2002). According to TCE, cooperation is 
advisable only if it minimizes the cost of governing (i.e. monitoring and controlling) 
organizational activities (Hesterly, Liebeskind, and Zenger, 1990). Moreover, under this 
perspective it is advised that organizations should consider the level of transaction 
specific investment in the economic exchange as the principal determinant of whether an 
economic exchange should be managed internally within the organization or not 
(Williamson, 1985). However, the limitation of transaction cost perspective is that inter-
firm relationships may be established for other reasons than a desire to enhance 
transactional efficiency. That is, TCE has been criticized for paying exclusive attention 
to cost minimization and neglecting value creation in strategic alliances (Das and Teng, 
2000). In particular, an internationalization approach of inter-firm relationships may be 
adopted for direct strategic reasons, not only foreign market entry, knowledge and 
technological transfer, but also a desire to foreclose the market or supply access in the 
host countries (Heide and Stump, 1995). Furthermore, one widely acknowledged 
weakness of TCE is its focus on a single firm and single transactions, thus providing little 
insight into the processes by which multiple firms, working collaboratively, develop 
individual and common capabilities.  
Some of the proponents of the relational capabilities approach have argued that it is more 
appropriate for explaining the boundary of the firm than TCE. For example, in a critique 




minimizing the opportunistic potential that arise when asset-specific investments are 
made. While the relational capabilities perspective the firm is seen as a bundle of 
capabilities that create relational rents even it has to encounter with the risk of 
opportunistic behaviours from alliance partners (Kale et al., 2000).  Firms that use inter-
firm cooperation according to the predictions of the relational capabilities may perform 
quite differently from those whose use of inter-firm cooperation is best explained by TCE. 
Hence, management scholars have called for investigation into what is a firm to do when 
resource constraints push managers towards inter-firm cooperation even though this may 
not be the efficient choice from the TCE perspective. 
3) Complementary view 
A third view is that the relational capabilities approach and TCE are complementary, each 
offering unique insights that generally point managers in similar directions. That is, the 
relational capabilities approach proposes a similar aspect to TCE, namely, a relation-
specific asset, to capture the long-term investment in the people, assets, and procedures 
of a partnership (Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Ganesan, 1994; Gundlach et al., 1995; 
Morgan and Hunt, 1994). This study follows Dyer and Singh (1998) and Rokkan et al., 
(2003) in treating asset specificity and a relation-specific assets as interchangeable. 
However, in contrast to the TCE framework, under the relational capabilities approach it 
is claimed that a relation-specific asset signals the desire to invest in an enduring 
relationship. That is, the investment increases the cooperative behaviour and transaction 
value of the partnership (Dyer, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Saxton, 1997). In general, 
the relational capabilities approach therefore focuses on cooperative behaviour to explain 
the relationship between asset specificity and partnership performance. The 
complementary view is also reflected in Gray and Wood's (1991) suggestion that neither 
resource nor economics-based perspectives adequately explain collaboration and hence 
both perspectives are needed (Combs and Ketchen, 1999). 
4) The conflict view between Trust and TCE 
In the context of inter-organizational collaborations, advocates of TCE theory (e.g. 
Williamson, 1985, 1993) have accentuated the economic man assumption in that they 
have focused on the choice of mode of economic governance that minimizes transaction 




opportunistically. In contrast, advocates of inter-organizational and inter-personal trust 
(Zaheer et al., 1998) imply the heroic man assumption, i.e. they emphasize trust as critical 
to promoting and maintaining value-enhancing collaborations. Researchers from each 
standpoint have provided empirical evidence in support of the different assumptions of 
their espoused theory (for examples of empirical corroboration of TCE-based tenets, see 
Heide and John, 1992; for examples of empirical support of trust, see Dyer, 1997; Zaheer 
and Venkatraman, 1995). Although these works have yielded insights, they have also 
presented dilemma regarding these two perspectives, as discussed next.  
Researchers have attempted to validate or refute the claim of the TCE regarding trust 
(Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Lado et al., 2008) 
that this engenders neutral outcomes. This claim rests on the assumption that within 
principal-agent exchange relationships, trust and opportunism tend to counteract each 
other, such that the positive effects of trust tend to neutralize (or diminish) the negative 
effects of opportunism on relationalism. Researchers have found some empirical support 
for the neutralizing effect in exchange-related behaviours, such as information sharing, 
performance monitoring, negotiation, and conflict resolution (e.g. Dyer and Chu, 2003; 
Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Zaheer et al., 1998), although the cross-sectional nature 
of these works tends to preclude making causal inferences.  
Furthermore, researchers very often relax some core assumptions of, or integrate trust 
variables into the TCE framework in order to reconcile the two different perspectives to 
explain the same phenomenon. But by doing so, they may reduce the uniqueness and 
simplicity of TCE theory and the concept of trust. For example, Zand (1972) argued that 
a relationship exists between trust and bounded rationality and that it is mediated by 
information. That is, the existence of trust in a contractual relationship may lead to 
information exchange that is more accurate, greater receptivity to influence by others and 
relaxation of controls on others, which, in turn, reduces behavioural 
uncertainty/complexity, which, in turn, economizes on bounded rationality. According to 
Dyer and Chu (2003), trust in supplier-buyer relations may be an important source of 
competitive advantage in industrial settings in which transaction costs are expected to be 
high due to conditions that create transactional difficulties (e.g. environmental 
uncertainty and high inter-organizational asset speciﬁcity). Under such circumstances, 




and/or organizational challenges (Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999) and may be the 
primary organizing principle to safeguard against opportunistic behaviour (McEvily et 
al., 2003).  
5) Research assumptions 
This research incorporates the relational capabilities approach, the concept of trust and 
TCE theory in order to understand a complicated inter-firm relationship, namely strategic 
alliances. This is because the review of the literature has revealed the need for researchers 
to look beyond a single theoretical explanation of how inter-organizational relationships 
are developed and maintained. This researcher posits that relational capabilities can help 
companies successfully balance the acquisition of new resources and capabilities with the 
protection of existing asset specificity in alliance situations. More specifically, it is 
contended that relational capabilities facilitate learning and sharing through close one-to 
one interaction between alliance partners, whilst at the same time minimizing the 
likelihood that an alliance partner will engage in opportunistic behaviour in the trust-
based relationship.  
Moreover, the focus in this study is on ex post opportunism (Jap and Anderson, 2003), 
since the researcher investigated ongoing alliance project management that had been in 
existence for at least one year. Further, in accordance with TCE theory, it was assumed 
that alliance managers have bounded rationality as well as being aware of uncertainty and 
opportunistic behaviours of their alliance partners, at the personal contact level, because 
they had dedicated resources and capabilities as well as investing their asset specificity. 
Nevertheless, inter-personal trust and inter-organizational trust increase their willingness 
to take risk, which act as safeguards of transaction factors in strategic alliances. 
Specifically, these assumptions provide strong support for the complementary effects of 
trust and asset specificity, which represent commitment and dependence between alliance 
partners and enhance alliance performance.  
2.4 Empirical studies on Supply chain management 
Supply chain management (SCM) is the integration of key business processes from end 
user through to the original suppliers that provide products, services, and information that 




Increasingly, firms are building collaborative relationships with their supply chain 
partners in order to achieve efficiencies, flexibility, and a competitive advantage (Nyaga 
et al., 2010). Management scholars have devoted substantial attention to the study of 
buyer–supplier alliances and how they impact on supplier (and buyer) performance. 
There is a great deal of evidence, for example, that through such vertical collaboration, 
suppliers and buyers are able to revamp production processes, reduce transaction costs 
and deliver better products to consumers (e.g. Dyer, 1997; Helper, 1991; Kotabe et al., 
2003; Martin et al., 1995; Srinivasan and Brush, 2006; Lazzarini et al., 2008). This section 
reviews empirical studies of relational capabilities, trust and TCE, which have been 
studied in the SCM literature, with the aim of enhancing understanding of this context. 
More specifically, the contributions to the literature include increased comprehension of 
the factors that influence the perceived success of collaborative relationships from both a 
buying and a supplying firm perspective, as well as a comparisons of these two 
perspectives. 
2.4.1 Relational capabilities and SCM 
A number of empirical studies relating to inter-organizational collaboration have adapted 
the concept of relational view into a specific context, for instance, the buyer-supplier 
relationship, collaboration in a range of industries and in the context of different 
institutions (Pagano, 2009). Most of the extant research has concluded that relational 
capabilities can help improve dyad alliances and firm performance significantly. For 
instance, Nyaga et al. (2010) viewed relational capabilities as collaborative activities 
between buyers and suppliers, such as information sharing, joint relationship effort, and 
dedicated investments. They contended that these promote successful buyer-supplier 
collaborations in both the quality of inter-firm relationships and overall alliance 
performance. In SCM research, relational capabilities represent each party’s willingness 
to give and take in the relationship and this allows it to adapt over time in response to 
changes in the business environment (Williamson, 1993). These capabilities deter 
opportunism, encourage cooperative behaviour, and increase the potential value of the 
exchange relationship (Srinivasan and Brush, 2006).  
Moreover, researchers have provided evidence of the important role of social capital in 




this context. They found that key suppliers and buyers exhibit closeness in the 
relationship through their flexibility to supply requests, help assisting in emergencies, 
and reliability built through repeated exchange. In doing so, a collaborative relationship 
is established where relational capital appears to accrue (Heide and Miner, 1992). Krause 
et al. (2007) showed that relational capital accumulation can improve company 
performance, whilst Lawson et al. (2008) elicited that relational capital is a mediator 
between relational embeddness of buyer-supplier relationships and buyer performance 
improvement. More specifically, they adopted the notion of social capital and applied it 
to the relationship between buyer firms and their key suppliers. In addition, they viewed 
trust as a foundation of the relational dimension, which refers to the personal relationships 
people have developed with each other through a history of interactions, leading to 
relations of trust, obligation and reciprocity. They found that the linking of relational 
embeddedness and structural embeddedness can enhance buyer performance. 
In general, trust contributes to improving alliance performance and alliance satisfaction 
in prior SCM research. According to Doney and Cannon (1997), trust in the context of 
the buyer-supplier relationship refers to the perceived credibility and benevolence of a 
target. In other words, a buying firm that faces some degree of risk in a purchasing 
situation, turns to a supplier or salesperson whom it believes is able to perform effectively 
and reliably and is interested in the customer’s best interests. Evidence of trust-based 
performance improvement in supply chain management has been found by comparing 
supplier relationships in the auto industry in Japan and the U.S. (Cusumano and Takeishi, 
1991; Dyer, 1996). That is, these studies found that Japanese automakers, such as Toyota, 
perform better that Western automakers, such as GM, due to their higher ability to 
integrate with their supplier network. Moreover, Cusumano and Takeishi (1991) elicited 
that buyer-seller relationships in the auto industry in Japan tend to be longer term, more 
stable, and with earlier supplier involvement in product development than in the U.S., 
where heavier reliance is placed on direct market forces among suppliers. They also 
discovered that GM has had to deal with the threat of opportunism by reducing the level 
of transaction specific investment in its suppliers (i.e. by having multiple competing 
partners), by insisting on elaborate contractual protections, or by vertically integrating 
the supply relationship (ibid). Further, Dyer and Chu (2003) found that supplier trust in 
a buyer results in lower TC, greater information sharing and better collaborative 




as shared planning and flexibility, have a positive impact on supplier trust in the buyer 
firm. Furthermore, much research has studied the trust building process and the roles of 
trust in supply chain management. Dyer and Chu (2000) argued that a buyer’s routines 
that represent commitment, assistance giving and supplier selection routines increase 
supplier trust. Vinella et al. (2010)’s study of buyer-supplier relationship in Spanish 
manufacturing sector support the importance of trust in this context. That is, they found 
that personal interaction at multiple levels, mutual respect, and trust were significantly 
positively related to performance improvements in the buyer’s operational performance 
along the dimensions of product design, process design, lead time and product quality. 
Some researchers have not only acknowledged the important role of trust in inter-firm 
collaborations, but also considered it as risk investment since it increases dependence 
between firms. Close relationships emerge as a response to the need for safeguarding 
those risks and adapting to uncertainty (Heide and John, 1990) by establishing 
governance mechanisms to reduce risk from opportunistic behaviours. For example, 
Srinivasan and Brush (2006) compared the effect of formal and informal governance 
mechanisms on performance in buyer-supplier alliances. They found that relational 
safeguards, such as relationship length and volume stability and increased supplier 
performance, while formal safeguards, such as contract duration and quantity agreement, 
do not impact on alliance performance. Carey et al. (2011) suggested that firm should 
have the formalization of expectations relating to operational requirements and protection 
of shared knowledge when buyers and suppliers have a relationship characterized by 
mutual trust and reciprocity to help lower product cost and total cost, and drive 
improvements in products and processes.  
2.4.2 TCE in SCM  
Transaction cost theory is a well-established framework for examining supply chain 
governance options. In the early stage of the theoretical development of the relational 
view, this theory played an important role in the empirical studies found in the strategic 
alliance literature. In particular, it was discovered that collaboration among supply chain 
partners may result in greater economic benefits in comparison to traditional (market 
exchange) relationships (Paulraj et al., 2008). These greater investments place each party 




decision more important as this can significantly affect relationship performance and 
success.  
Scholars have studied the influence of TC factors, including asset specificity and 
uncertainty that are bounded in the exchange between buyer-supplier (Croom et al., 
2000). For example, Dyer (1996) suggested that human asset specificity and site 
specialization have a positive impact on operational performance. Consistent with this 
Dyer (1997) later claimed that human asset specificity in the form of a specialized 
supplier group lowers transaction cost in alliances, because this type of asset involves 
greater information sharing, has a longer payback period and is the cost of safeguarding 
the relation-specific investments. Uncertainty is another factor that plays an important 
role in the supply chain management context. For, when compared to risk, it is a condition 
under which it becomes more difficult to predict the likelihood of future events (Gaur et 
al., 2011; Milliken, 1987; Sutcliffe and Zaheer, 1998). It is widely accepted that risks and 
environment uncertainty are inherent in supply chain relationships (Hult, Christopher, 
and Ketchen, 2010). Heide and John (1990) found evidence of three forms of uncertainty, 
including volume unpredictability, technological unpredictability, and performance 
ambiguity, having a significant impact on buyer-supplier partnerships. Other studies have 
also linked the nature of relationships to environmental uncertainty and resource 
interdependence (Hayes and Pisano, 1994). Furthermore, exploring their contingency 
effects can help provide better understanding why certain supply chain partnerships result 
in higher performance (Luo, 2002; Krishnan et al., 2006). 
In sum, it is clear that the importance of transaction cost economics and trust has been 
recognised by a number of researchers in SCM literature. This researcher recognises that 
the understanding of supply chain management allows for examination of the conditions 
under which relational capabilities affect collaborative performance between buyers and 
suppliers. However, the theoretical development of this study that is concerned with 
buyer-supplier alliance phenomena requires a more integrated approach than that used 
previously regarding relational capabilities, one which incorporates a combination of 
TCE and trust disciplines. That is, as such, the current research differs from previous 
models in that it highlights resources and capabilities from buyers’ perspective for 
managing strategic alliance projects with suppliers. More specifically, it contains 




specificity and relational-oriented constructs as well as organisational trust in buyer-
supplier relationships, while being mediated by the relational capabilities to achieve 
relational rents in this context.  
2.5 Unit of analysis: Strategic alliances at the project level 
Alliances have been the subject of a great deal of empirical research in the field of 
strategy. The literature suggests the term “alliance” to be a broad one covering many 
types of independently initiated inter-firm linkages, such as long-term purchasing 
(supply) agreements, licensing, collaborations on R&D, technology exchanges and joint 
ventures (Gulati, 1995; Nooteboom et al., 1997). When defining an alliance, virtually all 
researchers use terms such as cooperation, collaboration, value creation, or similar ones, 
which convey the idea that they involve a closer and more interdependent relationship 
than standard supplier transactions. This ambiguity in how alliances are defined makes 
them difficult to study, because the results of any given work will depend critically on 
the definition that the researcher has used.  
The broad classification of strategic alliance contains two types: horizontal and vertical. 
Although both have been the subject of investigation in prior research, the two streams 
of literature appear to have developed in relative isolation. Horizontal alliances focus on 
more radical innovations in relation to the size, complexity, and uncertainty of the 
particular alliance. While vertical alliances are concerned with cost reduction or on 
reducing time to market (Carr and Pearson, 1999; Oxley and Sampson, 2004). According 
to Mayer and Teece (2008), alliances and long-term buyer–supplier relationships are 
different and that failure to differentiate between them would hurt the chances of 
collaborative success. However, what has been largely missing from the literature on 
alliances is detailed examination of how they differ from traditional supplier 
relationships. Hence, scholars need to make the distinction between buyer-supplier 
relationships, alliance projects and alliance portfolios (ibid). 
2.5.1 Buyer-supplier relationships  
General relationships between buyers and suppliers are at the heart of business exchange. 
Regarding these, scholars have focused on long-term buyer–supplier contracts and how 
they are used to create proper incentives and/or overcome exchange hazards. Supplier 




transaction costs and yield a more cooperative relationship. Any effort to manage the 
flow of information or materials across the supply chain is likely to be successful, if there 
are active supply chain organisational relationships (Handfield and Nichols, 1999). 
Peterson et al. (2005) describes three different types of buyer–supplier relationship 
ranging from arm’s length relationships to alliances, in the following sequential order: 
1) Discussions are held with suppliers about specifications/requirements but the 
buying company makes all design and specification decisions; 
2) The buyer and supplier enter into an informal, or sometimes a formal joint 
development effort, which may include information and technology sharing 
and joint decision making regarding design specifications; 
3) The supplier is informed of customer requirements and then is given almost 
complete responsibility for the purchased item, with only review and 
concurrence on the purchased item’s specifications being left with the buying 
company.  
While many have moved away from strict arm’s length relationships with some of their 
suppliers, examples of sustained co-operative risk-sharing interactions are much less 
common. Consequently, alliances and other “hybrid” organizational forms are typically 
viewed as mechanisms for governing exchanges or relationships rather than standard 
market exchange or full integration (e.g. Williamson, 1991; Gulati, 1998). Some 
researchers who have studied strategic alliances have set out to elicit whether an alliance 
or partner level of analysis is the appropriate one (Levinthal, 2000). This is because 
alliance portfolios (as researched by e.g. Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006; Heimeriks and 
Duysters, 2006) and individual alliance projects (as investigated by e.g. Hoang and 
Rothaermel, 2005; Kale and Singh, 2007; Mesquita et al., 2007; Nelson and Nelson, 
2009) have different characteristics and underpinnning strategies in several respects.  
2.5.2 Alliance projects 
Alliance projects differ from more traditional longer-term buyer–supplier contracts in 
several important respects. To start with, project work by definition is specific and 
unique, thus often requiring creative problem solving and novel solutions (Prencipe and 




strategic logic for its alliance and to adopt the appropriate best practice in each stage. 
However, the management of alliances is a difficult organizational activity due to the 
complexities and uncertainties inherent in working across organizational boundaries 
(Rothaermel and Deeds, 2006). A project alliance only binds the parties together for the 
duration of one project (Scheublin, 2001) and it is through this alone the means for 
enforcement are determined as well as the defining of the roles and responsibilities of 
each party (Mayer and Teece, 2008). Therefore, strategic alliance project management 
places the emphasis on process management, which is defined as the degree of 
interaction, including communication and coordination, perceived to be required by the 
initiating partner in the process of implementing and sustaining the alliance tasks of the 
particular alliance project (Shah and Swaminathan, 2008). The specific personnel who 
are directly associated with the alliance is the key to this process. Hence, process 
manageability takes into consideration the degree of emotional stress experienced by 
managers and other personnel involved in the alliance and the amount of communication 
by partners for the effective coordination and control of alliance activities.  
2.5.3 Alliance portfolio 
While an individual alliance project involves a single and independent transaction, a 
company can simultaneously participate in more than one project alliance at the same 
time. A firm can gain additional advantages by considering its entire set of individual 
alliances as one portfolio, and managing it as such (Lavie and Miller, 2008). A strategic 
alliance portfolio refers to temporary cooperative agreements in which two or more firms 
share reciprocal inputs to realize improved competitive positions, whilst maintaining their 
own corporate identities (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2006). Alliance strategies, derived 
from the business strategy, determine the goals of all alliances of the business unit (e.g. 
developing a new technology or entering a new market) and the configuration of the 
business alliance portfolio (Hoffmann, 2007). Researchers who have probed the problems 
associated with managing multiple dyads have used the terms multilateral alliance (Doz 
and Hamel, 1998), alliance constellation (Gomes-Casseres, 1996), alliance network (Das 
and Teng, 2002), and alliance portfolio (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996). At the 
portfolio level, top executives provide strategic direction by defining the current and 




made to the alliance, examining the partners’ strategic compatibility, and handling shifts 
in the relative value of partners’ contributions over time (Doz and Hamel 1998).  
2.5.4 Different characteristics of inter-organizational relationships 
While there has been a lot of empirical work on the characteristics and scope of strategic 
alliances, relatively little is known about how they differ from general buyer–supplier 
relationships, alliance projects and alliance portfolios. Alliances pose some unique 
challenges due to their broader scope and need for more administrative structure and 
information exchange. Oxley and Sampson (2004) have suggested that choosing the 
scope of activities to include in an alliance linking a particular set of firms establishes 
both the probability and the cost of opportunistic behaviour by the partners. This is 
because the extent of coordination and more intimate face-to-face contact necessary to 
achieve success increases along these dimensions (Kogut, 1988; Kogut and Zander, 1992; 
Gulati and Singh, 1998) and uncertainty raises the costs of monitoring and assessing 
partner behaviour (Pisano, 1989). This could partially explain why many studies have 
found that alliances have a higher failure rate, i.e. their wider scope involves more 
complex interaction and joint effort than do traditional long-term relationships. If firms 
enter an alliance negotiation and treat it like a supplier contract, then they run the risk of 
having a poorly designed contract that could hurt their chances for success (Mayer and 
Teece, 2008). Therefore, they need to pay close attention to the four dimensions of the 
contract identified above, which delineate how alliance contracts differ from standard 
supplier ones (even complex supplier contracts). The different characteristics of these 











Table 2.2 Key differences in alliance and supplier relationships 
 Buyer-Supplier 
relationships 








Decision-making Mainly autonomous Mainly joint with 
alliance partners 
Mainly autonomous at 
the top level management 
Managers Purchasing 
department 
Project managers Alliance managers, CEOs 
Administrative 
structure 































































Sources: Adapted from Mayer and Teece (2008) 
Buyer-supplier alliances are long-term, cooperative relationships designed to leverage the 
strategic and operational capabilities of individual participating companies to achieve 
significant on-going benefits for each party. By their very nature, they provide a fruitful 
environment for knowledge sharing and learning. Buyer–supplier relationships, on the 
other hand, lack the necessary administrative structure for fostering the same firm level 
outcomes among exchanging parties. Mayer and Teece (2008) compared the different 
characteristics between buyer-supplier relationships and alliances regarding a number of 




1) specified payment terms and incentives for each party; 2) the structure of the 
relationship and how the parties interact; 3) specified information, resources and 
knowledge would be exchanged; 4) the warranties, liabilities and how disputes would be 
resolved. In terms of administration, alliance contracts tended to have a longer duration, 
involve more complex administrative structures and dispute resolution mechanisms, 
specified the exchange of much more firm-specific information such as technical 
knowledge and capabilities.  
Alliances were found to be broader in scope, had very different payment terms, and 
involved more joint decision-making. Moreover, under these arrangements an umbrella 
agreement usually codifies overall guidelines for organizing new product development 
projects, but the specificity of each project means that the partners must work out 
organizational details on a project-by-project basis. Deciding whether to work alone or 
in an alliance is different to deciding whether one partner in an alliance or both will do a 
specific project, for the latter decision requires the partners’ joint agreement on who will 
work alone. Supply contracts, on the other hand, were shorter and more directly focused 
on describing the direct interaction and what was necessary for each party in terms of 
payments and quantity as well as the quality details for the supplier. Further, the 
governance structure of an alliance portfolio (i.e. a contractual alliance for multiple 
projects, a contractual alliance for one project, or a joint venture) influences the number 
of organizational options available at the project level. Although, alliance-level 
governance in a contractual relationship does not include an ultimate individual authority, 
the partners may agree to have one manager lead a specific project (Gerwin and Ferris, 
2004).  
In terms of learning, knowledge exchange and learning from the other party is extensive 
and broad in alliances as compared to being minimal in buyer–supplier relationships. 
Consequently, alliance contracts have to serve many functions that are largely absent in 
traditional supplier ones, including facilitating learning, knowledge transfer, joint 
decision-making, and so on. These are important aspects of a strong alliance relationship 
and should not be neglected when the relationship is being negotiated. Regarding 
relationship governance, there was seen to be an overlap in the issues covered under both 
types of agreements, but the alliance contracts were much longer, more complex and 




Teece, 2008). Not only did the contracts differ, but the overall management of the alliance 
relationships was also different than for supplier relationships, in particular, in relation to 
the procedural differences (e.g. how a relationship begins, what to do when someone 
wants to exit the relationship but refuses to comply with the termination clause). 
Moreover, at the alliance level, firms typically have either broadly similar or broadly co-
specialized skills (Hennart et al. 1999), but the distribution of specific skills between the 
partners at the project level may vary across the different projects. 
Each individual alliance project is important, and a firm certainly needs to have a sound 
strategic logic for it as well as adopting appropriate best practices at each stage of its life 
cycle (Parise and Casher, 2003). These routines range from valuing resource 
contributions, protecting confidential technical information, creating relational 
capabilities among project participants, maintaining a balance of power, and preventing 
cannibalization of their firms’ products by the jointly exercised procedures (Doz and 
Hamel 1998; Mowery 1992; Gerwin and Ferris, 2004). Participating in alliance projects 
has risen in popularity despite the difficulties encountered when trying to implement such 
an approach. Previous studies have investigated individual projects in relation to 
territorial restraints in licensing agreements (e.g. Mueller and Geithman, 1991), up-front 
fees and royalty rates in franchising agreements (e.g. Lafontaine, 1992), and alliance 
project governance (e.g. Mayer and Agyres, 2007). However, few have attempted to 
understand the relationship between these partner characteristics and the way in which 
they operate under different alliance project types.  
Alliance project levels have distinct organizational issues because they involve different 
tasks performed by different types of people. At the project level, mid- and low-level 
managerial and technical people implement activities by actually developing new 
products (Gerwin and Ferris, 2004). Studying strategic alliance management at the 
individual project allows researchers to understand the emotions and experiences of 
middle level managers and staff at the operational level whilst modifying organizational 
routines to achieve relational rents.  Such research, on the other hand, has much less to 
say about the lower-level project organization issues of jointly conducted new product 
development. An increase in the vertical scope of an alliance predictably remedies the 
complexity of the collaborative challenge (Reuer, Zoilo, and Singh, 2002). From the 




capabilities (Kale et al., 2000; Hong and Rothermel, 2005; Dyer and Kale, 2007) in the 
context of alliance portfolios. However, antecedents of relational capabilities at the 
individual project level between two companies have been overlooked. This researcher 
contends that relational capabilities can be also derived from inter-firm factors, namely, 
relational and economic dimensions, for these can have an impact on alliance project 
outcomes. In addition, Reuer and Ariño (2007) have suggested that firms craft more 
detailed alliance contracts in successive collaborations. Consequently, they have called 
for future research on alliance contracts to examine whether, and when, managers or firms 
develop the capabilities to draw up better contracts. Hence, it is important to identify 
those skills that comprise a firm’s capability to manage an individual alliance, in addition 
to those needed to run an entire alliance portfolio.  
In sum, this research focuses on a measure of vertical scope that is particularly relevant 
to R&D-related alliances, i.e. comparing alliances that involve R&D activities alone with 
those that combine them with other activities, specifically, manufacturing and/or 
marketing. That is, the most accessible dimension of alliance scope in terms of conceptual 
clarity and data availability is the functional or 'vertical' scope of the alliance, i.e. to what 
extent the partners combine multiple and sequential functions or value chain activities 
within the alliance, such as R&D, manufacturing and/or marketing.  
2.6 Research settings: Thai manufacturing sector 
For this thesis, trust, specific transaction cost factors and relational capabilities are 
considered the most important factors in cross-cultural strategic alliances. This research 
extends the concept of relational capabilities of Dyer and Kale (2007) by integrating trust 
and TCE, thereby addressing a gap in the literature. Two theoretical frameworks are 
developed by drawing on these three perspectives. The research setting is that of strategic 
alliances between MNE subsidiaries and local suppliers in the Thai manufacturing sector 
as there is rich evidence of trust and up-stream relationship management in this context 
(Brimble and Urata, 2006). 
Inter-organizational relationships provide an appropriate research setting to study the 
relational capabilities approach since this involves investigating how firms can leverage 
their resources and capabilities to achieve relational rents. Previous research has tested 




supplier relationships. However, few studies have set out to investigate empirically the 
relationship among cross-cultural buyer–suppliers in relation to alliance projects. In order 
to address this gap, this research is aimed at investigating as well as testing the relational 
capabilities approach in cross-cultural buyer-supplier alliance projects in the Thai 
manufacturing sector. This context allows the researcher to study the impact of economic 
and relational dimensions on the dyadic relationships as well as to examine whether 
relational capabilities work effectively.  
Strategic alliance between buyers and suppliers are unlike simple buy-sell arrangements, 
which involve no long-term mutual dependence, shared managerial control, or continuing 
contributions of technology and products. Moreover, such alliances continue so long as 
significant value accrues to both parties. Further, strategic alliances require that the 
following necessary and sufficient conditions are present: independence of the parties, 
shared benefits among the parties and on-going participation in one or more key strategic 
areas, for example, technology, products, markets, etc (Yoshino and Rangan, 1995). 
Under such arrangements, purchasing organizations typically buy not only their 
suppliers’ products or services, but also their systems and capabilities. Further, when the 
buying firm extensively manages its suppliers, the activities that may be included are 
exchange of personnel, training and education of personnel as well as the possibility of 
direct capital investment. These activities represent investment in transaction specific 
assets that may provide the benefits of vertical integration, i.e. lower costs, better 
communication, coordination and quality without the costs of actual ownership (Carr and 
Pearson, 1999). For instance, suppliers may collaborate with buyers to reduce inventory 
and promote timely delivery (e.g. just-in-time production). Also, a supplier can 
collaborate with the buyer in the process of designing a new product or improving 
existing ones. Intense vertical alliances typically exhibit considerable amounts of joint 
effort in the activities in which the partners are involved. Such intense vertical alliances 
have been found to positively influence the performance of buyers and suppliers, in terms 
of both production efficiencies and innovation (Clark, 1989; Cusumano and Takeishi, 






MNE buyers and local suppliers in Thailand 
Most of the empirical studies that have studied the relational view have focused on Asian 
economies, since this context is rich with trust and in-group business relationships. 
Regarding this, past studies on Japan and South Korea compared the relational view 
among Japanese, Korean and US automakers (Martin et al., 1995; Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Sako and Helper, 1998; Dyer and Chu, 2003). They found that the Japanese and South 
Korean’s deployed social capital and networking within supplier groups to benefit the 
alliance, whist their Western counterparts did not. Recently, Li et al. (2010) put forward 
that managers in international subsidiaries in China need to understand that relational 
mechanisms, such as brokered access, shared goals and trust are a viable means for 
acquiring local knowledge from their Chinese suppliers.  However, alliance trust and the 
relational view are relatively under-studied in Thailand, which is an emerging economy 
(Hosskinson et al., 2000) in which inter-organizational relationship management is also 
a critical success factor. The outcomes of this research will also benefit organizations 
from other individualist cultures as it will provide understanding regarding how 
individuals and organizations from collectivist cultures view strategic alliance 
management.  
MNEs create linkages with local business partners through local sourcing and supply 
relationships (Giroud and Scott-Kennel, 2009). Both local firms and MNEs benefit from 
inter-organizational networks and linkages, because they enhance industrial growth, 
knowledge sharing, technology transfer, and job creation while strengthening national 
self-reliance in the host countries (Lim and Fong, 1982). The development of Taiwan’s 
IT industry shows that the strategic alliance between MNE buyers and local suppliers in 
Taiwan are amongst the fastest growing, and probably constitute the most important form 
of cross-border cooperation (Engardio and Einhorn, 2005). That is, close interaction with 
MNE buyers has been providing great opportunities for Taiwanese local firms to learn 
leading-edge production technology, quality control, and product design.  
MNEs have played an important role in Thai economic growth and technology transfer, 
especially in the manufacturing sector, e.g. automotive, auto parts and supplies industries 
as well as the rubber tires and inner tubes industries. Almost 50% of gross output was 




in 2003 (Kohpaiboon, 2006). MNEs establish a foreign subsidiary as the vehicle for 
vertical integration in order to assure reliable availability of needed resources or 
materials, and to avoid the higher costs involved when buying from an independent 
source (Herbert, 1984). There is a general tendency for MNE affiliates to become 
increasingly embedded in their host countries the longer they are present and the more 
conductive their host’s overall investment climate becomes over time (Kohpaiboon, 
2010). 
Most MNEs in the Thai automotive and electronic industries are linked, to a certain 
degree, to the vertical supply chain of Thai industrial clusters and share related 
information with regard to specific product related issues, especially regarding new 
products. Most MNEs in the Thai automotive and electronic industries are linked, to a 
certain degree, to the vertical supply chain of Thai industrial clusters and share related 
information with regard to specific product related issues, especially regarding new 
products. For instance, Suwannaporn and Speece (1998) interviewed with five MNE 
subsidiaries in Thailand’s food processing industry and found that MNEs operated new 
product development (NPD) in Thailand to localise products and imported NPD from 
other regions to response to market changes. Also, Rungsithong (2004) found that MNEs 
in Thailand’s vegetable and fruit processing industry conducted product and process 
innovation in collaboration with local and foreign suppliers to increase competitive 
advantage in the host market. Furthermore, Punyasavatsut (2008) found that Toyota 
motor Thailand is an example of an MNE initiative that has been bringing in closer 
collaborative and technical ties between parts suppliers and local suppliers. While this 
relationship has helped lower costs and enhanced productivity among large firms, it also 
opened up opportunities to local suppliers for mutual benefits from technical 
collaboration. Kohpaiboon and Poapongsakorn (2011) examined MNE involvement in 
the Hard Disk Drive (HDD) industry in Thailand since 1983 to present. They noted that 
Seagate Technology Inc. trained numerous technical workers and enlarged the 
availability of skilled labour. These created a magnetic effect, enticing other key players 
such as IBM (1991), Fujitsu (1991), Western Digital (2001), Hitachi Global Storage 
(2004), and Toshiba (2008) to set up operations in Thailand. These MNEs subsidiaries 
also cooperated with local suppliers in product and process development in order to 




establishment of long-term relationships between MNEs and local suppliers results in a 
strong commitment to increase the competitiveness these suppliers. 
From the above discussion, it can be seen that MNE subsidiaries are increasingly 
becoming embedded in the Thai manufacturing sector by vertical integration with local 
suppliers. Moreover, inter-firm relationships between MNE subsidiaries and local 
suppliers are not only important drivers of the Thai economy, but are also salient features 
of the international business strategy in the Thai manufacturing sector. It appears from 
this earlier research that it is now increasingly important for MNEs to devote greater 
attention to developing closer linkages with local suppliers and institutions in Thailand 
in order to strengthen their ability to manufacture quality products and process related 
activities (Brimble and Urata , 2006; Kohpaiboon, 2010) as well as to enhance firms’ 
competitiveness.  
Strategic alliance projects between MNE buyers and local suppliers in Thai 
manufacturing is the focus of this thesis. More specifically, the focus of this study is on 
alliances that fall into the “non-traditional contracts” classification, where transactions 
take place between buyers and suppliers of industrial goods and services. This type of 
alliance is defined as a “strategic alliance project” in that it consists of a vertical value-
chain relationship between MNE buyers and their suppliers. In most cases, these alliances 
seek to add value, increase flexibility, and allow the company to focus more on its own 
core competences. This research concentrates on bilateral dyadic alliances based on 
formal and informal inter-firm agreements. A better understanding of how relational 
capabilities are applied will help managers to make better choices. Consequently, the key 
aims are to provide some insights into what are sources of and barriers to relational 
capabilities as well as how to conduct the relational capabilities process so as to have 









2.7 Chapter summary 
In the quest to find an appropriative theory for addressing the research question and 
research objectives, relational capabilities, trust and TCE are combined to build the 
analytical framework. It is evident in past literature that economic and relational 
constraints both have the ability to promote relational capabilities and generate relational 
rents. With regard to this, the two main objectives for this study are: 1) to identify the 
antecedents of relational capabilities; and 2) to investigate the mediating effects of 
relational capabilities which have an impact on alliance performance. This researcher 
views trust and asset specificity as inter-party resources that promote the firm’s 
confidence to share resources and capabilities with alliance partners. The firm utilizes 
these resources by applying relational capabilities and gaining relational rents in terms of 
alliance performance. The objective of this study is to examine the impact of inter-
organizational commitment, namely, the economic and relational dimensions, and 
relational capabilities on alliance performance as well as providing insights into cross-
cultural alliance management at the project level. The next chapter discusses the 




















In this chapter, the concept of alliance management capabilities is developed focusing on 
relational capabilities between organizations, which as has been demonstrated in Chapter 
2 has been largely overlooked in the extant literature. To this end, a number of hypotheses 
are presented which explore the antecedents and consequents of relational capabilities. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 explains the importance of economic and 
relational conditions in strategic alliances, whilst Section 3.3 predicts the nature of 
antecedents and barriers of relational capabilities in the form of a number of hypotheses 
that are empirically investigated. Finally, Section 3.4 considers the mediating role of 
relational capabilities, namely, trust and asset specificity as well as performance, in 
strategic alliance projects by also proffering several hypotheses which are to be to be 
tested in this research.   
3.2 Economic and relational conditions in strategic alliances 
Previous studies have shown that a company requires greater alliance experience and 
know-how from previous alliances in order to build a proficient and successfully 
managed business (Simonin, 1997; Kale et al., 2001). However, theories such as the 
resource-based view (RBV), TCE and social exchange theory cannot provide sufficient 
explanation as to how firms gain competitive advantage while collaborating and 
maintaining relationships with alliance partners (Lavie, 2006). This research develops 
theoretical frameworks with this purpose in mind based on two research questions: 1) 
What are the antecedents of relational capabilities in cross-cultural alliance projects? 
and 2) What is the role of relational capabilities in strategic alliance management to 
achieve alliance performance in cross-cultural alliance projects? 
Inter-organizational conditions in inter-firm exchange play a key role in alliances in that 
they can either act as barriers to progress or serve a advantages that can help support 
cooperative activities. Regarding this, previous research has elicited that a firm’s alliance 
function and alliance experiences are drivers of relational capabilities (Kale et al., 2000; 




conditions can facilitate or hamper partner learning along five dimensions: environment, 
task, process, skills and goals. That is, these authors found that these dimensions play a 
key role in fostering or blocking learning, in that, for example, in some alliances they 
have engendered cognitive learning (what the managers understand of how the 
relationship should be handled), whilst at the same time stifling behavioural learning 
(what managers can do to better manage the relationship). However, some literature 
overlook the dual role of relational and economic dimensions that facilitate cooperative 
capabilities of firms in managing alliances, which is important for any business exchange. 
Thus, the researcher needs to explore whether these inter-organizational factors drive 
firms to build relational capabilities to manage strategic alliances. In addition, alliance 
experiences and alliance functions are antecedents of relational capabilities in the context 
of alliance portfolios and the dyadic relationships regarding these have also been largely 
ignored. This researcher posits that relational capabilities can be also derived from inter-
firm factors, namely, the relational and economic dimensions, since these are 
commitments underpinning alliance projects, which contrasts with the literature that 
suggests that intra-firm factors, such as experiences and alliance functions, are most 
salient in alliance portfolios. Further, the dyadic factors that are critical for alliance 
success, such as inter-personal trust, inter-firm trust, asset specificity and human resource 
distance all hold the potential to promote or hinder relational capabilities, but few studies 
have considered these aspects. Accordingly, it is posited here that the formation of an 
inter-firm exchange requires an investment in the relational and economic dimensions in 
order to develop the necessary complementary competencies for success. In support of 
this, Parise and Casher (2003) are take strong view that trust, transparency (i.e. visibility 
and openness), commitment, communication, and compatibility are critical success 
factors in alliances. In sum, the objective of this study is to explore the sequential 
relationships between the economic constructs and trust, at both the inter-personal and 
inter-organizational levels, that contribute to or hinder relational capabilities building and 
alliance performance.  
3.2.1 The importance of economic conditions 
Alliances may require one of the partners to make financial investment in an asset that 
would have significantly less value outside the alliance. Such transaction specific 




(Hansen, Hoskisson, Barney, 2008). As with information asymmetries, such investment 
may present both a high threat of opportunism and on the plus side, substantial 
opportunities for gains from trade. Therefore, traditional transaction cost logic suggests 
that increasing levels of transaction specific investment calls for opportunism minimizing 
governance to avert the threat of opportunism. That is, when entering into an alliance 
contractual governance arrangements can provide incentives to refrain from opportunistic 
behaviour like hold-up by attaching costs to such behaviour and thus create enough 
confidence among the collaborating partners to move forward with the exchange (Mayer 
and Agyres, 2004). 
3.2.2 The importance of relational conditions 
The presence of trust in exchange is a basic postulate of a socialized view of relationships 
(Granovetter, 1985). Defined in contracting behaviour terms, trust reflects the extent to 
which negotiations are fair and commitments are upheld (Anderson and Narus, 1990) and 
one party's belief that its requirements will be fulfilled through future actions undertaken 
by the other. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is strong argument in the extant literature 
that relational exchange is heavily dependent on trust and hence, this is the focus 
relational capabilities in the current research. By way of further explanation in support of 
this, the parties involved in relational exchange strive for non-economic satisfaction and 
therefore, engage in social exchange as well as economic. A high trust environment 
boosts the convenience of working with business partners, because this can help the firm 
to reduce transaction costs and opportunistic behaviours by the alliance partners (Dyer 
and Chu, 2000; Child and Möllering, 2003; Peng, 2009), facilitate capabilities (Yli-Renko 
et al., 2001; Paulraj et al., 2008; Nelson and Nelson, 2009), promote adaptive and flexible 
adjustment to change circumstances in the context of joint utility maximization (Carney, 
1998) and thus enhance alliance performance (Aulakh et al., 1996; Dyer and Chu, 2003; 
Krishnan et al., 2006). The logic underlying the above discussion is in line withs 
Granovetter’s (1985) suggestion that strong relational ties between individuals and/or 
organizations “lubricate” social exchange, promote cooperation, and generally facilitate 
relational coordination and communication. Moreover, strong social ties among partners 
are a function of prior favourable interactions, interpersonal and professional similarity, 




is, all of these factors tend to encourage the extensive interactions that are required during 
knowledge sharing and joint problem-solving. 
Economic and relational dimensions have distinct and common attributes in the business 
exchange literature. Regarding the former, first, trust is viewed as the basis for the 
relationship underlying social exchanges (Blau, 1964), while economic exchanges are 
impersonal and hence, trust is not relevant. Second, investment in the relationship is 
critical to social exchange (Rousseau, 1995), but is not an aspect of economic exchange. 
Third, trust requires a long-term orientation, since the exchange is ongoing and based on 
feelings of obligation, whereas economic exchanges do not necessarily imply long-term 
or open-ended and diffuse obligations, but rather, focus on economic agreements such as 
pay for performance. Thus, alliance partners’ expectations about the duration of the 
exchange, as long-term and open-ended (relational exchange) or narrowly defined 
financial obligations without long-term implications (economic exchange), is usually a 
critical distinction between these two forms of exchange. A final distinction is the 
emphasis on financial (e.g. pay and benefits) as compared with socio-emotional (e.g. give 
and take, being taken care of by the organization) aspects of exchange (Doney and 
Cannon, 1997; Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999). Similarly, research on relational 
exchange has emphasized socio-emotional aspects of the alliance partner relationship (i.e. 
feelings of obligation and trust), while economic exchange has emphasized the financial 
and more tangible aspects of the collaboration (Schore et al., 2006).  
The major common attributes of relational and economic exchange relationships that 
have been emphasized in the literature include inter-organizational commitment for value 
creation and interdependence relationships. Regarding the former, Williamson (1985) 
recognized the abundance of intermediate governance forms and suggested that, under 
certain conditions, such relationship are maintained by economic weapons, such as 
hostage and credible commitments to keep opportunistic behaviour at bay. As the inter-
firm relationship develops with recurrent transactions between the two parties trust 
becomes established (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992). Subsequently, the parties come to 
rely on non-economic factors, such as trust, to move the project along, thereby 
contributing to a more durable, stable and long-term form (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 
1995). Parkhe (1993) found that the commitment of non-redeployable investments in a 




studies elicited that relational rents generated through relation-specific investments are 
realized through lower total value chain costs, greater product differentiation, fewer 
defects, and faster product development cycles. Kwon and Suh (2005) also suggested that 
commitment is a key success factor in achieving supply chain integration and trust is a 
root to fostering such commitment, for if one party is threatening to quit the exchange or 
reduce their efforts, trust cannot be fostered (Coff, 1993). Moreover, proximity facilitates 
the transferring of tacit knowledge through information-rich media, such as face-to-face 
communication, which in turn brings with it commitment (Lengel and Daft, 1988; Nohria 
and Eccles, 1992). Regarding this, in the automotive industry, resident engineers who are 
employed by one firm, but work at another, have been known to enhance the transfer of 
knowledge and routines, which has resulted in improved product and process quality 
(Dyer, 1994; Nishiguchi, 1994). Thus, commitment between alliance partners, in the form 
of trust and asset specificity, promote repeat exchanges which in turn enhance alliance 
outcomes.  
Another common attribute of the economic and relational dimensions is inter-dependent 
relationships between organizations. Economic constraints, as suggested by transaction 
cost economics, are positively related to cooperative between alliance partners because 
of the lock-in situation (Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999). The key strategic 
implication of asset specificity investment is that alliance partners may need to make 
bundles of related routines, such as adaptation, coordination and safeguarding, in order 
to realize the full potential of those investments involved in an alliance relationship (Dyer 
& Singh, 1998; Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti, 1997). For instance, Inkpen and Currall 
(1998), Joshi and Stump (1999), and Subramani and Venkatraman (2003) found a 
positive relationship between asset specificity and the quality of inter-firm relationships 
(joint actions and trust) in that cooperative behaviours play a role as a safeguard to prevent 
these investments from being opportunistically exploited by the supplier. Also, once 
firms make a financial commitment to support their business partners, they are dedicated 
to working closely with the partners to ensure the return of the investment (Hanfield and 
Bechtel, 2002). Moreover, trust is also a factor that creates lock-in relationships between 
business partners. To be precise, Dore (1987) invoked examples from the Japanese textile 
industry to argue for the significance of sociological elements in exchange. Specifically, 




the maintenance of exchange relationships between supplier and buyer firms. Therefore, 
this researcher posits that a higher degree of commitment and dependence due to higher 
investments and trust between alliance partners requires efforts at both the inter-personal 
and inter-firm levels. 
3.3 Antecedents and barriers to relational capabilities  
3.3.1 Inter-personal trust as an antecedent to relational capabilities 
This researcher expects that trust at the two levels, as discussed in Chapter 2, leads to 
knowledge sharing through different processes. Regarding trust at the individual level, 
this should be treated as a personal belief about the degree to which a particular referent 
is trustworthy and to which one is willing to accept vulnerability (Zaheer et al., 1998). To 
begin with, inter-personal trust refers to the willingness to accept vulnerability based on 
positive expectations of a specific other or others, ranging from the individual level (a 
psychological state), the team level (a shared psychological state among team members) 
and the organizational level (a shared psychological state among organizational 
members) (Fulmer and Gelfand, 2012). In other words, inter-personal trust is the bond 
that allows any kind of significant relationship to exist between people (Song, Kim, Kolb, 
2009).  
Most trust literature has evidence to support that it facilitates relational capabilities at the 
inter-organizational level. However, this researcher posits that trust at the individual level 
also enhances inter-organizational routines in the same direction as inter-organizational 
trust. By way of explanation regarding this stance, in strategic alliances collaborating 
firms control their resource investments, but the use of these resources depends on the 
people directly involved in the day-to-day operations of the alliance (Fang et al., 2008). 
Hence, inter-personal trust between staff of two parties allows inter-organizational 
routines to run smoothly and gain high quality resources and capabilities from alliance 
partners (Williams, 2007). In support of this perspective, Luo (2001) suggested that 
personal attachment can help firms complete the evolutionary process of knowledge 
exchange in relational contracts, such as joint ventures, because trust, which is derived 
from attachment, makes boundary spanners more willing to transfer knowledge needed 
by their counterparts. Moreover, personal interactions ease the settlement of disputes or 




inter-personal cooperation and teamwork necessitate a high degree of involvement on the 
part of individuals. In particular, each individual must not only contribute fully, but also 
must be highly involved in the activities of others; high involvement requires members 
of a team to commit fully to the team endeavour (Jones and George, 1998). Since routines 
involve patterns of interdependent actions carried out by multiple actors, an individual’s 
ability to engage or interact with other individuals, may affect the execution and outcome 
of a routine or capability (Felin et al., 2012). Specifically, as an alliance project proceeds, 
the alliance team will probably require more resource input and more sensitive 
information from their alliance partners. If the firms do not have sufficient inter-personal 
trust with their counterparts, they will not provide such information and resources (Fang 
et al., 2008). 
Inter-personal trust is a foundation for knowledge sharing in strategic alliances between 
people or organizations (Abrams et al., 2003). More specifically, as human behaviour is 
inherently opportunistic, adverse selection and moral hazard may inﬂuence the 
individual’s motivation to share knowledge in a negative manner. Therefore, the provider 
of knowledge needs to trust that the receiver will not exploit that shared for purposes 
other than those agreed upon and close personal interaction between the partnering 
entities can enable individual members to develop this understanding (Bouty, 2000). 
Learning or transfer of such know-how is then contingent upon the exchange environment 
and mechanisms that exist between the alliance partners. Inter-personal trust can lead to 
an increase cooperative behaviours and communication between alliance partners. That 
is, social climates that facilitate high levels of trust, cooperation, and shared language 
may result in employees investing greater effort in alliance activities, an increasing 
efficiency of interactions between employees, and greater risk taking and 
experimentation (Collins and Smith, 2006). In sum, it is expected that high interpersonal 
trust, based on previous experiences with another colleague in repeated interactions, tends 
to result in the decision to establish knowledge sharing routines between organizations in 
collaborations and from this the first hypothesis is formulated as:  
Hypothesis 1a: The higher the level of inter-personal trust in strategic alliances, 




By capturing, disseminating and applying alliance management knowledge, individuals 
within the firm are more likely to engage in stable and repetitive activity patterns (Winter, 
2003). A firm’s complementary capability can thus be seen as its ability to internalize 
complementary resources and capabilities from alliance partners (Kale et al., 2002). 
However, the development of the complementary capability that results in access to 
alliance partners’ resources depends on the existence of trust between people, since this 
can act as an organizing principle that facilitates the transfer of and adaptation of 
knowledge and practices to a wider circle of individuals (Jones and George, 1998; 
Heimeriks and Duysters, 2006). Individual experiences and skills account for an essential 
part of the organizational memory and entail a set of repetitive activities ensuring a 
smooth functioning of organizational operations (Coriat, 2000). Further, inter-personal 
trust enhances the degree of shared understanding between individuals, which is required 
for comprehending and integrating new resources and capabilities acquired from 
collaborations (Collins and Smith, 2006). 
Moreover, complementary capability is concern with learning complementary resources 
and capabilities between alliance parties, which may lead to a free-riding problem after 
sharing resources in terms of knowledge leakage. However, inter-personal trust can create 
a positive environment that facilitate learning. Learning success also rests upon an 
iterative process of exchange between the member firms and the extent to which 
personnel from them have direct and intimate contact to further an exchange (Badaracco, 
1991). This is because under such circumstances team members do not feel that they have 
to protect themselves from the others’ opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, the shared 
values that underlie good will trust provide individuals with the high degree of confidence 
in each other necessary for synergistic team relationships to emerge. That is, the sharing 
of values promotes high confidence in others, because one can be assured of the others' 
ultimate intentions and objectives (Bateson, 1988) and consequent displays of positive 
affect promote social bonding. Interpersonal trust is an essential condition of a 
functioning organization, because it creates the necessary commitment and confidence in 
the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge (Hoe, 2007). Researchers have found that 
positive affective states promote social interaction and creativity (Isen and Baron, 1991) 




Inter-personal trust also increases the willingness and ability of partners to engage in a 
mutual exchange of information and know-how to achieve reciprocal learning with 
confidence. In addition, von Hippel (1988) and Marsden (1990) have argued that close 
and intense interaction between individual members of the concerned organizations acts 
as an effective mechanism to transfer or learn sticky and tacit know how across the 
organizational interface. According to Jones and George (1998), the sharing of values 
characteristic of inter-personal trust provides individuals with the assurance they need to 
become fully involved in a team endeavour. In addition, inter-personal trust can also 
increase “interpersonal citizenship behavior”, i.e. increased assistance, a desire to help 
peers meet personal objectives, and the tangible expression of care and concern. 
Interpersonal trust can therefore be invaluable to organizations, in general, but especially 
to firms using cross-functional teams or other collaborative structures to coordinate work 
(Massey and Kyriazis, 2007). From this discussion, the next hypothesis is put forward as: 
Hypothesis 1b: The higher the level of inter-personal trust in strategic alliances, 
the higher the level of complementary capability  
From the TCE perspective, although the intent of the contracting parties is to work 
together, the potential for opportunistic behaviour does exist (Williamson, 1991). 
However, inter-personal trust facilitates informal cooperation and coordinated social 
interaction, and thus reduces the need to monitor others’ behaviour, formalise procedures, 
or create specific contracts (Williams, 2001). Importantly, McAllister (1995) found that 
peer managers who trust each other are more sensitive to each other’s personal and work-
related needs. In particular, they are less likely to engage in “control-based monitoring”, 
i.e. trying to manage the inherent uncertainty when they cannot count on the reliability of 
the other manager (Massey and Kyriazis, 2007). Interpersonal trust also increases “need-
based monitoring”, i.e. a sensitivity to and keeping track of colleagues’ needs (Clark et 
al., 1989). Conversely, in low trust relationships managers may behave defensively to 
protect themselves against the effects of unreliable peers. This can involve requesting 
assistance well before it is actually required, drawing on multiple, redundant sources of 
assistance, “working around” and avoiding others, and making requests more formally 




Since developing trust relies heavily on human relationships, the governance mechanisms 
involved will tend to be more informal rather than structural. Regarding this, informal 
governance mechanisms allow the verification of trust and mutual understanding. 
According to Jeffries and Reed (2000), two people in a collaboration may not only be 
confident in each other's abilities, but may also have trust in each other because of the 
mutual concern for well-being and the emotional attachment of friendship. As a result, 
inter-personal trust may influence the nature of the customizing of the alliance contractual 
process. For example, inter-personal relationships might sensitize managers and their 
organizations to potential disturbances to contractual relationships about which they were 
previously unaware, thus enabling them to foresee contingencies that may have an impact 
in the future better (Mayer and Argyres, 2004). Makhija and Ganesh (1997) identified a 
number of governance mechanisms at the personal level in strategic alliances, including 
teams and taskforces, meetings and organized personal contact, transfer of managers, and 
lateral movements, as well as certain rituals, traditions, and ceremonies. Also, in 
empirical research, mechanisms such as personnel transfers (Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Inkpen and Dinur, 1998) and training programmes (Inkpen, 1997; Lane et al., 2001; Lyles 
and Salk, 1996) have been found to be particularly effective at supporting the alliances, 
as they establish contact between the employees of the partners (Janowicz-Panjaitan and 
Noorderhaven, 2009). Furthermore, many cooperative behaviours between alliance team 
members have been seen to serve governance, production, and communication purposes, 
simultaneously, such as those concerning project scheduling, which are aimed at 
communicating plans, and at reaching common understanding as well as avoiding self-
serving actions. Hence, this researcher posits that:   
Hypothesis 1c: The higher the level of inter-personal trust in strategic alliances, 
the higher the level of effective governance  
3.3.2 Inter-organizational trust as an antecedent of relational capabilities 
According to Dyer and Singh (1998), knowledge sharing routines are particularly 
important since know-how transfers typically involve an iterative process of exchange, 
and the success of such transfers depends on whether personnel from the two firms have 
direct, intimate, and extensive face to face interactions. That is, after observing the 




team meetings and best practice, these authors concluded that this can enhance 
performance by engendering organizational capability development (ibid). In othe words, 
trust fosters openness and transparency that may smooth the knowledge exchange (Lee 
and Cavusgil, (2006). Moreover, inter-firm trust can benefit a firm by way of more access 
to tacit knowledge, increased risk sharing, and higher qualitative information since 
organizational actors are expected to be more willing to share sensitive and proprietary 
details about themselves or their organization when this is in place (Kale, Singh and 
Perlmutter, 2000; Zollo, et al., 2002; McEvily, Perrone and Zaheer, 2003; Williams, 
2007). However, since the costs of sharing know-how in collaborations are high, inter-
firm trust must be in place to allow knowledge sharing and to discourage free-riding 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998). Perceived trustworthiness reduces transaction costs and is 
positively correlated with greater information sharing in buyer-supplier collaborations 
and if the alliance partners can trust each other, they can predict the partners’ behaviours 
will not take the form of opportunism and hence, this will result in good faith regarding 
confidential information sharing (Dyer and Chu, 2003). In addition, as conﬁdence in a 
partner’s goodwill increases, there is closer cooperation, a more open information 
exchange, and a deeper commitment between the partners (Lui and Ngo, 2004). Inter-
firm trust is expected to promote positive attitudes that may facilitate communication and 
the sharing of information between alliance partners and thus, the following hypothesis 
is formulated:  
Hypothesis 2a: The higher the level of inter-firm trust in strategic alliances, the 
higher the level of knowledge sharing routines. 
It is posited that “close and intense interaction between organizations” is an effective 
mechanism for the sharing of complementary resources and capabilities across 
organizational boundaries (Inkpen and Dinur, 1998; Kale et al., 2000). That is, such 
informal commitment, which manifests itself as trust can result in learning for both the 
collaborating firms, which is because these efforts are considered as a sign of benevolence 
by both partners (Wasti and Wasti, 2008). As a corollary to this, when confidence in a 
partner’s good intention increases, there is more open information exchange and a deeper 
commitment between partners (Fryxell et al., 2002; De Jong and Klein Woolthuis, 2008). 




the firm will gain access to the complementary resources and capabilities through the 
interaction (Levin and Cross, 2004). 
Inter-firm trust encourages partners to minimize redundancies in exploiting each other’s 
complementary resources and capabilities. That is, if inter-firm trust or a sense of 
trustworthiness can be safeguarded, cooperative interactions are more probable and the 
firms’ efforts to cooperate should be more productive (Tyler, 2001). As such, the firm’s 
ability to acquire from and transfer complementary resources to their partners, is 
important for the ultimate outcome of an alliance (Björkman et al., 2007). At the 
organizational level, the performance benefits deriving from inter-firm trust include the 
competitive advantage that accrues from an organization's ability to reap the value added 
produced by teamwork, synergy, and the development of valuable organizational 
capabilities (Jones and George, 1998). In strategic alliances, where partners need each 
other’s resources and where reciprocal needs exist, they are less likely to resort to 
opportunism. That is, the resource interdependence created through mutual trust is likely 
to result in reciprocity, thereby reducing incentives for opportunistic behaviour, as both 
partners perceive value in their relationship (Sarkar et al., 2001). Thus, firms with high 
levels of mutual trust should be more confident in applying complementary capability 
with their alliance partners, because they are secure in their behaviour against 
opportunism and expect to receive reciprocal actions from them. 
Hypothesis 2b: The higher the level of inter-organizational trust in strategic 
alliances, the higher the level of complementary capability  
Inter-organizational trust stands as being relevant in situations where firms make 
substantial and open commitments to a partnership (Krishnan et al., 2006). However, one 
important concern with alliances is that conflict between partners can occasion high costs 
or a premature breakdown of relationships (Zaheer et al., 1998). Inter-firm trust helps 
defuse such conflict in alliances, because trusting partners are more likely to interpret 
each other’s actions in a manner conducive to the stability of the relationship. Regarding 
this, Doz (1996) argued that if a firm encounters unexpected actions by its partner that 
could be ascribed to both good and bad intentions, the presence of trust reduces the 
likelihood of a negative interpretation. For instance, when confronted with disappointing 




basis of an ineffective promotional campaign, or view the failure as signalling a lack of 
commitment on the part of the other party. Managing inter-organizational relationships 
involves using appropriate governance mechanisms, developing inter-firm knowledge 
sharing routines, making appropriate relationship-specific investments, and initiating 
necessary changes to the partnership as it evolves, while also managing partner 
expectations (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati et al., 2000). Moreover, effective governance 
capability is the capacity of the firm to assign an appropriate mix of formal and informal 
safeguards to govern the partnering relationship, which helps mitigate potential 
opportunism through the interaction of organizations and personnel across the 
organizations (Dyer and Kale, 2007). The resulting inter-firm trust reduces the need for 
time spent on monitoring and bargaining over agreements and allows firms to invest more 
effort in acquiring resources and capabilities from the alliance partners (Yli-Renko et al., 
2001). Under high levels of inter-organizational trust, firms are expected to apply 
effective governance capability to alliances based on open communication and preference 
for non-opportunistic, win-win solutions (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Kale et al., 
2000; Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009). This discussion suggests that inter- organizational 
trust facilitates relational governance mechanisms between alliance partners, which leads 
to: 
Hypothesis 2c: The higher the level of inter-organizational trust in strategic 
alliances, the higher the level of effective governance  
3.3.3 Asset specificity as an antecedent of relational capabilities 
Transaction value maximization is another important outcome of inter-organizational 
cooperation, for greater interdependence will lead to provision for information sharing 
and communication between the parties, in order to prevent potentially damaging 
contingencies from upsetting the relationship (Williamson, 1991). In addition, when 
partners are bilaterally dependent, the partner with greater impact on the relationship may 
require key decision rights in order to participate in the exchange (Grossman and Hart, 
1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). Furthermore, Dyer (1997) explained that in addition to 
enjoying economies of scale and scope with an increasing volume of exchange, partners 




asymmetry and the potential for opportunism, which in turn, minimizes transaction costs 
(Lui et al., 2009).  
Greater asset specificity would also be likely to increase the need for information sharing, 
because idiosyncratic exchanges tend to require greater coordination than standardized 
ones with alliance partners. Information exchange is broadly defined as the formal as well 
as informal sharing of rich, intensive, meaningful and timely information between firms 
(Corsten et al., 2011). It is closely related to learning routines, which are sometimes 
defined as a regular pattern of interactions among individuals that permits the transfer, 
recombination, or creation of specialized knowledge. Regarding which, effective firms 
have developed routines that allow them to develop, store and apply new knowledge 
systematically (Nelson and Winter, 1982). In addition, existing research suggests that 
knowledge sharing routines reduce the fear of opportunistic behaviour (Gulati, 1995; 
Zaheer et al., 1998), thus allowing for greater transparency during knowledge sharing and 
hence the next hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 3a: The higher the level of asset specificity, the higher the level of 
knowledge sharing routines.  
Clearly, one of the reasons that firms enter into alliances is because they lack certain 
capabilities needed to be successful in a desired arena (Das and Teng, 2000). The key 
factor to be considered in the alliance formation phase is partner complementarity, which 
concerns the contribution of non-overlapping resources by partners and interdependence 
between them. Complementary capability refers to the degree to which firms in an 
alliance are able to eliminate deficiencies in each other’s portfolio of resources (and, 
hence, enhance each other’s ability to achieve business goals) by supplying distinct 
capabilities, knowledge, and other things that lead to a more even resource distribution. 
Complementarity ensures that both partners bring different, but valuable, capabilities to 
the relationship and also creates the potential for each firm to learn from its partner (Kale 
et al., 2000). Mowery et al. (1996) found that complementarity between alliance partners 
correlates positively with inter-partner learning across the alliance interface. That si, 
when firms have complementary abilities, each partner can concentrate on the part of the 
value chain where it can make the greatest contribution. For example, in airline alliances, 




such alliances to be successful is based on the development of idiosyncratic systems that 
effectively integrate these capabilities so as to provide passengers with seamless travel 
(Varadarajan and Cunningham, 1995).  
According to Cohen and Levinthal (1990), complementary capability results from 
specific investments in strategic alliances. Asset specificity requires the development of 
complementary capability, because this motivates the development of higher order 
routines that can be used to combine and deploy the complementary resources pooled by 
the partner firms successfully. It helps firms to manage an alliance in a way that allows 
them to combine and synthesize successfully their complementary resources over time, 
thus creating idiosyncratic resources (Hunt, 2000; Spekman et al., 1999). Given the high 
stakes involved, suppliers will be very attentive to buyer needs and will apply their 
knowledge throughout the stages of innovation to develop novel solutions (Song and Di 
Benedetto, 2008). That is, suppliers stand at risk that the buyer will behave 
opportunistically and exploit their dependence, they will be more engaged and strive 
harder to meet and exceed the buyer’s requirements in order to safeguard their investment 
which, in turn, will enhance the innovativeness of products and processes. For instance, 
suppliers who feel they belong to the Honda supplier network are more willing to 
exchange information with that company than with competitive buyers (MacDuffie and 
Helper, 1997) and similarly, at Toyota, suppliers feel a sense of obligation to the network, 
which has stirred considerable sharing of tacit and explicit knowledge (Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 2000). Hence, it would appeared that more intensive and richer information 
exchange is engaged in by suppliers who identify with their buyers, which gives rise to: 
Hypothesis 3b: The higher the level of asset specificity in strategic alliances, the 
higher the level of complementary capability  
TCE implies that when alliance parties are dependent, i.e. when their joint activities are 
interrelated in ways that create asset specificity, they will make greater effort to identify 
potential contractual hazards and to incorporate safeguards into their contract, in 
particular, in terms of requiring constant monitoring effort in the market (Williamson 
1985). That is, firms need effective governance mechanisms to protect relationship-
specific assets as a safeguard of the transaction and the devising of contractual forms to 




provisions: for dispute resolution to prevent or adjudicate conflicts, for “hostages” to be 
exchanged, and for longer contract duration to enhance commitment (Williamson 1983, 
1985). Moreover, a firm can guard itself against opportunistic behaviour by using both 
formal and informal governance mechanisms (Sambasivan et al., 2013). According to 
Aoki (1990), in situations of ‘moderate’ uncertainty, the learning incentive will dominate 
and alliances will be formed, whereas when uncertainty is high, the risk of cheating and 
opportunism will be the major influence and hierarchical modes of organization will be 
sought. With regard to governance, several provisions can be added that are clearly aimed 
at preventing behaviour that is self-interested, if not opportunistic. For example it has 
been found that several such provisions serve governance, production, and 
communication purposes simultaneously, such as those concerning project scheduling, 
and those defining major and minor engineering changes (Mayer and Argyres, 2004).  
Because asset specificity creates relational routines that are alliance-specific and not 
tradable, partners are exposed to opportunism through negotiation (Dyer and Kale, 2007), 
but governance capabilities can help a firm deal with such situations. Recently, scholars 
have explored the possibility that firms can develop capabilities for governing activities 
in ways similar to those in which they develop production capabilities (e.g. Anand and 
Khanna, 2000; Azoulay and Shane, 2001; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Mayer and Argyres, 
2004). Capabilities in monitoring, a key component of governance capabilities, could 
help a firm track the progress of the contractor's investment and head off any attempts to 
shirk responsibility. Furthermore, knowing how to craft an effective contract could assist 
it in aligning better expectations so as to avoid misunderstandings, better specify 
milestones to facilitate monitoring, and to provide pecuniary incentives to discourage 
opportunistic renegotiation. Hence, this suggests: 
Hypothesis 3c: The higher the level of asset specificity in strategic alliances, the 
higher the level of effective governance  
3.3.4 HR distance as a barrier of relational capabilities 
The importance of managing cross-cultural alliances is reflected in the extensive 
literature on this topic, which has focused primarily on the structuring of cross-border 
partnerships. For example, a number of studies have examined the rationale for 




(Sirmon and Lane, 2004; Krishnan et al., 2006), and cross-border marketing partnership 
(Aulakh et al., 1996; Ling-yee and Ogunmokun, 2001; Skarmeas et al., 2002). More 
specifically, national culture is a type of organizational context that reflects the values of 
a society that establish the norms for behaviour and hence, can lead to behavioural 
uncertainty in collaborations. In other words, it encompasses the deeply-set values that 
are common to the members of a nation (Sirmon and Lane, 2004). At the firm level, 
organizational capabilities are embedded in the national environment, e.g. ways to 
interact with business partners, how to perceive the business environment, processes for 
allocation of organizational resources, human resource management policies and 
practices, characteristics of innovation processes and the technological products and 
services developed and exploited, all of which tend to differ across cultures (Kogut and 
Singh, 1988; Björkman et al., 2007). Consequently, different cultures between alliance 
partners is a form of uncertainty in transactions, which has been termed 'behavioural 
uncertainty' (Williamson, 1985) and arises from the difficulty in predicting the actions of 
the other party in the relationship, in view of the potential for opportunistic behaviour. 
According to Minbaeva et al. (2003), HRM practices of MNEs, such as training and 
competence, have an influence on employees’ abilities to transfer knowledge between 
organizations. Human resource distance can be defined as the culture-based factors that 
impede the flow of information between the firm and its partner or environment. Internal 
development opportunities, such as cross-training, promotion from within and mentoring, 
facilitate the development of shared language among employees by exposing them to the 
jargon and perspectives used by different functional areas and levels of their firm (Collins 
and Smith, 2006). Consequently, different types of human resources require a variety of 
structures to achieve their full potential. For instance, highly skilled employees may 
prosper under a regime of high personal autonomy, while less skilled ones may need more 
hierarchical structures, less delegation, and closer monitoring (Hofstede, 1993). Existing 
human resource management practices, transferred to another context, may thus not 
achieve the same results (Fey and Björkman, 2001; Fey et al., 2009; Estrin et al., 2009). 
HR management policies and practices (Cyr and Schneider, 1996) play an important role 
in signalling to employees what behaviour is valued. As discussed in these scholars’ 
work, communication, training, staffing, appraisal and reward systems have the potential 




strategic business objectives. However, consideration of the compatibility of the partners' 
employees who actually interact in the primary value-creating activities of an alliance 
may be underdeveloped (Pothukuchi et al., 2002; Simon and Lane, 2004). As Madhok 
and Tallman (1998) pointed out, many alliances fail to achieve their goals, in part, 
because the partners underestimate the difficulty of working together. One common cause 
of this shortcoming is a failure to attend to the differences in how each firm approaches 
the processes involved in the primary value-creating activities of the alliance. Based on 
the above notion of HR distance, this researcher proposes that the development of the 
unique capabilities that lead to tacit knowledge depends on the context of the alliance. 
Furthermore, Estrin et al. (2009) argued that differences in HR distance between countries 
of origins contribute to different organizational and administrative practices and 
employee expectations. Top management of MNEs from the same country may share 
assumptions about the generalizability of HR management competence, because cultural 
beliefs that are prominent in a country influence the values, beliefs, and hence the 
decisions of managers (Abo, 1994; Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994; Rosenzweig and 
Singh, 1991). As a result, the HR policies of MNEs based in the same country are likely 
to be more similar to each other than those of MNEs based in others. Regarding this, there 
is evidence that Japanese firms that face home environments with strong homogeneous 
institutional pressures, often adopt similar HR policies when operating overseas (Sing, 
1991; Thong, 1991; Yeh, 1991). 
Knowledge sharing between alliance partners can be affected by HR distance since 
individual behaviour is embedded in a broader institutional context that differs in its 
characteristics (Hofstede, 2001; Michailova and Hutchings, 2006; Makela et al., 2012). 
Previous research indicates that the different business environments may affect the firms’ 
perceptions of their alliance partners’ opportunistic behaviours, because uncertainty 
poses difficulties for the firms meeting their obligations (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; 
Skarmeas et al, 2002; Hitt et al., 2006). For competitive reasons, alliance partners may 
be highly protective of their knowledge resources. That is, knowledge sharing can be 
hampered by a lack of common understanding of market-oriented systems or of the 
corporate strategy intended for the venture (Cyr and Schneider, 1996). Consequently, 
clear communication of firms’ strategies and policies, of their goals, and of individual 




understanding of new strategic directions in collaborations. Regarding which, shared 
codes and language comprise a common set of terms, symbols, and understandings that 
allow individuals to communicate effectively with one another (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 
1998). Moreover, some researchers have found that although language differences exist, 
these are not as problematic as might expected, becasue many local managers and 
employees have expressed a strong desire to learn a foreign language (Cyr and Schneider, 
1996). HR distance creates additional difficulties and challenges for managers, whereby 
they have to spend more time on inter-organizational communication, such as knowledge-
sharing and knowledge-transfer routines (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Hitt et al., 2006), 
design of compatible work routines, and development of common managerial approaches 
(Simonin, 1999). Specific to learning, Mowery et al. (1996) contended that the forbidding 
barriers of culture, language, educational background, and distance with cross national 
partners are likely to result in lower levels of learning and knowledge transfer. These 
barriers have also been noted as accentuating partner tendencies to engage in 
opportunistic behaviours (Kale et al. (2000). This debate leads to the following: 
Hypothesis 4a: The higher the level of HR distance between alliance partners, the 
lower the level of knowledge sharing routines. 
Cultural sensitivity on the part of foreign managers is considered to be an important 
aspect in joint learning. In particular, the different business environments may affect 
firms’ perceptions of their alliance partners’ opportunistic behaviours, because 
behavioural uncertainty poses difficulties regarding their meeting their obligations 
(Skarmeas et al., 2002). Creating and learning a new corporate culture, which fits with 
the values and requirements of the locals, whilst at the same time being consistent with 
the foreign partner’s policies and practice for the accomplishment of specific company 
strategic objectives becomes crucial (Cyr and Schneider, 1996). In a stable, predictable 
environment, organizations might efficiently achieve complementary capability by using 
bureaucratic systems that focus on developing a human capital pool with a narrow range 
of skills and HR systems that elicit restricted employee behaviour (Wright and Snell, 
1998).  
To what degree these assets are shared with the parent depends largely on the parent's 




venture and the parent firm. When learning from the outside, in particular from abroad, 
is seen as an admission of weakness, the receptivity will be poor (Westney, 1988) and 
low receptivity to inputs from the partnership will naturally encourage a passive attitude 
towards the transfer of knowledge among staff. This tendency is further reinforced if the 
socialization activities in the partnership are controlled by the local parent, as is often the 
case in Western joint ventures in Japan (Pucik, 1988). For example, the American 
managers in the Alpha-Hito JV were convinced that Alpha manufacturing processes 
could be substantially improved if an effort was made to learn from the alliance. The 
Japanese partner, as well, was quite willing to share its technology. However, at the 
executive level in Alpha, several levels above the alliance manager level, there was a very 
different perspective in that they questioned the learning potential, given the JV’s modest 
financial results, and the applicability of what they referred to as “Japanese” management 
techniques in the American plants. This case illustrates what Edgar Schein referred to as 
a lack of alignment between different organizational cultures in that there were two 
cultural communities directly involved in the alliance and when compared to the 
assumptions of the parent executives, the alliance managers had very different 
assumptions about the alliance relationship, objectives, and performance. Because the 
two communities had different assumptions, when the organization attempted to learn 
from its alliance, the cultures collided and accessing complementary resources and 
capabilities was frustrated, which gives rise to: 
Hypothesis 4b: The higher the level of HR distance between alliance partners, the 
lower the level of complementary capability 
HR distance between the partners also may influence alliance governance mechanisms. 
Under TCE perspective, governance structures of market and hierarchy are more 
dependent upon broader environmental factors, such as legal and institutional contexts, 
that are not under the direct control of transaction partners (Lu, 2002; Peng, 2009). An 
MNE that establishes an overseas affiliate in partnership with a local firm will experience 
greater institutional pressures to utilize local HR practices, because the local operation, 
prior to the arrival of the MNE, had functioned under a local system. Arguably, HR 
distance creates barriers to the use of incentives as well as to authoritative and relational 
governance mechanisms, such as trust and relational norms (Estrin et al., 2009). To be 




establishing effective governance mechanisms. The latter is defined as the capacity of 
HR management to facilitate the organization's ability to adapt effectively and in a timely 
manner to changing or diverse demands from either its environment or from within the 
firm itself (Taylor et al., 1996). As the firm becomes increasingly dependent, the need for 
flexibility will increase, and the highest level will be required during the most advanced 
stage of inter-firm collaboration. The concept of coordination flexibility, as applied to 
HR management practices, addresses the issue of how quickly the practices can be 
resynthesized, reconfigured, and redeployed. In much of the literature on achieving fit 
between strategy and HR management practices, scholars assume that the HR department 
quickly, efficiently, and effectively develops and implements new practices consistent 
with a firm's strategic needs in an environment free of obstacles (Wright and Snell, 1998). 
However, alliance firms which have greater HR distance are unlikely to be fit and flexible 
due to different HR practices among them and it must be assumed that the partner is doing 
the same, as much of the necessary information is actually in the public domain (Taylor 
et al., 1996). Therefore, this researcher expects that the larger are these HR differences, 
the greater the integration and coordination challenges to establish mutual governance 
decisions for alliance partners and hence puts forward: 
Hypothesis 4c: The higher the level of HR distance between alliance partners, the 
lower the level of effective governance  
3.4 Mediation effects of relational capabilities 
Firms engage in buyer-supplier alliances because they expect to benefit from the 
relationship and only as long as they perceive this to be the case do they continue with 
the collaboration (Carr and Pearson, 1999). Alliance performance in this study is seen as 
being in alignment with the definition of ‘relational rent’ as presented in Dyer and Singh’s 
(1998) relational view perspective. The relational view leads to competitive advantage 
for the firm, because the relationship-specific resources and capabilities result in (1) the 
attainment of extra marginal performance that is unavailable in the market and (2) impose 
difficulties for a partnership outsider to comprehend the value of specificity and hence to 
be able to achieve superior performance (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006; Dyer and 




This researcher expects to find inter-organizational trust and alliance performance at the 
root of the causal relationship through the relational capabilities mechanism. Previous 
research focused on the influence of inter-firm trust and alliance performance (Luo, 2002; 
Krishnan et al., 2006; Krause et al., 2007; Robson et al., 2008; Robson et al., 2008; Carey 
et al., 2011), but the mixed results in these studies suggest that relational resources alone, 
such as trust and partner commitment, are not enough to achieve good outcome (Kale et 
al., 2002; Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007; Kale et al., 2007; Nielsen and Nielsen, 2009; 
Mesquita et al., 2008). According to the literature, trust strongly influences alliance 
performance. Regarding this, Kanter (1994) reported trust to be a key element of alliance 
success for almost 40 companies competing in 11 countries, while Sherman (1992) cited 
a lack of trust to be a major cause of alliance failure. Cooperative behaviour can be rooted 
in many different factors, two in particular are focused upon here: calculative and trust 
(Peccei and Guest 2002). In line with the concept of capabilities in the study of Dosi, 
Nelson and Winter (2000), the firm needs capabilities to transform those resources in 
order to achieve alliance performance. Relational capabilities are the routines of the firm 
that enable it to deliver alliance goals to the organization. Inter-personal and inter-
organizational trust can enhance a firm’s relational capabilities by: (1) improving inter-
firm coordination and resource support of alliances; (2) acting as a focal point for learning 
and leveraging complementary resources and capabilities from ongoing alliances; and (3) 
monitoring and controlling alliance governance. All these activities should help the firm 
in generating greater value and success with its alliances. The existence of alliance 
capability, due to the dedicated alliance function and its specific role described above, 
may be useful in generating alliance performance. The following subsections consider in 
detail the mediation roles of relational capabilities on the link between relational 
dimensions and alliance performance, which includes inter-personal and inter-
organizational trust. 
With a high level of inter-personal trust in strategic alliances, team members are likely to 
use cooperative routines, such as knowledge sharing, to manage projects. That is, inter-
personal trust promotes the exchange of valuable ideas between core knowledge workers 
that will, in turn, lead to greater alliance success. In contrast, when trust among employees 
is low, individuals will be cautious about exchanging information and ideas with one 




inter-personal trust develops as people exchange information and develop positive 
attitudes towards each other, thus allowing them to take the role of the other. Through 
inter-personal trust people develop stable expectations of each other that routinize their 
interactions and thus, makes them predictable and reliable. In particular, knowledge 
sharing routines can facilitate the communication and the quality of the exchanged 
information. Moreover, if there is high level of trust among alliance team members, they 
are likely to be more open to sharing their knowledge (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). 
Trusting the other makes one party more open and willing to accept the knowledge 
offered by this person (Chiles and McMackin 1996) and trustworthiness of the source can 
thus be conceived of as a proxy for the quality and veracity of the knowledge conveyed 
(McEvily et al. 2003). As a result, alliances which have robust inter-personal trust are 
likely to achieve alliance success, which leads to the hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5a: Inter-personal trust affects operational performance through 
knowledge sharing routines  
Hypothesis 5b: Inter-personal trust affects strategic performance through 
knowledge sharing routines  
Inter-personal trust reflects a trustor’s belief that a trustee will not act opportunistically, 
thereby increasing their willingness to access complementary resources and capabilities 
with alliance partners (Kale et al., 2000). Through inter-personal trust people develop 
stable expectations of each other that routinize their interactions and make them 
predictable and reliable. Positive attitudes characteristic of inter-personal trust may 
provide an individual with a certain degree of confidence in others, but this is often 
guarded, in that the individual can never be sure about the others' real intentions or 
ultimate goals (Dasgupta, 1988). Therefore, alliance team members are more likely to 
engage in synergistic social behaviours and make organizational-specific investments 
(Jones and George, 1998). This higher-order resource consists of or is captured by 
complementary capability, which can increase a firm’s ability to perform repeatable 
patterns of action with respect to, for instance, identifying complementary resources and 
capabilities in alliances (Dyer et al., 2001; Simonin, 1997). 
Furthermore, shared values result in a strong desire to cooperate, even at personal 




1998). That is, a climate for shared codes provides a common base of understanding 
through which individuals with different experiences and backgrounds can integrate new 
resources and capabilities and benefit from collaboration. Moreover, a greater level of 
inter-personal trust between alliance staff will positively affect alliance performance by 
facilitating complementary capability in alliance projects, whereby members are more 
likely to cooperate and develop synergistic team relationships. In turn, these relations 
lead to superior performance benefits, such as the development of unique organizational 
capabilities and extra-role behaviours that can give an organization a competitive 
advantage. Hence, this researcher hypothesizes that:  
Hypothesis 6a: Inter-personal trust affects operational performance through 
complementary capability  
Hypothesis 6b: Inter-personal trust affects strategic performance through 
complementary capability  
The existence of a high level of inter-personal trust provides negotiators with an 
opportunity to obtain more complete information, thus allowing project team members to 
feel comfortable with any deal that is reached (Jeffries and Reed, 2000).  Moreover, a 
high level of inter-personal trust provides an environment in which questions can be 
asked and answered without fear of creating irreparable damage to a friendship, which 
permits a more aggressive stance in the offers and counter-offers that are made. 
Consequently, the range of options considered will be more extensive and the probability 
of finding the best possible solution increased (Thompson, 1991). In addition, such inter-
personal trust might also help firms to more effectively use contracts to facilitate 
adaptation to change and flexible adjustment, or how to craft agreements that better 
safeguard vulnerable assets and enhance alliance performance. Thus, this researcher 
predicts that effective governance mechanisms are likely to mediate the relationship 
between inter-personal trust and alliance performance.   
Hypothesis 7a: Inter-personal trust affects operational performance through 
effective governance mechanisms 
Hypothesis 7b: Inter-personal trust affects strategic performance through 




Kale et al. (2000) found that trust and commitment enables the quick and accurate 
movement of potentially useful and important information through the network. Mutual 
trust also has a direct influence on acquiescence and cooperative behaviour (Morgan and 
Hunt, 1994), which stabilizes and strengthens an alliance. As a result, such trust improves 
communication between alliance partners (Schreiner, Kale, and Corsten, 2009). A firm’s 
superior communication ability should make it easier for its partner to increase its own 
knowledge about the focal firm’s competences, idiosyncrasies, and alliance motives, and 
thereby lead to higher sales or profit for the firm. This can reciprocally enhance the 
partner’s willingness to disclose relevant information about its own customers to the focal 
firm. A firm’s open and honest communication with its partner also demonstrates its 
reliability and trustworthiness, which consequently may lead the latter to feel secure in 
granting a preferred partner status to the former. This researcher proposes that firms who 
have higher levels of trust with alliance partners and have developed knowledge sharing 
routines are more likely to be successful in managing alliance projects. That is, inter-
organizational collaboration, which creates conditions for organizations to access and 
share each other’s organizationally embedded, knowledge-based resources, is considered 
to be a particularly effective means of mutual learning (Inkpen 1997; Muthusamy and 
White 2005). A high level of relational bonds between the partners can also enhance the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the alliance, because these bonds reduce costly 
safeguarding needs against opportunistic behaviour and facilitate the transfer of 
knowledge (Schreiner et al., 2009). Moreover, knowledge sharing between alliance 
partners at the organizational and personal levels can increase information volume and 
diversity, which will allow for better planning, goal setting, problem solving and 
adjustments that, in turn, improve buyer performance (Lawson et al., 2008). Therefore, it 
is posited that:    
Hypothesis 8a: Inter-organizational trust affects operational performance 
through knowledge sharing routines 
Hypothesis 8b: Inter-organizational trust affects strategic performance through 
knowledge sharing routines 
For a collaborative relationship to start and flourish, signs of each parties’ goodwill, i.e. 




communicative, honest, and ethical. Each party needs also to become convinced about 
the other’s technical and business capabilities (Doney and Cannon, 1997; Sako and 
Helper, 1998). In other words, one’s maturity and ability to participate in interaction 
where the benefits can be equally and mutually seen is likely to result in the desired 
alliance outcomes. In particular, when a firm has a strong self-reference based on 
previous interactions, it is able to trust alliance partners (Blomqvist, 2002) and thus create 
confident learning environment between those involved. Various studies have suggested 
that firms which consistently generate above-average rents in alliances possess specific 
alliance capabilities (Anand and Khanna, 2000; Kale and Singh, 1999). More specifically, 
inter-firm trust encourages firms to grant others access to their tacit knowledge (Dirks 
and Ferrin 2001; McEvily et al. 2003), which leads to better understanding of the 
demands of customers, and faster identification of the complementary resources and 
capabilities appropriate for acting on such information (Dow, 2006; Ellis, 2000). 
Moreover, closer inter-organizational relations with alliance partners enables firms to 
change product attributes more rapidly than competitors (Bruton et al., 2007). In addition, 
by proactively taking on and effectively nurturing inter-organizational trust, firms are 
likely to become more flexible and adaptive in responding to the requests of alliance 
partners and the changing needs of dynamic environments. Moreover, Mesquita et al. 
(2008) found that firms’ relational resources and relational capabilities develop suppliers’ 
production efficiency in strategic alliances, the additional value from which could 
eventually be reflected in improved sales or profitability for the focal firm. Hence, 
complementary capability could facilitate the fulfillment of several key strategic goals in 
a given alliance, which gives rise to:  
Hypothesis 9a: Inter-organizational trust affects operational performance 
through complementary capability 
Hypothesis 9b: Inter-organizational trust affects strategic performance through 
complementary capability 
Effective alliance governance reduces coordination and integration costs relative to those 
associated with the use of other transaction mechanisms to form alliances (Ireland et al., 
2002). However, goodwill trust extends beyond contractual obligations in that partners 




explicitly guaranteed (Sako, 1991). In fact, with a high level of inter-firm trust, firms can 
lower expected governance costs over all three modes whenever exchange hazards are 
present. Put differently, trust always complements a firm’s governance choices with 
respect to performance, because it facilitates making adjustments that lower costs (Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002). Furthermore, inter-organizational trust can act as a substitute for 
formal governance by enabling the use of less-formal modes and thus enhancing 
performance in all three recognised governance modes (Gulati and Nickerson, 2008), and 
in turn improves exchange performance. In addition, inter-organizational trust facilitates 
mutual understanding between alliance partners, thereby allowing for the benefit of the 
doubt, which thus reduces the costs of inter-partner conflict as well as other transaction 
costs (Dyer and Chu, 2003; Zaheer et al., 1998). With high level of inter-organizational 
trust in alliance projects, firms could make decisions regarding the governance 
mechanisms that lower their costs while maintaining strong relational ties with alliance 
partners. Hence, it is hypothesized that:  
Hypothesis 10a: Inter-organizational trust affects operational performance 
through effective governance mechanisms 
Hypothesis 10b: Inter-organizational trust affects strategic performance through 
effective governance mechanisms 
Compared to general purpose investments, idiosyncratic assets that are tailored to the 
requirements of the buyer create unique innovative products and processes, because these 
assets are not available to the buyer’s competitors (Stump and Heide, 1996). Furthermore, 
asset specificity makes possible the integration of the partner firms’ individual resources, 
that is, allows alliances to extract the competitive advantage potential from the 
combination of their respective resources (Hunt 2000). Since asset specificity is unique 
to the alliance and is constantly evolving, this helps to maintain the durability and 
inimitability of their resource advantage (Dyer and Singh 1998; Jap 1999). In addition, 
according to Dyer (1997), after observing Toyota’s affiliated suppliers, asset specificity 
impacts on cost performance and in many situations, the primary objective of making 
relation-specific investments is to obtain a differential cost advantage. Furthermore, asset 
specificity represents a greater level of commitment as it reflects higher switching costs 




to make the current collaborative relationship as effective as possible (Corsten et al., 
2011). Based on TCE, asset specificity is useful in strengthening the ties among members 
by weakening the flexibility of pursuing other alternatives or severing the inter-
organizational relationships (Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999). Some researchers 
have claimed that a partner’s specific asset investment indicates the expectation of 
commitment of the relationship, because this is created or purchased for a particular 
strategic purpose, which may not be easily transferred to other functions (Young-Ybarra 
and Wiersema, 1999) and hence, is likely to lose value upon transfer (Parkhe, 1993). 
Moreover, asset specificity investments provide strong incentives for firms to work with 
alliance partners on joint value creation initiatives (Corsten et al., 2011). Therefore, 
partnering firms involved in a collaborative relationship characterized by high levels of 
asset specificity are more likely to be highly interdependent in terms of task, goal and 
achievements. In addition, the value of any specialized investments will vary according 
to the degree of task interdependence, which refers to 'the extent to which the items or 
elements upon which work is performed or the work processes themselves are interrelated 
so that changes in the state of one element affect the state of the other' (Scott, 1987: 214). 
That is, the higher the degree of interdependence, the more specialized assets must be 
devoted to coordination (Dyer, 1996). Hence, inter-organziational collaborations will 
become more accommodative and will improve when the focal firm creates a dependence 
situation by investing high asset specificity in the partnership (Aulakh et al., 1996; Joshi 
and Stump, 1999; Luo, 2002). 
Moreover, close and intensive interactions are characterized by higher levels of 
information exchange and are preconditions for achieving performance benefits (Krause, 
1999). When alliance partners share important information related to sourcing and 
logistics, they are more likely to increase quality as well as reducing material and 
processing costs (Carr and Pearson, 1999). Moreover, sharing information with alliance 
partners reduces inventory cost because suppliers can better account for demand trends 
and subsequent ordering changes in supply chain management (Cachon and Fisher, 
2000). The firm that implements such activities will improve its cost performance. 
Finally, rich information exchange concerning process failures or supply chain 
disruptions will allow swift reactions and elimination of such issues (Paulraj et al., 2008). 




and performance. For example, Luo (2002) demonstrated that cooperation positively 
drives international joint venture performance. As shown by Dyer and Nobeoka (2000), 
the knowledge and sharing routines inferred in information exchange construct result in 
process and product innovations. Greater asset specificity is also likely to increase the 
need for information sharing, because idiosyncratic exchanges tend to require greater 
coordination than standardized exchanges with alliance partners. Hence, this gives rise 
to: 
Hypothesis 11a: Asset specificity affects operational performance through 
knowledge sharing routines 
Hypothesis 11b: Asset specificity affects strategic performance through 
knowledge sharing routines 
Complementary capability facilitates the combining ‘of tangible and intangible asset 
possessed by the alliance partners to create idiosyncratic resources that may be used to 
efficiently alliance management and affects alliance outcomes’ (Kale et al., 2000). As 
strategic alliances become more important as an organizational form for accessing 
resources, they become vital to a firm's overall performance. Owing to the perceived 
overlap of goals, values and beliefs and the shared language that facilitates 
communication, suppliers who identify with their buyers increase the exchange of 
information and learning beyond traditional supplier–buyer relationships. 
Interdependence in strategic alliances includes goal, task and reward interdependence 
(Sambasivan et al. 2013). This notion is akin to the idea that investments of specific assets 
by partner firms will enable them to focus on specific goals and tasks in the alliance 
(Wageman and Baker, 1997). Martin and Salomon (2003a) formalized technology 
transfer as a firm-specific capability. They proposed that this capability, inherent in the 
development and creation of technological capabilities, decreases the costs of sharing 
knowledge and bestows upon a firm the capability to protect proprietary assets during 
technology transfer better (Mayer and Salomon, 2006). Cooperation also offers a 
platform for inter-organizational learning (Dyer and Singh, 1998). For example, Von 
Hippel (1988) found that most innovations can be traced back to suppliers, which 
suggests that a firm's alliance partners are the most important sources of new ideas and 




collaborative relationship characterized by high levels of asset specificity are more likely 
to be highly interdependent in terms of task, goal and reward achievements than those 
that are not. Based on the above discussion, it is hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 12a: Asset specificity affects operational performance through 
complementary capability  
Hypothesis 12b: Asset specificity affects strategic performance through 
complementary capability  
Under the condition that firms invest in greater asset specificity, effective governance 
mechanisms prevent opportunistic behaviours and facilitate operational management 
running smoothly. If effective governance is based on some resource dependence 
between partners, this acts as an effective means to monitor and control partner behaviour 
(Filatotchev, Stephan, and Jindra, 2008). Moreover, effective governance mechanisms 
help a firm craft better ex ante contracts to define the roles and responsibilities of each 
party clearly, specify the knowledge to be exchanged, identify appropriate milestones and 
specify the monitoring mechanisms (Dyer and Kale, 2007). Further, effective governance 
enhances the likelihood of alliance success by reducing cost of relationship-specific 
investment in several ways, such as contracting costs being minimized because firms 
implement routines to monitor alliance partners to behave fairly, monitoring costs are 
lower because external, third-party monitoring is not required and costs of complex 
adaptation are lowered because partners are willing to be flexible in response to 
unforeseen circumstances (Dyer and Singh, 1998).  Therefore, this researcher proposes 
that:  
Hypothesis 13a: Asset specificity affects operational performance through 
effective governance mechanisms 









In conclusion, figure 3.1 presents the theoretical framework of this thesis which is built 
on hypothesis development in this chapter.  
 








3.5 Chapter summary 
The main research questions focus on the antecedents, barriers and consequents of 
relational capabilities in cross-cultural strategic alliance management. To address these 
questions, this researcher has integrated the relational and economic dimensions into a 
relational capabilities framework. That is, it is proposed that inter-personal trust, inter-
organizational trust and asset specificity are factors facilitating relational capabilities that 
represent commitment to create value in the collaboration. More specifically, trust is 
likely to promote positive attitudes that facilitate communication and the sharing of 
information, while asset specificity promotes incentives to be an economic hostage in the 
alliance. In addition, relational capabilities play an important role as mediators in the 
relationship between inter-firm factors, namely trust and asset specificity, and alliance 
performance. The next chapter discusses the research methodology adopted for empirical 








































This chapter presents the research design and data analysis approach for this study. As 
the research aim is to predict and generalize the conditions that are appropriate for 
applying trust, TCE and relational capabilities to managing strategic alliance projects 
between MNE subsidiaries and local suppliers in the Thai manufacturing sector a 
quantitative analysis method is adopted. First, the research philosophy and the research 
design of this study are discussed. Next the operationalization of the variables are 
presented and finally, the data collection, the unit of analysis and the analysis techniques 
are described and justified.  
4.2 Research philosophy  
The philosophical aspects underpinning methods facilitate their categorization into 
paradigms. The concept of the paradigm was proposed initially by Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn, 
1970). It is applied when a high level of professional consensus is recognized within 
particular communities of scientists, regarding aspects of philosophical beliefs, theories, 
standards for research and exemplary findings (Kuhn, 1970). This scholar claimed that 
the formation of paradigms is related to philosophical assumptions in his comment that 
researchers should explore certain basic questions, such as: what are the fundamental 
entities of which the universe is composed? How do these interact with each other and 
with the senses? What questions may legitimately be asked about such entities and what 
techniques employed in seeking solutions? (ibid). Kuhn also emphasized that 
philosophical positions are adopted about: the nature of matter, what can be known, and 
how can this knowledge be attained when conducting research. Furthermore, within a 
specific paradigm it is likely that a consensus exists with regards to particular research 
methods concerning fundamental equations, their associated theories and the basic 
concepts underpinning these theories (Clark, 1998).     
A research paradigm comprises a basic set of beliefs that guide human action and provide 
a philosophical basis for the research strategy (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). An 




clarify research designs and recognize which design may work in certain investigations, 
and which will not, that may be beyond his or her previous research experiences 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). According to Burrell and Morgan (2003), a comprehensive 
classification of social research under four key paradigms each of which has distinct 
philosophical assumptions about the nature of social science and the nature of society can 
be drawn up. Each paradigm offers a coherent view of the social world and they are: 
ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology.  
4.3 Classification of different research philosophy 
4.3.1 Basic philosophical assumptions 
1) Ontology 
Ontology is defined as the assumptions that we make about the nature of reality 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007).  The key ontological 
question is ‘what is the form and nature of reality and, therefore, what is there that can be 
known about it?’ Ontological assumptions distinguish between two concepts; 
objectivism/realism and constructionism/nominalism. Objectivism/realism relates to an 
ontological assumption through which social phenomena and their meanings have an 
existence that is independent of social actors (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Hence, reality is 
external to individuals; i.e. reality is objective in nature (Burrell and Morgan, 2000). 
Constructionism/nominalism is concerned with an alternative ontological stance that 
underlines the subjective nature of social phenomena and their meanings; i.e. reality is 
continually accomplished by social actors (Bryman and Bell, 2007). It postulates that the 
social world external to an individual’s cognition is made up of only names, concepts and 
labels that structure reality (Burrell and Morgan, 2000). Hence, reality is the product of 
individual consciousness; i.e. reality has a subjective nature.  
2) Epistemology 
Epistemology concerns what is regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline i.e. what 
is known to be true (Bryman and Bell, 2007). The main question here is whether or not 
the social world can be studied through the same forms of knowledge (principles, rules, 
systems) as are applied in the natural sciences. Consequently, the assumptions of 




to the general set of assumptions regarding the best ways of enquiring into the nature of 
the world (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). The key epistemological questions are: ‘What is 
the relationship of the researcher to that being researched and what can be known? Should 
the researcher remain independent of that being researched in an attempt to control for 
bias, or should the researcher interact with that being studied?’ Here the prime concern 
is with the nature of the reality of the phenomenon under investigation. Epistemological 
and methodological considerations are involved at each stage of the research process as 
the information collected by the researcher, whether qualitative and/or quantitative, is 
transformed through analysis into data, and then into knowledge (Briggs and Coleman, 
2007). 
3) Human nature   
This paradigm concerns the relationship between human beings and their environment. It 
is related to the behaviour of humans; i.e. how they respond to external forces, and the 
ways in which humans respond lead to the construction of different models of man. The 
deterministic model considers man and his activities as being completely influenced by 
the situation or by his environment. That is, human beings and their experiences are seen 
as products of the environment (Burrell and Morgan, 2000) and positivism emphasises 
these deterministic relationships, seeking to elicit the causes of the mechanisms that 
produce effects (Neuman, 2006). The main argument of the deterministic approach is that 
positivism is grounded in absolute determinism, i.e. people are like robots or puppets who 
must always respond in the same way. The causal laws derived from this stance are 
probabilistic, so although they may help in making accurate predictions of the expected 
social behaviour of a large group, they cannot be expected to be applicable to the specific 
behaviour of one specific person within the group.  
The other model of human nature is voluntarism which implies that man is completely 
autonomous and free-willed (Burrell and Morgan, 2000). Here man is regarded as the 
creator of his environment and hence, human actions are based on the subjective choices 
and reasons of individuals. Since interpretivism emphasizes voluntary individual free 
choices, this perspective is supported by the interpretivist approach (Neuman, 2006). The 
main argument against voluntarism is that external forces have certain impacts on human 




activities, they should also consider the intermediate viewpoint taking into account both 
situational and voluntary elements when dealing with human beings’ activities. 
4) Methodology 
Methodology addresses the combination of techniques used to enquire into a specific 
situation (Lincoln and Guba, 2000; Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). It focuses on the way in 
which knowledge is obtained or investigated and as such, refers to the approach adopted 
for the research. The key methodological question is ‘what is the process of research?’ In 
past literatures, the two common research methodologies that relate theory to reality are 
the inductive and deductive approaches (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Saunders et al., 
2007). The inductive approach involves theory building and begins with empirical 
observation, which leads to identification or development of the theoretical phenomenon 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007). Moreover, the methodology provides a rationale for the ways 
in which researchers conduct their research activities (Briggs and Coleman, 2007) and 
indicates the best means of gathering knowledge about the world in terms of methods, 
techniques, or tools. Each paradigm of the three discussed above reflects a specific 
methodological stance through which knowledge can be investigated and obtained. The 
deductive approach relates to theory testing and is used to derive a set of hypothesis (or 
relationships among dependent and independent variables) and seeks to test these to prove 
or disprove hypotheses. That is, based on the data collected, a theory is accepted, rejected 
or modified (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002; Saunders et al., 2007; Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
The inductive approach is commonly aligned to the research falling within the 
constructivism/phenomenology paradigm, whereas a deductive approach is often adopted 
when testing observed phenomenon under the positivism/post-positivism paradigm (de 
Vaus, 2005). Below in table 4.1 the philosophical assumptions related to positivism and 
interpretivisms are summarized. This research follows the deductive research 
methodology to develop the hypotheses related to the relationship between relational 










Table 4.1: Philosophical assumptions related to positivism and interpretivism 
 
Factor Positivism Interpretivism 
Research purpose Discovering natural laws 
to predict and control 
events 
Understanding and 
describing social situations 
Objective Explanatory  Exploratory 
Ontological 
stance 
Reality is already 
in existence and stable, ready 
to be discovered. Objective 
to human 
cognition 
Relativism: no single point of 
view or value position is 
better than others; 




Objectivism: the researcher 
is 
objective by viewing reality 
through a “one-way mirror”. 
Dualism: the researcher 




the researcher is a “passionate 
participant” or interactively 
linked within the world being 
studied 
Human nature  Deterministic Voluntarism 
Methodology Concerned with testing 
theory using quantitative 
methods: experimental 
design and non-experimental 
design 
e.g. survey, simulation 
modelling 
Narrative, phenomenology 
ethnography grounded theory 
case studies 
Research logic  Deductive Inductive 
Nature of knowledge Verified hypotheses 
established as facts or laws 
Individual reconstructions 
coalescing around consensus 
Values Value free Values are integral part of 
social life 
Methods Purely quantitative Mainly qualitative 
Findings Findings are true Finding are literally created 
 
4.3.2 Positivism and Social Constructionism  
Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) identify two contrasting views commonly adopted in 
management research as positivism and social constructionism in terms of research 
paradigm (Bryman, 2004; Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe, 2002; Guba, 1990; 






Positivism is an epistemological stance that supports the application of natural science 
methods to social research which is grounded in discovering causal laws, careful 
empirical observations, and value free research (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Neuman, 2006). 
The ontological assumption of positivism is that reality in positivist research is external 
and is objective in nature. The epistemological assumption is that the social world exists 
externally and its properties should be measured through objective methods rather than 
being inferred subjectively. Positivist interpretation is nomothetic in that it is based on a 
system of general laws and researchers connect causal laws and observed facts about 
social life with deductive logic. That is, under this nomothetic view, the researcher applies 
scientific methods of the natural sciences (Neuman, 2006). The positivistic researcher 
assumes the role of an objective analyst, making detached interpretations about the data 
independent of the informants. Thus, a deductive approach is emphasized to measure the 
concepts being studied by collecting quantitative data. To verify hypotheses, these are 
subjected to empirical tests, in order to prove or disprove the proposition under carefully 
controlled conditions (Bryman, 2004; Easterby-Smith, et al., 2002; Guba, 1990; Lincoln 
and Guba, 2003).  
However, Gill and Johnson (2002) have drawn on the criticisms regarding positivism 
made by Laing (1967) as follows: 1) human action has its own logic which must be 
considered in order to present a comprehensive interpretation of action; 2) the logic of 
natural science does not capture the subjective perspective of human beings in 
understanding action, so that such a methodology is inappropriate and insufficient; 3) the 
social world cannot be understood through causal law as human action is purposive and 
becomes explainable only when its subjective quality is considered. Although empiricism 
has been recognized as a philosophy in itself (Clark, 1998), it is best understood as a 
quantitative paradigm that can be shaped by more than one philosophy. 
2) Post-positivism  
Post-positivism is an alternative research philosophy that moves away from the positivist 
view and puts a stress on critical realism. A proponent of critical realism contends that 
there is a reality independent of our thinking about it. Nowadays, it is proposed that post-




researchers’ empirical methods and its underlying tenet is that all observation is fallible 
and all theories are revisable (Kwan and Tsang, 2001, Outhwaite, 1987, Cook and 
Campbell, 1979). This research rests on the post-positivism philosophy to understand and 
analyse the research problems discussed here. A critical realism lens is adopted to 
understand the relationship between a supplier’s distinct capabilities and its effects on the 
buyer-supplier collaboration performance. In brief, advocates of critical realism claim 
that ‘we will only be able to understand and so change the social world if we identify the 
structures at work that generates those events and discourses’ (Bryman and Bell, 2007).   
3) Social Constructionism  
Contrary to social science conducted according to the positivist perspective, the 
interpretivist approach is ideographic and inductive. The ideographic view provides a 
symbolic representation or detailed description of something with very limited 
abstraction (Neuman, 2006).  In this case, the social scientist takes a subjective stance 
which requires the researcher to comprehend the subjective meaning of social action. 
Hence, the study of the social world requires a different logic in the research procedure, 
one that reflects the distinctiveness of humans against the natural order (Bryman and Bell, 
2007). The proponents of social constructionism view reality as socially constructed 
rather than as determined by objective measures and external factors (Watzlawick, 1984; 
Shotter 1993 as cited in Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Moreover, the ontological 
assumption subsumed in social constructionism is that reality is not objective and exterior, 
but is socially constructed and ‘given meaning by people’ (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002: 
29). Thus, epistemologically, social reality under this paradigm is determined by the 
social actors rather than by objective and external factors. In other words, exponents of 
the constructivist paradigm assume that there are multiple realties, which are dependent 
for their form and content on the persons who hold them. Thus, the inductive approach 
to understanding what the actors are thinking and feeling regarding the research focus is 
emphasized. That is, the researchers undertaking work in the social constructivist 
paradigm engage in different forms of participative enquiry to grasp the subjective 
meanings of social actions, because it is taken that the complex qualities of the human 
mind or the known can only be unpacked through these processes (Bryman, 2004; 




therefore, are necessarily part of what is being studied and the interpretations of the 
observations emerge from the actors themselves.  
4.4 Research strategy 
Research strategy is defined as the systematic and orderly approach to collecting and 
analysing data so that information can be obtained to understand the research problem in 
hand (Jankowicz, 2005). Saunders et al. (2007) proposed that a research strategy refers 
to the general planning required to answer the research questions. Following this, the 
researcher’s choice of philosophical optic is justified in terms of the nature of the problem 
and research methodology adopted. From another point of view, Bryman and Bell (2007) 
classify the research strategy according to the nature of the research; whether it is 
qualitative and quantitative. Qualitative research rests on the constructivism paradigm 
and focuses on the generation of hypotheses or patterns, whereas quantitative research 
draws on positivism or a post-positivist paradigm and focuses on the testing of theory or 
hypotheses. In qualitative research, the intent is to gather participants’ views about a 
particular phenomenon whereas in quantitative research, the aim is to understand how 
data provided by participants fits an existing theory i.e. a model, framework or 
explanation. The notion of combining the qualitative and quantitative approaches to 
address a research problem has been well rehearsed in the literature and it is argued that 
an effective combination has the potential to capture the benefits offered by both 
qualitative and qualitative data collection and analysis techniques (Erickson and Kaplan, 
2000).  
In this thesis a quantitative research strategy was adopted, thus providing a way of 
quantitatively linking theoretical categories or concepts with the empirical research and 
thereby taking an objectivist standpoint for testing theory (Bryman and Bell, 2007). This 
researcher uses a survey-based study to investigate the research questions and examine 
the pertinent theoretical phenomenon. The design of this research is based on post-
positivism because the researcher aims to understand reality and obtain data from the 
business environment with empirical evidence that sheds light on the antecedents and 
consequences of relational capabilities in strategic alliance projects between MNE 
subsidiaries and local suppliers. One of the outcomes of taking a post-positivist approach 




govern the ways in which organizations operate. These causal relationships will, it is 
argued, enable management to become more scientific and better able to predict and 
control their environments (Johnson and Durberley, 2000).  
The research design for this investigation is based on the post-positivist approach which 
has eight propositions: independence, value-freedom, causality, hypothesis and 
deduction, operationalization, reductionism, generalization, cross-sectional analysis 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Importantly, under the post-positivist lens it is accepted 
that theories, background knowledge and the values of the researcher can influence what 
is observed and that there is a possibility of biases being involved.  According to Bryman 
(1984), the quantitative methodology is routinely presented as an approach to the conduct 
of social research, which applies the techniques from the natural sciences, and in 
particular, takes a positivist approach regarding understanding social phenomena. This 
study seeks to incorporate real-world data into research through empirical study, which 
is in keeping with the majority of empirical studies that are conducted within the 
managerial and behavioural science fields. Furthermore, empirical research can provide 
strong foundations for making realistic assumptions underpinning mathematical and 
simulation modelling in management (Flynn et al., 1990). That is, according to Snow and 
Thomas (1994), empirical studies can be used to either build theory or to verify it, with 
the latter referring to the documentation of relationships among variables. This approach 
is based on a scientific methodology whereby hypotheses are generated in advance and 
subsequently tested using the collected data, whereas a theory-building study is based 
upon assumptions or frameworks pertaining to a perceived problem. The main objective 
of this research investigation is to verify the relational capabilities approach in the context 
of Thai manufacturing sector i.e. it seeks to verify theory. In addition, the concept of trust 
and TCE are integrated to the relational capabilities approach in order to establish a 
foundation upon which to help to extend extant theory. 
In view of the above, the selected research design and measurements should correspond 
with the phenomena under investigation. The selected data collection tool, which has 
frequently been deployed for acquiring information in extant empirical research, takes 
the form of questionnaires that can provide valuable insights regarding individual 
perceptions and attitudes, as well as shed light on policies and practices in firms (Baruch 




objectivity is maintained by ensuring distance between the observers and the observed, 
along with possibility of external checks being made on the research questionnaire by a 
third, independent party.  Moreover, it should be noted that this researcher is independent 
from her sample group, namely the MNE subsidiaries in the Thai manufacturing sector, 
and has no vested interests in them. In addition, deductions are made from the empirical 
observations in order to test hypotheses regarding the causal relationships between inter-
organizational factors, including trust and asset specificity, relational capabilities and 
alliance performance. Furthermore, the concept of trust, HR distance and relational 
capabilities are measured quantitatively with the ordinary least square and bootstrapping 
techniques applied to test antecedents and consequents of relational capabilities. Finally, 
the researcher ensured the prerequisite of a sufficiently large sample so that valid 
comparisons could be made across the different firms categories. 
4.5 The research population  
The dataset has been generated through a questionnaire survey sent to purchasing 
managers of MNE subsidiaries in the manufacturing sector in Thailand. This sector is an 
appropriate sample for the study because of the Thai manufacturing’s history of creating 
alliances between buyers and suppliers (Doney and Cannon, 1997; Krishnan et al., 2006). 
The survey instrument focused on buyers because most MNE subsidiaries in the Thai 
manufacturing sector have developed the role of being buyers from local suppliers. This 
unit of analysis is consistent with previous empirical studies (Petersen et al., 2005; 
Cousins et al., 2006; Paulraj et al., 2008; Li et al., 2010).  
The research population of MNE subsidiaries in the Thai manufacturing sector includes 
firms involved in the following areas: chemical and petrochemicals, machinery and 
transport equipment, electronics and electrical appliances, measuring and analytical 
instruments, optical apparatus and watches as well as medical instruments, and comprises 
approximately 800 companies listed in the Federation of Thai Industry (FTI) Directory 
for 2010. The FTI is the national centre for Thai industries and prepares industry-related 
press releases for the media, distributes information to members and various interested 
stakeholders in order to promote and develop industrial enterprises as well as to cooperate 
with the Thai government in setting up industrial policies. In addition, the organization 




company information. The specific respondents targeted with the questionnaire survey 
were the purchasing managers and staff of MNE subsidiaries in the Thai manufacturing 
sector ‘identified from this reference list’. These managers are deemed to be the most 
knowledgeable about their firm’s relationships with their supplier and company specific 
information (Paulo et al., 2008). Because the actual products differed from company to 
company, the respondents were specifically asked questions relating to their most 
important supplier, and in particular, about one product with which they were familiar 
and that was typical of their company’s output. 
4.6 Unit of analysis 
A comprehensive literature review regarding the unit of analysis and research 
operationalization in buyer-supplier alliances was undertaken in order to identify key 
informants and relevant issues. Previous research has examined this from the firm and 
the dyadic perspectives using buyer supplier alliances as the unit of analysis. Some extant 
research examined only buyers or suppliers’ perspectives (Doney and Cannon, 1997; 
Dyer and Chu, 2003; Subramani and Venkatraman, 2003; Cousins et al., 2006; Srinivasan 
and Brush, 2006; Krishman et al., 2006; Paulraj et al., 2008; Nielsen and Nielsen, 2009 
and Li et al., 2010), whilst other scholarship examined buyer-supplier views (Stuart, 
1997; Johnson et al., 2004; Peterson et al., 2005; Krause et al., 2007). The dyadic level is 
very useful since the findings were derived from the views of both buyers and suppliers 
and thus avoids single informant bias. However, the response rate in the surveys deployed 
in dyadic level studies was low compared with those carried out at the single firm level 
because of the difficulty in survey administration. In light of this literature review, this 
researcher conducts this study from the buyer perspective, because most MNE 
subsidiaries in Thailand play a significant role as buyers and in creating linkages with 
local suppliers. Specifically, the unit of analysis is alliance projects between buyers and 
suppliers, as discussed in detail next. 
Alliance projects between buyer-supplier 
Alliances are voluntary arrangements between two or more organizations involving 
‘exchange, sharing, or co-development of products, technologies, or services’ (Gulati, 
1998). Strategic alliances can be formed at many different organizational levels, and at 




however, is to connect the research and/or development functions of two or more 
organizations in an attempt to capture the benefits of combining the scientific and 
technological assets of the alliance partners (e.g. Powell et al., 1996; Hagedoorn, 1993). 
Buyer-supplier alliances have no specific form and they vary according to both parties’ 
goals and objectives (Heide, 1994; Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Some may be moderate 
extensions of traditional arm’s length relationships, with longer-term contracts and 
expanded buyer–supplier communications. Alternatively, in a few extreme cases, the 
buyer and supplier can develop a degree of mutual dependency, with the buyer 
relinquishing some control to the supplier and the supplier dedicating resources to serve 
the buyer exclusively, that is, these resources cannot be easily altered to serve other 
customers (McCutcheon and Stuart, 2000). Sako (1992) identifies three major areas 
where alliances differ from traditional supplier relationships.  
1) Technology transfer and training, especially where the costs or value of 
providing this to the other party are not tracked nor pre-approved.  
2) Increased communication channels i.e. an increased number of different access 
points across firm boundaries and increased intensity of communication. 
3) Risk sharing, especially where the costs of shared risk are settled case-by-case 
after the fact, using fairness rather than prior negotiations as the means of deciding. 
These three characteristics truly distinguish relationships that blur the traditional lines 
between buyer and supplier. In addition, they serve to separate a strong buyer-supplier 
alliance not only from arm’s length contractual arrangements but also from what many 
managers may very broadly term supplier partnerships. While many firms may have 
developed somewhat closer relationships with their key suppliers, relationships with 
these specific characteristics are as yet relatively unusual (ibid). While the benefits of 
alliance relationships may be difficult to establish, most managers recognize the real risks 
they pose, for clearly, there are risks in giving suppliers access to information and in 
developing dependency on them (Kale et al., 2000). Given these risks, if a firm is to reap 
the benefits from this type of relationship, it must have a clear binding contract that 
safeguards its interests. Among the many types of strategic alliances, this researcher 
selected only strategic alliance projects between buyers and suppliers, such as: R&D 




chain management. These activities could offer a relatively balanced situation for both 
antecedents and relational capabilities variables to play a role in affecting alliance 
outcomes. This is compared to both the more traditional resource access or market entry 
joint ventures, where the initial conditions of the transaction may largely determine 
outcomes.  
4.7 Questionnaire design 
The questionnaire is primarily a tool for data collection used with the objective of 
collecting confidential information about the business unit and soft data from 
respondents. Soft data refers to the opinions and attitudes of the alliance managers that 
cannot be acquired from archival data. The questionnaires in this research were initially 
developed by identifying construct items used in previous studies. Further, the chosen 
format of a self-report survey used for this investigation eliminates the interviewer and 
can benefit the process by putting respondents at ease so that they can be honest when 
commenting on sensitive subjects (Brace, 2005). In addition, respondents have time to 
consider their answers at their leisure. According to Spector (1994), objections to self-
report studies are strongly directed to those with cross sectional designs where all the data 
are collected at one point in time, nonetheless, self-report studies can provide a picture of 
how people feel about the research questions. A Likert scale, which was first published 
by psychologist Rennis Likert in 1932, is the most common technique used to measure 
questionnaire respondents’ attitudes, with the question usually being in the form of a 
statement to which respondents are asked to state their level of agreement (Hosker, 2008). 
This research utilized responses coded 1 to 7 with 1 standing for ‘strongly agree’ and 7 
for ‘strongly disagree’. Each respondent’s score is obtained by totalling the scores for 
each item, for example, the maximum score for three questions would be 21, with 3 as 
the minimum.   
The researcher is concerned with single source data, which is subjected to the common 
variance method (CMV) and is especially suited to the self-report survey (Podsakoff et 
al., 1986; Chang et al., 2010). CMV is variance that is attributable to the measurement 
method rather than to the constructs that the measure represents. Further, it creates a false 
internal consistency, that is, an apparent correlation among variables generated by their 




evaluate an MNE’s organizational capabilities and the firm performance in the same 
source. Krishnan et al. (2006) and Chang et al. (2010) suggested remedies to avoid this 
by indicating the confidential nature of the survey in the cover letter, pre-testing the 
survey and using separate scale items and data from different sources. To mitigate the 
problem of same-source bias, this research aims to use different levels of respondents for 
the independent variables (relational capabilities) and the dependent variables 
(operational and strategic performance) (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004).  Purchasing 
managers were contacted initially and asked to evaluate alliance performance with their 
local suppliers for a period covering the previous last three years, from 2009 to 2011, to 
avoid biased responses occurring from abnormal one-off experiences (see Artz and 
Brush, (2000) for a similar treatment). They selected one important strategic alliance 
project with a local supplier and evaluated inter-organizational trust and alliance 
performance. Subsequently, they were asked to forward the questionnaire to another key 
informant e.g. the purchasing manager, project manager or technical manager, who, 
during the previous three years, had been involved in a strategic alliance project with the 
local supplier for the critical component in their manufacturing process. The second 
respondents completed another questionnaire relating to inter-personal trust and 
relational capabilities of the focal project.  
The concept of strategic alliance and other measurements, such as inter-organizational 
trust, interpersonal trust, relational capabilities and performance, were explained clearly 
to the respondents in the questionnaires. A set of questionnaires was developed in English 
and Thai utilizing a broad range of questions relating to the nature of suppliers’ 
relationships with their suppliers. In order to ensure consistency between the Thai and 
English versions of the questionnaire, the English questionnaire was translated into Thai 
by a native speaker with a sound technical knowledge of buyer–supplier relationships. A 
ﬂuent Thai speaker then translated the questionnaire back into English, thereby 
identifying and resolving any inconsistencies. The questionnaires were piloted in thirteen 
companies at which time any remaining issues were resolved. 
The questionnaires can be distributed to targeted respondents in a variety of ways, such 
as by mail survey, fax, face-to-face and by holding a telephone interview as well as by 
distributing a web-based survey. The selected means of distribution depends on the needs 




studies, it emerges that the mail questionnaire is one of the most frequently used but 
controversial data collection techniques applied in social science research. A mail survey 
allows respondents to complete questions with anonymity and at their convenience 
without time constraints, all of which can reduce respondent bias. However, they are time 
consuming, expensive and difficult to identify with a specific respondent, so nowadays, 
the web-based survey is a popular alternative. This offers several benefits to researchers 
in management, including; lower costs, broader distribution, a potentially higher response 
rate, improved accuracy of data entry, faster survey turnaround times and randomized 
ordering of items (Klassen and Jacobs, 2001). Moreover, an internet-based survey can 
use the same formats as traditional methods and hence generate equivalent findings 
(Vazire et al., 2004). Some empirical studies of buyer-supplier relationships and strategic 
alliances have used a web-based survey, such as Cousins et al. (2006) and Nielsen and 
Nielsen (2009) and their return rates were 14.8% and 19.5% respectively. Moreover, a 
combined approach using postal mails and the internet to survey managers offers 
significant benefits over relying on just one technique since it generates a higher response 
rate and improves item completion rate (Klassen and Jacobs, 2001). 
In sum, this research combined web-based and postal mail surveys for data collection. 
Moreover, telephone contact was used for pre-notification and recruiting respondents 
(Duncan, 1979; Klassen and Jacobs, 2001; Dillman et al., 2009). The respondents were 
asked to complete the web-based survey with the option of the postal mail survey. The 
appearance of the survey web page was designed to match the paper and pencil survey 
allowing respondents to scroll through the entire instrument to see its length and the type 
of questions. Moreover, they could answer the questions in any order and complete the 
survey in several sessions. On-line definitions of the technical terms, such as alliances, 
trust and relational capabilities, were provided when the respondent clicked on a web-
link and this mirrored the glossary sheet provided in the paper-based survey.  
4.8 Pilot study 
There was a possibility that the measurement in the questionnaire might not fit the 
specific contexts of all respondents. Hence, it was necessary to recruit a small sample of 
purchasing managers and technical sales representatives in order to test the questionnaire, 




to ensure that the words and meanings were clear, reliable and valid (Flynn et al., 1990; 
Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Therefore, this researcher conducted a pilot study with six 
academics and eighteen industry contacts to assess the scale items’ face validity and to 
obtain feedback on the content, design and usability of the survey website. In addition, 
she conducted semi-structured interviews in September 2010 in order to review the 
concept and receive feedback from ten practitioners from MNEs subsidiaries in the Thai 
manufacturing sector. The interview questions were partly exploratory and mostly open-
ended and each interview lasted between 30 and 45 minutes. From the interviews, it was 
revealed that the sample firms from high-technological industries were likely to have 
vertical alliances with their suppliers. This was owing to the fact that they need to acquire 
complementary resources and capabilities from suppliers to develop products and 
services correspondent with high technological specifications and rapid demand changes 
in the markets.  
In addition, the researcher asked informants’ views relating to the concept of relational 
capabilities, HR distance and trust to compare their information with the proposed 
models. Most interviewees reported that they had applied the relational capabilities 
approach and trust in the alliance management practices with their local suppliers because 
this approach had the possibility of helping them maintain good relationships and smooth 
cooperative activities between them and their alliance partners. However, they realized 
the importance of this approach operating at different levels and acknowledged that it 
was dependent on the companies’ regulations, culture and length of relationship between 
organizations. Moreover, the inter-personal trust concept emerged as significant as some 
informants commented on the impact of salesperson relationships on alliance 
management. Therefore, the researcher synthesised the findings from the semi-structured 
interviews with the self-report survey, which were subsequently compared with the 
results of the statistical analysis.           
A pre-survey was conducted in the period from January to March 2011 with small 
samples. To start, six PhD students in the School of Management and six practitioners 
reviewed the questionnaires and provided their feedback in January 2011. Subsequently, 
the researcher refined the clarity of the questions using a vocabulary familiar to managers, 
and with terms that had consistent meaning in English and Thai languages. Next, the 




during February and March 2011. Some lessons were learned from this, including: the 
difficulty regarding finding the second respondent and some missing values caused by 
rather ambiguous questions and instruction in some parts of the survey. Some minor 
content and design changes were made at this stage. 
4.9 Data collection administration 
The researcher collected data in the field during the period from August to December 
2011. In disseminating the survey, the researcher mostly followed the advice of Duncan 
(1979) regarding the appearance of the questionnaire and facilitating ease of use in order 
to boost the response rate. The survey package, both postal and web-based survey 
formats, included: 
1) Cover letter: An introductory letter explaining the objectives, assuring 
confidentiality and access to the samples as well as the specification of the 
deadline.  The letter clearly explained the purpose of the questionnaire so that 
respondents could grasp its value, and the contact details of the researcher were 
provided (i.e. her terrestrial address, telephone number and email address).  
2) Two questionnaires, one each for the purchasing director (first respondent) and 
alliance manager (second respondent). 
3) Pre-paid, self-addressed envelope to return the questionnaire (only for the postal 
format). 
The survey was initiated by using telephone notification. Surveys were mailed directly to 
managers or owners who agreed to complete the survey during the telephone screening 
and whose firms fitted the screening criteria. Suitable first and second respondents were 
identified during the telephone notification stage, which was also when they could choose 
to complete the questionnaires either on-line or by post. A cover letter explaining 
research, received either online or by post also contained a link to the survey website.  
Efforts were made to enhance the response rate by sending a follow-up email to managers 
two weeks after the initial mailing and by offering respondents a composite summary of 






4.10 Operationalization of study measurements 
The researcher drew upon the literature reviewed in the Chapter 2 with regards to 
relational capabilities, trust and TCE and hypothesized that this approach can help the 
firm collaborate with the partners successfully. Therefore, the focal research interest 
concerns the antecedents and outcomes of relational capabilities of strategic alliance 
projects. The researcher narrowed the design of the research project to the consideration 
of vertical alliances or buyer-supplier alliances because buyers and suppliers were 
involved with inter-organizational transactions. The variables and measurements 
reviewed in the literature were used or adapted through the stages of the pilot interviews 
and testing. As explained above, the questionnaire items, unless stated otherwise, were 
measured using a seven-point Likert scale with the anchors for this being 1 = strongly 
agree through to 7 = strongly disagree.   
1) Relational capabilities 
Relational capabilities refer to firms’ capacity purposefully to create, extend, or modify 
their resources and routines, augmented to include the resources of their alliance partners 
in the relationship management process (Dyer and Kale, 2007). The concept of relational 
capabilities is based on three foundations: complementary capability, knowledge sharing 
routines and effective governance capability. There was no existing scale available to 
measure directly the relational capabilities concept and hence, the researcher used survey-
based, multi-item scales to measure each of these aspects of them. Since there was little 
empirical precedent in developing these measures, the researcher selected the scale items 
through ﬁeldwork and through a study of the relevant academic literature. The researcher 
also pre-tested the survey instrument with purchasing managers of 19 MNE subsidiaries 
and modiﬁed the items as necessary. The researcher then used conﬁrmatory factor 
analysis to estimate a second-order factor model that best represents these relationships.  
2) Knowledge sharing routines 
The concept of knowledge sharing routines is defined as a regular pattern of firm-level 
interactions that permit the transfer, recombination, or creation of knowledge (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; Dyer and Kale, 2007). Knowledge sharing routines in this research were 




extent to which buyers and suppliers shared relevant task-related information in the 
alliances. The degree of information sharing between partners is operationalized by 
measuring the extent to which buyers shared: (1) confidential/proprietary (e.g. technical) 
information; (2) information on their production costs, and (3) know-how. Moreover, 
knowledge sharing routine scales were also adopted from Kale and Singh (2007) to 
measure the formal and informal sharing know-how activities between partners.   
3) Complementary capability 
Complementary capability refers to the ability to identify and evaluate potential 
complementarities, and the role of organizational complementarities to access benefits of 
complementary strategic resources (Dyer and Kale; 2007). Complementary capability 
measurements were adopted from the scale of partner fit used in the research of Kale et 
al. (2000), which also has been applied by other researchers (Corsten and Kumar, 2005; 
Lavie et al., 2012). These measures involve a multi-item scale representing the different 
degrees to which the focal firms are able to verify similarities in complementary resources 
and capabilities between their company and the partners. 
4) Effective governance mechanisms 
Effective governance mechanisms refer to the capacity of the firm to assign an 
appropriate mix of formal and informal safeguards to govern the partnering relationship 
(Dyer and Kale, 2007). The measurement of effective governance mechanisms is 
characterized by both formal and informal governance (Poppo, Zhou and Zenger, 2008). 
The researcher infers that high levels correspond to an increased commitment to use 
relational governance to guide behaviour in alliance partner exchanges. The researcher 
views effective governance mechanisms as involving collaborative problem solving and 
the sharing of business plans, which are critical success factors  in strategic alliances. 
Therefore, consistent with prior work (Mesquita et al., 2008; Koetker and Mellewigt, 
2009; Li, Poppo and Zhou, 2010), the researcher employed three items that assess the 
degree to which firms rely on formal contracts, i.e. the extent to which the subsidiary has 
speciﬁc, customized, and detailed contractual agreements with the supplier. In addition, 
the researcher measured the extent to which the firms are able to use social commitments 
of collaboration as gauged by their efforts to share information, assist each other and 




5) Asset specificity 
Asset specificity refers to the assets which the buying firm dedicates specifically for the 
alliance project. Given that this study targeted the manufacturing sector and the primary 
respondents were purchasing personnel dealing with operational plant processes, an 
eight-item scale developed by Dyer (1997), Subramani and Venkatraman (2003), Zhou 
and Poppo (2010) was adopted as the construct measure.   This was because this measure 
was considered to capture a broad range of asset specificity that could affect the 
operational management of the plant. These assets include: physical asset specificity (e.g. 
manufacturing equipment and machinery), business process specificity (software and 
application, administrative procedures) and human asset specificity (change in skill levels 
and trained staff) that are used in the alliance project with the supplier. This measure has 
been deployed in other research such as that of Artz and Brush (2000) and Mesquita et 
al. (2008).  
6) Inter-organizational trust and inter-personal trust  
Trust in this research is defined as the willingness of the firm to take risk and the 
vulnerability to the alliance partners’ opportunistic behaviour and other actions. This 
researcher adapts the definition of inter-personal trust and inter-organizational trust from 
Zaheer et al. (1998). The term interpersonal trust refers to the extent of a buyer’s 
representative trust in her counterpart in the supplier organization while the term inter-
organizational trust is deﬁned as the extent of trust placed in the supplier organization by 
the members of a focal organization. This study followed recent studies on alliance trust 
(Currall and Inkpen, 2002; Zaheer et al., 1998) which measured interpersonal and inter-
organizational trust in order to capture the concept of trust at the two levels. Moreover, 
previous empirical studies in the context of the buyer-supplier relationship have used this 
measurement, including those of Lui and Ngo (2004), Lui et al. (2006), Gulati and 
Nicholson (2008) and Li et al. (2010). 
The measurement of inter-organizational trust gauged the buyer’s attitude towards the 
supplier’s behaviour at the firm level based on a five point system: two reflected the 
fairness component of trust, one directly assessed the possibility of opportunistic 
behaviours and the other two drew upon the reliability aspect of trust. The measurement 




contact person at the individual interaction. The scale of interpersonal trust consisted of 
one point relating to predictability, three relating to fairness, and one that directly 
assessed interpersonal trust. 
7) Human resource (HR) distance 
Human resource distance at the country level refers to different aggregated skill of labour 
at the country level. The level of skilled labour and education differences between 
alliance partners who originate from different countries, can hamper establishment of 
common ground for communication, which is an important condition for advancing 
cooperation (Luo, 2001; Estrin et al., 2009). The measure used in this research was 
developed in an earlier study by Estrin et al. (2009) which probed the complementary 
roles of institutional and human resource distances on foreign investors’ entry strategies. 
The education measures used by these scholars drew on the percentage of the 
economically-active population with tertiary education, and the average schooling years 
in the total population gathered from data contained in the ILO Yearbook of Labour 
statistics, OECD statistics and the statistical offices of selected countries. The state of 
technology was measured through data taken from the World Development indicators 
that showed the number of computers and internet hosts per 1,000 persons. Data for the 
year 2010 was employed as this was the most recent available prior to the survey data 
collection in 2011.  
HRDj = ∑ {(Iij – Iit)2/Vi}/4 
Where Iij stands for the index for the ith human resource dimension and jth country, Vi is 
the variance of the index of the ith dimension, t indicates Thailand, and HRDj is human 
resource difference of the jth country between alliance partners.  
8) Strategic alliance performance 
Various studies have used different measures and levels of analysis to capture strategic 
alliance performance. For example, alliance performance has been measured by alliance 
satisfaction (Lui and Ngo, 2004; Krishnan at al., 2006), alliance success rate (Zollo et al., 
2002), financial performance (Simonin, 1997), organizational learning (Sinomin, 1997; 
Kale and Singh, 2007), operational performance, and strategic performance (Paulraj et 




the alliance performance at the focal firm level in the context of the manufacturing sector. 
As suggested by previous studies (Cousins et al., 2006; Krause et al., 2007; Paulraj et al., 
2008 and Lawson et al., 2008), collaborations between buyers and suppliers in the 
manufacturing sector aim to improve efficiency on a daily routine basis and for the long 
term benefits of the company. Therefore, there are two dependent variables of relational 
capabilities representing operational and strategic ones. The former highlights the 
achievement of operational improvements in terms of cost, quality and lead time (Paulraj 
et al., 2008; Lawson et al., 2008; Villena et al., 2011). The latter encourages the 
accomplishment of more strategic outcomes such as the development of new products 
and markets (Jap, 2001; Ling-Yee and Ogunmokun, 2001; Lunnan and Haugland, 2008; 
Lu et al., 2010; Villena et al., 2011). These sets of alliance performance were adapted 
from Villena et al. (2011), which capture these two variables in the research in order to 
ensure the consistency of the measurement. Operational performance was measured by 
the extent to which the buying company received manufacturing process improvement, 
especially in reliability, delivery and flexibility, as a result of its alliance with the supplier 
over the last three years. Strategic performance was measured by the extent to which the 
buying company received marketing and innovation benefits as a result of its alliance 
with the supplier in the last three years.   
9) Control variables 
In order to verify the validity of the findings, a number of variables are controlled in the 
equation analysis. Some additional control variables, reported in the literature to have 
influential effects on the study variables, such as firm size, inter-firm legal relationships 
and sub-categories of industry, were included. 
9.1) Firm size 
Larger firms have larger resource pools and, consequently, the ability to compete more 
effectively (Kotabe and Zhao, 2002; Mesquita et al., 2008). This measure is 
operationalized as to the number of employees of the affiliate (Kotabe and Zhao, 2002; 






9.2) Firm nationality 
The country of origin of MNE subsidiaries was based on the national location of its 
corporate headquarters (Makino and Beamish, 1998). Country of origin information was 
determined on the basis of the largest percentage of equity holding of the company, which 
is also reported by the Department of Business Development, Thailand. 
9.3) Sub-industries in manufacturing sector 
As the scope or intensity increases, so do information-processing needs that, in turn, 
require greater internal capabilities (Bensaou and Venkatraman, 1995). To measure the 
control for industry differences, this study uses dummy variables for the major industries 
in the sample (Krishnan et al., 2006). Based on two-digit SIC codes from a study by Zhou 
and Poppo (2010), three dummy variables were used for controlling differences in the 
primary industry in which the firm operates: automotive, heavy (i.e., chemicals, 
materials, machinery, iron and steels), and electronics.  
9.4) Previous alliance experiences  
Prior research has suggested that a ﬁrm’s alliance experience has a positive relationship 
with its alliance performance, because there is presumably an implicit ﬂow of feedback 
from prior experience that enables either an improvement in a ﬁrm’s existing alliance 
practices or development of new ones (Anand and Khanna, 2000). For the measurement 
of a ﬁrm’s previous alliance experience scales were adopted from Lunnan and Haugland 
(2008). Previous alliance experience was measured as the company’s level of experience 
in inter-ﬁrm cooperation and learning from past alliances.  
9.5) Alliance project duration  
Duration is an important control variable since longer projects tend to influence the 
quality of relationship between alliance partners as well as alliance performance. Alliance 
duration was measured by the year in which an alliance was formed and subsequently 
used to calculate its duration (Krishnan et al., 2006). 
9.6) Inter-organizational relationship duration 
With increasing relationship duration, parties have more opportunities to learn about each 




relationship is measured by using a single item that asks how long the supplier firm has 
been in contact with the buying firm (Doney and Cannon, 1997; Krause et al., 2007). 
9.7) Supplier dependence  
Supplier dependence was considered in terms of the ease with which the alliance partner 
could be replaced in accordance with Heide’s (1994) conceptual definition. In particular, 
the buyer’s dependence on the supplier was measured by the percentage of purchasing 
volume of the focal supplier compared with other suppliers during the last three year 
period (Carey et al., 2011). 
9.8) Alliance project types 
Alliance project types may differ in relational capabilities and impact on alliance project 
performance (Reuer et al., 2002; White and Lui, 2005) since the more complex joint tasks 
will require managers to expend greater time and effort working with an alliance partner. 
This research included four dummy variables for supply chain activities, incremental 
change, R&D products and R&D process, with ‘other’ representing the fourth. 
4.11 Sources of data 
There are two main sources of data for this research including primary and secondary 
data. The former was collected by a self-report survey that was distributed to the 
population to collect the main data for the research whereas the latter was required for 
gathering basic information and national distance of the companies in order to reduce the 
number of questions in the survey. The sources of the secondary data were The 
Department of Business Development (DBD), Thailand (www.dbd.go.th) which 
provided basic company information, and the Kogut and Singh (1989) composite index 
of Hofstede’s culture dimension for cultural distant measurement, as well as the ILO Year 
book and World Bank which gave data regarding human resource distance (see appendix 
for the list of variable measurements and data classified by sources.  
4.12 Descriptive results 
Questionnaires were distributed to all the eligible companies, rather than just a sample, 
because the population was small and it was believed that this was an effective way to 




contact by telephone with purchasing managers of 800 MNE subsidiaries on the 
aforementioned list, but unfortunately 87 companies could not be reached because of 
invalid telephone numbers and addresses. In line with a study by Fenton-O’Creevy (1996) 
regarding reasons for non-response to questionnaires, 448 firms refused to fill in the 
questionnaires for various reasons, i.e. potential respondents were too busy, key 
personnel were away during survey period, the survey was not considered relevant, and 
in some cases, it was company policy not to complete surveys and additional unknown 
reasons. Moreover, over-surveying in a growing number of areas means that employees 
are ﬂooded with questionnaires (Weiner and Dalessio, 2006). The result is that a large 
number of target individuals or ﬁrms are fatigued and therefore refuse to respond to non-
essential questionnaires. 155 companies acceded to completing the survey by post and a 
further 110 agreed to do so online, making a total of 265. Non respondents were sent 
reminders by postcards and email and were later telephoned. A total of 135 completed 
and returned the questionnaires by post and 96 completed questionnaires by submitting 
the online survey. Thirty-six firms replied that their companies had had no particular 
alliance with their suppliers in the last three years, and 39 firms completed only the first 
questionnaire. In total, paired questionnaires from 156 MNE subsidiaries, which included 
106 postal and 50 online surveys, were completed. Thus, the response rate for this 
research is 19.5% which can be considered to be fair in comparison to most postal 
surveys, which obtain a rate of between 6 and 16% (Harzing, 2000). Moreover, it is equal 
to response rates obtained in various earlier alliance studies (see Kale et al., 2002; Reuer 
et al., 2002a; Zollo et al., 2002; Cousins et al., 2006; Nielsen and Nielsen, 2009).  












Pilot study Academia  6 - - 
 Practitioners 25 - - 
Survey Population 800 - - 
 Failed to reach 87 - - 
 Postal mails 155 49 106 
 Online survey 100 50 50 





After data screening and removing outliers, the sample consisted of 156 firms from the 
following sub-industries: electronic and electric equipment (17%), chemicals and 
chemical products (23%), petrochemicals and petrochemical products (3%), automotive 
(29%), machinery products and metals (22%) and other manufacturing (5%). Firm size 
was measured in terms of both the number of employees and the firm’s registered capital. 
With respect to registered capital, the largest amount of respondents, namely 38%, 4% 
and 58% are found in the category of under US$ 1.6 million, between US$ 1.6 million 
and 16 million, and over US$ 1.6 million, respectively. Countries of origin of MNE 
subsidiaries in the sample are Japan (72%), US (9%), Taiwan (5%), China (3%), 
Germany (3%) and others (8%).  
All the purchasing managers and purchasing staff who completed the questionnaires are 
Thai. On average, the purchasing managers and purchasing staff have a work experience 
average of 8 and 10 years in their current companies, respectively. These individuals had 
primary responsibility for managing the day-to-day relationship with the customer, and 
were well aware of the history of the interactions between them and their buyer’s 
employees. On average, the inter-organizational relationship and inter-personal 
relationship had been established for 8 and 6 years respectively. The alliance partners of 
the sample can be divided into two groups; sharing the same country of origin (56%) and 
different countries of origin (44%). For the nationality of contact persons of the alliance 
projects, most respondents work with Thais (80%) while the rest work with expats (20%). 
The average alliance project duration is five years and 85% of these projects are still on-
going. In total, 92% of firms in our dataset reported on non-equity alliances, while 8% 
had equity alliances with their suppliers. Three main purposes of alliance projects were 
reported as: new product and process development (17%), joint purchases (14%) and joint 









Table 4.3 Sample characteristics (N = 156 MNE subsidiaries in Thai manufacturing) 
 Frequency % 
Industry   
Electronic and electric equipment 27 17 
Chemicals and chemical products 36 23 
Petrochemicals and petrochemical products 4 3 
Automotive  46 29 
Machinery products and metals 35 22 
Others 8 5 
Total 156 100 
Registered capital   
< 1.6 Million USD  59 38 
1.6 – 16 Million USD  7 4 
>16 Million USD 





MNEs’ country of origins   
Asia 133 85 
USA 14 9 
Europe 7 4 
Others 2 1 
Total 156 100 
Legal relationship between MNE 
subsidiaries and local suppliers 
  
            Affiliated companies 24 15 
            Independent suppliers 132 85 
Total 156 100 
Alliance project types   
New product and process development 31 20 
Joint R&D project for new product 
development 
28 18 
Joint R&D project for new process 
development 
26 17 
Supply chain management activities 65 42 
Other 6 4 
Total  100 
Titles of respondents 1   
Purchasing manager 66 42 
Assistant manager 19 12 
Engineering manager 11 7 
Supervisor 32 21 
Purchasing senior staff   
Total 156 100 
Titles of respondents 2   
Purchasing senior staff 90 58 
Purchasing staff 59 38 
Purchasing analyst/specialist 7 4 





4.13 Construct validity of the variable measurements 
It is important for any researcher to evaluate the ‘accuracy’ or the ‘robustness’ of the 
study with regard to the applied methods of data gathering and, moreover, the analysis of 
the collected material. In order to make sure that the quality of the research is sufficiently 
robust, the research design was carefully planned and this design has been followed 
throughout (Flynn et al., 1990). In addition, it is important for the researcher to critically 
evaluate the quality of the research. Means for conducting this evaluation can include a 
rigorous consideration of: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
statistical conclusion validity (Scandura and Williams, 2000; Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008). 
Internal validity concerns causality. A causal relationship among variables can only be 
asserted if there is: true co-variation between the variables under investigation, the 
procedures used to gather the data demonstrate that the cause precedes the effect, and, all 
alternative explanations have been discarded (Scandura and Williams, 2000). All of these 
aspects have been included in the present study. Moreover, there is a potential correlation 
between some pairs of variables, such as inter-organizational trust and inter-personal 
trust, and strategic performance and operational performance that may lead to 
multicollinearity problems in the statistical analysis. Therefore, we adopted the variable 
measuring scale from extant empirical research which clearly shows that there are no 
autocorrelation problems between trust and performance indicators, (for example, see 
Zaheer et al., 1998) and Villena et al., 2011). Also, the. Also, the multicollinearity 
problem was examined with variance inflation factor (VIF) that shows how much the 
variance of the coefficient estimate is being inflated by multicollinearity in the data 
verification process. 
External validity refers to generalizing across times, settings and individuals. In other 
words, external validity relies upon establishing a true representation of the relationship 
between two constructs and that the relationship is generalizable to different populations, 
measures and circumstances (Scandura and Williams, 2000). This research extends the 
relational capabilities approach, generalizes the concept and the variable measurements 
adopted from previous studies in various research settings, and examines their 




concerns arising with regards to research surveys in the field of international business; 
conceptual equivalence, measurement equivalence and translation equivalence 
(Rosenzweig, 1994; Meyer, 2007). To mitigate these obstacles regarding the 
generalizability of management research science, the researcher applied several remedies 
both in the pre-survey and post-survey phases. 
In the variable measurement setting phase, the researcher selected scales from previous 
empirical research that were operationalised to study the manufacturing buyer-supplier 
relationships, such as Dyer and Singh (1998), Doney and Cannon (1997), Paulraj et al. 
(2008). Hence, the sample in this research is equivalent to the samples used in some 
previous studies. Furthermore, as the technical terms relied upon in the manufacturing 
sector provide a universally understood set among professional personnel in the industrial 
buying context, the researcher assumed that the technical terminology in the 
questionnaire would be clearly understood by the respondents.  Moreover, Asian subjects, 
e.g. Japanese and Thai personnel, were inclined to consistently provide moderate answers 
that resulted in a tight variance, leading to difficulties in comparing the two populations 
(Rosenzweig, 1994). Therefore, the researcher overcame this problem by adding 
“Slightly agree” and “Slightly disagree” to the questionnaire, thereby converting it into a 
seven-point Likert scale. In the translation phase, the questionnaire was translated from 
English to Thai in order to help Thai respondents understand the terminology and 
complete the survey. To evaluate the interpretation equivalence, a Thai native 
management scholar translated the questionnaire back into English with any 
inconsistencies being identified and resolved (Tsui et al., 2007). In the pilot study phase, 
six PhD students from the School of Management, the University of Bath, and three 
practitioners from the purchasing department of two MNE manufacturers in Thailand 
reviewed and gave feedback on their comprehension of the questionnaire both in Thai 
and English. Finally, the questionnaire was distributed to thirteen purchasing managers 
of MNE manufacturing subsidiaries for a final check of the scale validity. Tests for non-
response bias were conducted by comparing the postal with the web-based surveys, and 
early respondents (response received within the first two weeks) with later respondents 
(response received in the third week or later). Two-tailed t-tests were conducted on firm 




firms and others) and sub-industries. No statistically significant differences between 
groups were identified at p< 0.05.  
Statistical conclusion validity refers to the ability to draw conclusions on the basis of 
statistical evidence of covariation as well as prediction (Scandura and Williams, 2000). 
The application of the appropriate statistical test, namely remedies of CMV and having a 
significant number of samples are the conditions that help enhance statistical conclusion 
validity of the research. In survey-based studies, common method variance is a 
widespread concern. This researcher has addressed this issue firstly by collecting data 
from two different respondents as suggested by Krishnan et al. (2006) which is described 
more fully above in the questionnaire design subsection. In addition, the researcher 
performed a Harman’s one-factor test, the most widely used technique for addressing 
common method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003). All the items of the individual values 
and the two dependent variables were entered into a principal components factor analysis 
with varimax rotation. According to this technique, if a factor emerges from the factor 
analysis or one “general” factor accounts for most of the variance at more than 50 percent, 
common method variance is deemed present. However, the highest factor accounted for 
only 21.69 percent of the variance and hence indicated the absence of CMV. 
4.14 Data analysis 
The hypotheses of this research require multiple regression and mediation effects to 
analyse whether trust and asset specificity are antecedents of relational capabilities and 
this relationship is deemed to improve alliance performance. The econometric approach 
consists of multiple regression (Ordinary Least Square: OLS) and bootstrapping 
techniques. The software used for the data analysis is SPSS 20 and AMOS 18. The SPSS 
is one of the best known and widely employed software packages for statistical analysis 
of social data (Hosker, 2008) and is used to analyze descriptive statistics, linear regression 
and simultaneous equation model. Another software, namely AMOS, is a software that 
is often used for testing confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Below, the statistical testing 
procedures for the multiple mediation effect of relational capabilities on the relation 
between economic and relational conditions and alliance performance are introduced. 
Linear regression is applied to test antecedents and barriers of relational capabilities. In 




capabilities on the relationship between inter-organizational dimensions, namely, trust 
and asset specificity, and the alliance performance.  
4.14.1 Hierarchical regression  
Hierarchical regression is a statistical technique that allows researchers to predict 
someone’s score on one variable on the basis of their scores on several other variables.  
Regression techniques have long been central to the field of econometrics (Sykes, 1993) 
and increasingly, they have become important in the social sciences and management 
research (e.g. Artz and Brush, 2000; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; Ruer and Ariño, 2007; 
Carey et al., 2011). According to Dougherty (2011), hierarchical regression requires a 
large number of observations. Its intercept represents the constant term, with the slope in 
each dimension implying one of the regression coefficients in a simple path analysis. The 
fact that the parameter is “statistically significant” simply means that in conventional tests 
one can reject the hypothesis that its true value is zero. In hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis, the researcher determines the order that variables are entered into the regression 
equation as they may want to control for some variable or group of variables and a 
multiple regression is performed with these as the independent variables. From this first 
regression, the researcher has the variance accounted for this corresponding group of 
independent variables. Then another another multiple regression analysis is run including 
the original independent variables and a new set, which allows for examination of the 
contribution latter beyond that of the former.  
R2 is a measure of the correlation between the observed value and the predicted value of 
the criterion variable. This has a simple definition—it is equal to one minus the ratio of 
the sum of squared estimated errors (the deviation of the actual value of the dependent 
variable from the regression line) to the sum of squared deviations about the mean of the 
dependent variable. In essence, this is a measure of how good a prediction of the criterion 
variable it can make by knowing the predictor variables. The sum of the squared 
deviations about the regression line is a measure of the extent to which the regression 
fails to explain the dependent variable (a measure of the noise). Hence, the R2 statistic is 
a measure of the extent to which the total variation of the dependent variable is explained 




In general, hierarchical regression is a technique that allows for additional factors to be 
entered into the analysis separately so that the effect of each can be estimated and thus it 
is valuable for quantifying the impact of various simultaneous influences upon a single 
dependent variable. This research involves applying multiple regression to analyze data 
as the aim is to develop a model for predicting antecedents and barriers of relational 
capabilities. This is because this technique can be used to infer causal relationships 
between these variables as well as to determine the overall fit (variance explained) of the 
model and the relative power of each of these predictors to explain the total variance. 
4.14.2 Mediation analysis and Bootstrapping 
According to Barron and Kenny (1986), a mediator is a variable that can significantly 
account for the relation between the predictor and the criterion of interest. Mediation 
effect and indirect effect are often used interchangeably and are said to occur when the 
causal effect of an independent variable (X) on a dependent variable (Y) is transmitted 
by a mediator (M). In other words, X affects Y because X affects M, and M, in turn, 
affects Y (Preacher et al., 2007). However, the mediation effect suffers owing to the 
assumption that the ‘total effect’ from X to Y needs to be present. Nevertheless, the causal 
steps approach, proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) is one of the most widely used 
method for testing hypotheses about intervening variables effects, despite the criticism as 
well as other highlighted failings (Zhao et al. 2010). For instance, in the assessment of 
indirect effects, it is quite possible to find that one is significant even when there is no 
evidence for a significant total effect (Preacher and Hayes 2004). Another criticism of the 
causal approach is that it is not based on the quantification of the very thing it is 
attempting to test, i.e. the intervening effect. Hayes (2009) argued that the inferences 
about the indirect effects should be based on the product of its quantified constituents 
parts (i.e. based on the values of a and b in the mediation model). He further contended 
that it makes more sense to minimize the number of tests one must conduct to support a 
claim and therefore, the causal steps approach is not the most appropriate approach for 
the intervening variables tests.  
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the total effect, direct effect and indirect effects in the case of an 
independent variable X, dependent variable Y and two mediating variables M1 and M2, 




expected amount by which two cases that differ by one unit on X are expected to differ 
on Y and this direct effect can be a combination of the other indirect effects (Hayes 2009). 
In figure 4.1 (b), a1 is the coefficient for X in the model predicting M1 from X, and b1 is 
that predicting Y from M1. While a2 is the coefficient for X in the model predicting M2 
from X, and b2 is that predicting Y from M2. c’ is the coefficient in the model predicting 
Y from X and it quantifies the direct effect of X, whereas the product of a1 and b1 
quantifies the specific indirect effect of X on through M1. The product of a2 and b2 
presents the specific indirect effect of X on Y through M2. The indirect effect is 
interpreted as the amount by which two cases that differ by one unit on X are expected to 
differ on Y through X’s effect on the mediator variables, which in turn affects Y. The 
direct effect is interpreted as the part of the total effect of X on Y that is independent of 
the pathway through M1 and M2. Figure 4.1 (b) presents a multiple mediation model, with 
the total effect being equal to the direct effect of X on Y plus the sum of the indirect effect 
through M1 and M2, which can be represented as c = c’ + a1b1 + a2b2. Finally, the total 
indirect effect is the sum of the indirect effects, i.e. a1b1 + a2b2 (Hayes 2009).  
Figure 4.1: A multiple mediation model: (a) illustration of a direct effect and (b) 
illustration of a multiple mediation effect (adapted from Preacher and Hayes, 2008). 
 
(a) Direct effect 
 





A modern approach to test intervening variable effects that are based on the product of 
the coefficients is bootstrapping (Lockwood and MacKinnon 1998), which is a non-
parametric method based on resampling with replacement, which is undertaken many 
times, e.g. 5000 times.  From each of these samples the indirect effect is computed and a 
sampling distribution can be empirically generated. With the bootstrapping technique, the 
standard error is not used to interpret the results and hence it avoids the controversy 
behind estimating the standard errors of the indirect effect. Moreover, it is acknowledged 
that the bootstrapping doesn’t assume normality for the sampling distribution (Hayes 
2009).  
In this thesis bootstrapping technique is used to test the hypothesised multiple 
mediation/indirect effects of relational capabilities on the relationship between inter-
organizational factors and alliance performance. This involves an empirical 
representation of the sampling distribution of the indirect effects (i.e. product of the a and 
b paths) by taking a new sample from the available one and estimating the indirect effects 
(Preacher and Hayes 2008b). Scholars, such as MacKinnon et al. (2004), Hayes (2009), 
and Williams and MacKinnon (2008), have concluded that bootstrapping is more robust 
than the Sobel test and the causal steps method for testing intervening variable effects. 
Previous empirical research (Fritz and MacKinnon, 2007; MacKinnon et al., 2002) has 
shown that tends to have greater power and is more appropriate for controlling statistical 
errors than other peer techniques, especially the Sobel test. It has also been argued that 
bootstrapping can produce more accurate results in the case of mediation analysis and 
that it should be used for estimating and testing hypotheses regarding the mediation effect 
(Efron and Tibshirani, 1998; Lunneborg 2000; Mooney and Duval 1993; Bollen and Stine 
1990, Lockwood and MacKinnon 1998). The process yields a percentile-based bootstrap 
confidence interval, but these are more accurate derived through bias correction or bias 
correction and acceleration (Stine, 1989; Lunneborg 2000, Preacher and Hayes, 2008a; 
MacKinnon et al., 2004).   
The guidelines provided by Hayes (2009) regarding bootstrapping are adopted in this 
study using 5,000 bootstrap samples to assess the indirect effects and the bias correction 




is examined by determining whether zero is between the lower and upper bound of the 
confidence interval. The indirect effect exists if zero is not inside the confidence interval. 
In this research, the multiple mediation macros created and validated by Preacher and 
Hayes (2008a) for SPSS/PASW are used to test the indirect effects of governance on the 
relationship between capability and collaboration. These macros have been effectively 
used in a number of previous studies (Buffardi and Campbell, 2008; Ruva and McEvoy 
2008). The control variables considered for bootstrapping are firm size, relationship 
duration, type of the firm and the remaining independent variables. The bias corrected 
95% confidence intervals are estimated for the significant statistical indirect effects. To 
test the hypotheses, the point estimates of the indirect effects are only significant in the 
case where zero is not contained in the confidence intervals. In this study, relational 
capabilities, including knowledge sharing routines, complementary capability and 
effective governance, are hypothesised as mediating variables. It is expected that the 
effect of trust and asset specificity on alliance performance be transmitted via (mediated 
by) relational capabilities. 
4.15 Chapter summary 
The research methodology adopted in this study is explained and justified in this chapter. 
The research philosophy, strategy and design are discussed in context of the research 
problem with the alliance project between MNE subsidiaries and local suppliers forming 
the unit of analysis in this research. This study adopts a survey based research 
methodology to investigate the relationship between economic and relational dimensions, 
namely trust and asset specificity, relational capabilities and alliance performance. Thus, 
the survey design procedures including pilot testing, questionnaire design and data 
collection administration are presented and the reliability and validity of the research are 
discussed. Finally, the operationalisation of the variables pertaining to the theoretical 
model presented in the previous chapter has been explained and justified along with the 










5.1 Introduction  
This chapter reports the statistical analysis of the data collected in this research, which is 
performed with the statistical software package SPSS version 18. The hypotheses 
developed in Chapter 3 are tested using the data collected in relation to the respondents 
in the purchasing departments’ perspectives on MNE subsidiaries in the Thai 
manufacturing sector. Section 5.2 describes the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
technique to decide the measurement scales for the independent and dependent variables 
as well as examining the bivariate correlations for estimating the possible relations 
between the different variables employed in this study. The multiple mediation test (or, 
indirect effect) of relational capabilities on the relation between economic and relational 
dimensions and alliance performance is described in section 5.3. 
 
5.2 Validity and reliability  
Two tests were used to check the validity of the multiple measures: (1) Cronbach’s alpha 
and (2) bivariate correlation between the scales used in the study with the main factor 
extracted from the multiple items. All the constructs in the framework were subjected to 
a systemic assessment to test the validity and reliability. That is, the terms of each factor 
were examined in the context of the conceptual framework to determine that those loaded 
onto the factor were theoretically consistent and no case of conceptual inconsistency was 
found. The content validity of each scale was already examined during the pilot study 
stage. The internal consistency of the scale is important to ensure that the items that make 
up the scale ‘hang together’ (Pallant 2007). That of the variables was examined using 
reliability analysis of the scale through Cronbach alpha coefficients ranging between 0 
and 1. The closer the coefficient is to 1.0 the greater the internal consistency of the items 
on the scale (Hair et al. 2006).  
Next, the internal consistency of the constructs was validated also using Cronbach’s alpha 
as knowledge sharing routines, complementary capability, effective governance 
mechanisms scoared 0.82, 0.83 and 0.84, respectively, thus indicating a reasonable level 




including inter-personal trust (0.86), inter-organizational trust (0.86), and asset specificity 
(0.84), confirmed a reasonable level of reliability. Also, the scores of operational 
performance and strategic performance are 0.84 and 0.85, respectively, thereby revealing 
a reasonable of reliability. These reported alphas were all bigger than the minimum 
required for the psychometric property (0.60) (Nunnally, 1978).  
5.2.1 Bivariate correlation  
Bivariate correlations were used to examine the nature of the relationship between the 
variables in the theoretical framework. Pearson correlation (r) is the most commonly used 
bivariate correlation technique, which measures the association between two quantitative 
variables without distinction between the independent and dependent variables and the 
value of coefficient (r) exhibits between -1 and +1. Malhotra and Grover (1998) suggested 
that an r greater than 0.8 indicates that the variables are highly correlated and hence, there 
is a multicollinearity issue. Table 5.1 shows the Pearson correlation values of the bivariate 
correlation between the variables in this study and it can be seen that the all the 
coefficients are below 0.72, which is under the limit of 0.8 for there being potential 
multicollinearity problems.  
In table 5.1, alliance experiences has a significant correlation with inter-organizational 
trust (r = 0.320), asset specificity (r = 0.405), knowledge sharing routines (r = 0.306), 
complementary capabilities (r = 0.253), effective governance mechanisms (r = 0.314), 
operational performance (r = 0.389) and strategic performance (r = 0.459). These 
significant relationships are consistent with those found in some of the literature 
(Heimeriks et al., 2004; Krishnan et al., 2006; Dyer and Kale, 2007). Moreover, alliance 
project types is positively correlated with strategic performance (r = 0.168), which 
indicates that the more complicated the nature of the project the better the strategic 
outcomes. Further, HR distance and strategic performance are significantly negatively 
correlated (r = -0.185), but there is no significant relationship between the former and the 
other variables. In particular, no significant correlation is found between this variable and 
relational capabilities. The correlation between inter-organizational trust and inter-
personal trust (r= 0.503) as well as asset specificity (r = 0.305) is positive, as is also the 




Table 5.1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of variables 
 Mean S.D. Cron 
bach α 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Interfirm_length 
 












.256 .438 NA .097 .108 -.057 1           
  
(5) Firm size 
 




1.916 .709 NA .029 -.006 -.009 -.134 -.099 1         
  
(7) Project Types 
 
3.019 1.193 NA -.080 .041 -.122 -.042 .128 -.090 1        
  
(8) HR distance 1.806 1.823 NA .012 -.053 -.130 -.093 .109 .033 .007 1         
(9) Inter-
organizational trust 
























23.987 5.743 .848 .015 .002 .389** .055 .009 -.075 .115 -.014 .450** .348** .420** .446** .426** .111* 1  
(16) Strategic 
performance 
21.826 6.927 .859 .060 .014 .459** .051 .069 .001 .168* -.185* .267** .226** .433** .342** .410** .105* .700** 1 




As expected, a significant relation is also found between trust and relational capabilities. 
That is, inter-personal trust is positively correlated with relational capabilities with its 
component parts having the following correlation coefficients: knowledge sharing 
routines, r = 0.449, complementary capability, r = 0.530, and effective governance 
capability, r = 0.150. Moreover inter-personal trust has a significantly positive association 
with alliance performance, as its item scores are: operational performance, r = 0.450, and 
strategic performance, r = 0.267. Similarly, inter-organizational trust is positively 
correlated with knowledge sharing routines (r = 0.406), complementary capability (r = 
0.408), effective governance mechanisms (r = 0.185), operational performance (r = 
0.348) and strategic performance (r = 0.226). Furthermore, it is evident that asset 
specificity has a significant moderate relationship with knowledge sharing routines (r = 
0.711), complementary capability (r = 0.597), effective governance capability (r = 0.584), 
which was anticipated in the sense that alliances with greater asset specificity tend to 
engage more in collaborative routines and capabilities with alliance partners. Asset 
specificity also has positive correlation with operational performance (r = 0.420) and 
strategic performance (r= 0.433). The different types of relational capabilities, including 
knowledge sharing routines, complementary capability and effective governance 
mechanisms are moderately related to each other, which was also expected because the 
activities involved in different types of collaboration are not mutually exclusive and they 
are carried out by the same staff in the organisation.  
In this study, operational performance and strategic performance were chosen as the 
dependent variables. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted using AMOS 
18 to estimate the measurement properties of the multi-item constructs and the results of 
the second CFA test regarding these are presented in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3, 
respectively. Regarding operational performance, the measurement of this variable in the 
model shows a good fit to the data. That is, as can be seen the statistical results are X2 
(503) = 885.522; CMIN/DF = 1.760; Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) = 0.901; comparative fit 
index (CFI) = 0.911; and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.07, 
all of which support a strong model fit. In relation to strategic performance, the 
measurement model also revealed a good fit of the model to the data, with results being: 
X2 (472) = 851.004; CMIN/DF = 1.803; Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) = 0.901; comparative 




0.07. All factor loadings were in excess of the commonly accepted 0.40 standard 




                                                             
1 There are twelve items of all variable measurements in the questionnaires that have 
factor loadings lower than 0.40. One plausible explanation is that the background of this 
study, namely alliance projects in Thai manufacturing sector, would make these 
individual items less relative and redundant to the concept of this study. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, alliance project levels have distinct the lower-level project organization issues 
since they have narrow scope and dynamic relationship between alliance partners. 
Consequently, the respondent population answered the questions differently than other 
studies due to the context of the relationship. Therefore, these items may naturally drop 
off if others are stronger and more fitting to the concept of this research. Those items that 
were removed from the analysis in order to improve model fit are as follows: 
OT5: Your company trust that confidential/proprietary information shared with the 
supplier will be kept strictly confidential by the supplier's sales and engineers, OT6: Your 
company provided recent detailed cost data to the supplier, OT7: Your company share 
information with the supplier on your long-term production plans, capital investments, 
and capacity utilization, PT4: You have faith in your contact person to look out for your 
interests even when it is costly to do so, PT5: You would feel a sense of betrayal if your 
contact person's performance was below your expectations, C1: There is high 
complementary between the resources/capabilities of the two partners, C2: The 
organizational cultures of the two partners are compatible with each other, G2: The 
formal documents, i.e. balance sheet, monthly report, service level agreements, are highly 
used in monitoring the performance of the supplier, G5: Disagreements between your 
company and the supplier will be only resolved with informal meeting between 
cooperation managers or project groups, A6: Your company has changed the extent of 
training needed for staff, A7: Your company has difficulty to redeploy people and 
facilities serving the alliance, and A8: It is important that this alliance continues, as 





Table 5.2 Confirmatory factor analysis 
 
Dependent variable: Operational performance 
Multi-construct 
Variables 
Measurements Loadings S.E. 
Inter-organizational trust 
(Zaheer et al., 1998) 
OT1: This supplier is trustworthy.   
1.000  
 OT2: This supplier has always been even handed in 
its negotiation with us. 
1.006 0.095 
 OT3: This supplier never uses opportunities that 
arise to profit at our expense.   
1.070 0.102 
 OT4: Your company is not hesitant to transact with 
this supplier when the specifications are vague. 
0.730 0.145 
Inter-personal trust 
(Zaheer et al., 1998) 
PT1: The contact person of this alliance has always 
been even handed in negotiations with you. 
1.000  
 PT2: You know how your contact person is going to 
act. S/he can always be counted on to act as you 
expect. 
0.906 0.063 
 PT3: Your contact person is trustworthy. 
0.853 0.064 
Asset specificity  
(Subramani & 
Venkatraman, 2003; Zhou 
& Poppo, 2010) 
A1: Your company has changed the location of the 
distribution facilities used in supplying products and 
services for this supplier 
1.000  
 A2: Your company has changed your manufacturing 
equipment and machinery. 
0.831 0.081 
 A3: Your company has changed your inventory and 
warehouse. 
0.967 0.072 
 A4: Your company has changed your software and 
applications used (e.g.,0 billing, inventory 
management, EDI etc.) 
1.023 0.077 
 A5: Your company has changed your administrative 
and operating procedures used (e.g. vendor selection, 




routines (Dyer, 1997) 
K1: Your company and this supplier conducted a 
collective review to assess the progress and 
performance of the strategic alliances.   
1.000  
 K2: Your company and this supplier participated in 
forums, such as committees or task forces, to take 
stock of their alliance management experience and 
practices. 
1.080 0.064 
 K3: Your company and this supplier participated in 
forums, such as meetings, seminars, or retreats, to 
exchange alliance-related issues (e.g. buyer and this 
















Measurements Loadings S.E. 
 K4: Your company and this supplier engaged in 
informal sharing and exchange of alliance-related 
information and know-how with peers or colleagues 
within the organization. 
0.770 0.079 
 K5: Your company and this supplier engaged in 
informal sharing and exchange of alliance-related 
information and know-how with peers or colleagues 
within the organization. 
0.686 0.095 
Complementary capability 
(Kale et al., 2000) 
C3: The organizational cultures of the two partners 
are compatible with each other       
  
1.000  
 C4: The management and operating styles of the 
partners are compatible with each other   
1.067 0.065 
 C5: Your company learnt or acquired some new or 
important information from the partner  
1.318 0.091 
 C6: Your company learnt or acquired some critical 
capability or skill from the partner         
1.304 0.091 
 C7: This alliance has helped your company to 
enhance its existing capabilities/skills            
1.303 0.096 
Effective governance 
mechanisms (Mesquita et 
al., 2008) 
G1: The formal contract/agreement is highly 
customized and required considerable legal work. 1.000  
 G3: Face-to-face meetings at the top management 
level are highly used in monitoring the performance 
of the supplier  
1.071 0.122 
 G4: Disagreements between your company and the 
supplier will be only resolved with the formal 
contracts or agreements   
0.892 0.115 
 G6: Your company and this supplier keep each other 
informed in relation to production plans, schedules 
and demand forecasts 
0.784 0.109 
 G7: Your company and this supplier extend technical 
support during emergencies and breakdown and/or 
onsite support for implementation of improvements 
0.999 0.117 
 G8: Your company and this supplier promote fair 




(Villena et al, 2010) 
OP1: Your company has continued to be able to 
improve product design performance through this 
alliance. 
1.000  
 OP2: Your company has continued to be able to 
improve process design through this alliance. 
0.965 0.065 
 OP3: Your company has continued to be able to 
improve product quality through this alliance. 
0.756 0.090 
 OP4: Your company has continued to reduce lead 
time after the alliance. 
0.810 0.089 
 OP5: Your company has continued to increase 
delivery time reliability through this partnership after 
the alliance.  
0.915 0.091 
 OP7: Your company has continued to be able to 








Table 5.3 Confirmatory factor analysis 
 
Dependent variable: Strategic performance 
Multi-construct 
Variables 
Measurements Loadings S.E. 
Inter-organizational trust 
(Zaheer et al., 1998) 
OT1: This supplier is trustworthy.   
1.000 
 
 OT2: This supplier has always been even handed in 
its negotiation with us. 
1.015 0.096 
 OT3: This supplier never uses opportunities that 
arise to profit at our expense.   
1.066 0.103 
 OT4: Your company is not hesitant to transact with 
this supplier when the specifications are vague. 
0.723 0.146 
Inter-personal trust 
(Zaheer et al., 1998) 
PT1: The contact person of this alliance has always 
been even handed in negotiations with you. 
1.000  
 PT2: You know how your contact person is going to 
act. S/he can always be counted on to act as you 
expect. 
0.904 0.063 
 PT3: Your contact person is trustworthy. 
0.853 0.064 
Asset specificity  
(Subramani&Venkatraman, 
2003; Zhou & Poppo, 
2010) 
A1: Your company has changed the location of the 
distribution facilities used in supplying your  
supplying products and services for this supplier 
1.000 
 
 A2: Your company has changed your 
manufacturing equipment and machinery. 
0.837 0.081 
 A3: Your company has changed your inventory and 
warehouse. 
0.962 0.072 
 A4: Your company has changed your software and 
applications used (e.g. billing, inventory 
management, EDI etc.) 
1.029 0.077 
 A5: Your company has changed your administrative 
and operating procedures used (e.g. vendor 




routines (Dyer, 1997) 
K1: Your company and this supplier conducted a 
collective review to assess the progress and 
performance of the strategic alliances.   
1.000 
 
 K2: Your company and this supplier participated in 
forums such as committees or task forces to take 
stock of their alliance management experience and 
practices. 
1.080 0.064 
 K3: Your company and this supplier participated in 
forums such as meetings, seminars, or retreats to 
exchange alliance-related issues (e.g. buyer and this 
suppliers employees jointly participated in someone 
else’s programmes) 
1.064 0.070 
 K4: Your company and this supplier engaged in 
informal sharing and exchange of alliance-related 
information and know-how with peers or colleagues 
within the organization. 
0.771 0.079 
 K5: Your company and this supplier engaged in 
informal sharing and exchange of alliance-related 
information and know-how with peers or colleagues 










Measurements Loadings S.E. 
Complementary 
capability (Kale et al., 
2000) 
C3: The organizational cultures of the two partners 
are compatible with each other        1.000 
 
 C4: The management and operating styles of the 
partners are compatible with each other   
1.066 0.065 
 C5: Your company learnt or acquired some new or 
important information from the partner  
1.318 0.092 
 C6: Your company learnt or acquired some critical 
capability or skill from the partner         
1.305 0.091 
 C7: This alliance has helped your company to 
enhance its existing capabilities/skills            
1.304 0.096 
Effective governance 
mechanisms (Mesquita et 
al., 2008) 
G1: The formal contract/agreement is highly 
customized and required considerable legal work. 1.000 
 
 G3: Face-to-face meetings at the top management 
level are highly used in monitoring the performance 
of the supplier  
1.073 0.122 
 G4: Disagreements between your company and the 
supplier will be only resolved with the formal 
contracts or agreements   
0.892 0.115 
 G6: Your company and this supplier keep each other 
informed in relation to production plans, schedules 
and demand forecasts 
0.786 0.109 
 G7: Your company and this supplier extend technical 
support during emergencies and breakdown and/or 
onsite support for implementation of improvements 
0.996 0.117 
 G8: Your company and this supplier promote fair 
sharing of cost savings and benefits arising out of 
joint efforts. 
0.916 0.106 
Strategic performance  
 (Villena et al., 2010) 
ST1: Your company has continued to be able to 
introduce a new generation of products. 
1.000 
 
 ST2: Your company has continued to be able to 
extend product range. 
0.993 0.060 
 ST3: Your company has continued to be able to open 
up new markets. 
1.030 0.058 
 ST4: Your company has continued to be able to enter 
new technology fields. 
0.867 0.069 
 ST5: Your company has continued to be able to learn 
about customers and markets for your products. 
0.821 0.064 
 
Model Fit: X2 (472) = 851.004; CMIN/DF = 1.803, TLI = 0.901; CFI = 0.912; RMSEA = 0.07. 
5.2.3 Common method variance and multicollinearity 
In survey-based studies, common method variance is a major concern. This 
researcher has addressed this issue, firstly, by collecting data from two different 
respondents at different levels in each company. For instance, the inter-personal trust 
variable was collected from purchasing staff, while the inter-organizational trust variable 




sources, including HR distance from archival data, alliance mode, which is a dummy 
variable, from purchasing managers and tangible and intangible asset specificity from 
purchasing staff. A Harman one-factor test, the most widely used technique for 
addressing common method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2003), was also performed this 
single factor accounted for only 21.7 percent of the variance, which is well below the cut 
off at 50 percent and hence consistent with the absence of such variance. 
Moderated hierarchical regressions were applied to test how the trust-knowledge sharing 
relationship is inﬂuenced by transaction cost factors and the estimation method used was 
ordinary least squares. In addition, all variables utilized to construct the interaction terms 
were standardized so as to eliminate the initial multicollinearity problem in the estimated 
model. With this correction, the maximum variance inflation factor (VIF) across the 
covariates was 3.89, which is significantly below the rule of thumb of 10 used to detect 
a multicollinearity problem. 
5.3 Research findings 
5.3.1 Antecedents of relational capabilities  
The results of the regression analysis of the model described earlier are reported in Table 
6.3, Table 5.4 and Table 5.5. Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 purported that the high levels of inter-
personal trust, inter-firm trust and asset specificity lead to relational capabilities. On the 
other hand, hypothesis 4 proposed that a high level of HR distance hampers relational 
capabilities. These hypotheses were tested using hierarchical regression. In the first step, 
all of the control variables were entered into the regression equations, which tested the 
effects of these variables and relational factors, including: firm size, inter-organizational 
duration length, previous alliance experiences and sub-industries. It emerged that 
previous alliance experiences has a significant positive relationship with knowledge 
sharing routines, complementary capability and effective governance capability as 
suggested by the literature (Kale et al., 2000; Heimeriks, 2004). Also, supplier 
dependence has a significant positive effect on complementary capability.  In the second 
step, the overall degree of inter-personal trust, inter-firm trust, asset specificity and HR 






Table 5.4 Regression results for antecedents and barriers of knowledge sharing 
routines  
 Step 1 Step 2 
 β t β t 
Intercept 17.109 5.109** 1.790 0.601 
Control variables     
Inter-firm_length 0.156 1.243 0.125 1.344 
Previous alliance 
experiences 
0.445 3.912** 0.030 0.324 
Project types 0.026 0.059 0.001 0.004 
Firm size -0.915 -1.040 -0.126 -0.190 
Sub-industries -0.450 -0.619 -0.184 -0.344 
Alliance_length -0.028 -0.223 -0.101 -1.090 
Supplier dependency 1.585 1.349 0.033 0.037 
     
Main effects     
Inter-personal trust   0.321 2.560* 
Inter-organizational trust   0.284 2.550* 
Asset specificity   0.500 8.234** 
HR_Distance   -0.205 -0.966 
     
R2  0.125  0.543 
Adjusted R2  0.084  0.509 
F  3.024*  15.581** 
     
               *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01 
Table 5.3 shows the results of the antecedents and barriers of knowledge sharing routines. 
Step 1 indicates that only previous alliance experiences has a significant effect on 
knowledge sharing routines, whereas the results from step 2 show that inter-personal trust 
(β = 0.32, p < 0.05), inter-organizational trust (β = 0.28, p <0 .05) and asset specificity 
(β = 0.50, p <0 .01) have significant effects. The results confirm hypotheses H1a, H2a 
and H3a and suggest that the relational dimension, namely, inter-personal trust and inter-
organizational trust, and economic dimension, namely, asset specificity, are antecedents 
of knowledge sharing routines. On the other hand, it appears that HR distance (H4a) does 
not have a significant impact on knowledge sharing routines, which leads to rejection of 





Table 5.5 Antecedents and barriers of complementary capability 
 Step 1 Step 2 
 β t β t 
Intercept 16.138 5.151** 1.332 0.464 
Control variables     
Inter-firm_length 0.115 0.985 0.082 0.913 
Previous alliance 
experiences 
0.377 3.542** 0.068 0.755 
Project types 0.545 1.330 0.474 1.511 
Firm size 0.228 0.277 0.567 0.887 
Sub-industries 0.251 0.369 0.436 0.849 
Alliance_length -0.117 -0.999 -0.126 -0.981 
Supplier dependency 2.262 2.058* 1.280 1.493 
     
Main effects     
Inter-personal trust   0.378 4.785** 
Inter-organizational trust   0.214 2.065* 
Asset specificity   0.378 6.455** 
HR_Distance   -0.044 -0.213 
     
R2  0.109  0.508 
Adjusted R2  0.067  0.470 
F  2.597*  13.514** 
     
               *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01 
Table 5.4 presents the results of the antecedents and barriers of complementary capability. 
In step 1, previous alliance experiences and supplier dependence have a positively 
significant impact this capability. The results from step 2 shows that inter-personal trust 
(β = 0.38, p < 0.01), inter-organizational trust (β = 0.21, p < 0.05) and asset specificity 
(β = 0.38, p < 0 .01) have a significant impact on complementary capability, which 
confirms hypotheses H2a, H2b and H2c. That is, these results indicate that the relational 
dimension, namely, inter-personal trust and inter-organizational trust, as well as the 
economic dimension, namely asset specificity, are antecedents of complementary 
capability. However, it is apparent that HR distance (H4b) does not have a significant 
impact on complementary capability, which calls for the rejection of the hypothesis that 





Table 5.6 Antecedents and barriers of effective governance capability 
 Step 1 Step 2 
 β t β t 
Intercept 21.730 5.603** 7.769 1.958 
Control variables     
Inter-firm_length 0.194 1.335 0.179 1.442 
Previous alliance experiences 0.628** 4.761 0.258 2.073* 
Project types 0.453 0.892 0.399 0.920 
Firm size 0.209 0.205 0.596 0.674 
Sub-industries -1.384 -1.644 -1.175 -1.654 
Alliance_length -0.095 -0.658 -0.172 -1.404 
Supplier dependency 1.701 1.249 0.366 0.309 
     
Main effects     
Inter-personal trust   0.331 1.983* 
Inter-organizational trust   0.162 1.091 
Asset specificity   0.491 6.075** 
HR_Distance   -0.045 -0.158 
     
R2  0.173  0.430 
Adjusted R2  0.134  0.387 
F  4.438**  9.885** 
     
               *p < 0.05, **p< 0.01 
Table 5.5 shows the results of the antecedents and barriers of effective governance 
mechanisms. In step 1, previous alliance experiences has a positively significant impact 
on effective governance mechanisms, whilst the results from step 2 show that inter-
personal trust (β = 0.33, p < 0.05) and asset specificity (β = 0.49, p < 0.01) have a 
significant impact on complementary capability, which confirms hypotheses H3a and 
H3c. Furthermore, the findings show that the relational dimension, namely, inter-personal 
trust and inter-organizational trust, as well as the economic dimension, namely, asset 
specificity, are antecedents of effective governance mechanisms. However, it emerges 
that HR distance (H4c) does not have a significant impact on effective governance 
mechanisms, thus leading to rejection of the hypothesis that HR distance is a barrier of 




In sum, the results provide consistent support for Hypotheses 1 and 3; the degree of inter-
personal trust and asset specificity are positively related to knowledge sharing routines, 
complementary capability and effective governance capability. However, hypothesis 2 is 
only partially supported as inter-firm trust has no significant impact on effective 
governance capability. No significant effect of HR distance has been found on relational 
capabilities and hence, hypothesis 4 is rejected.  
5.3.2 Mediating variable bootstrapping results  
The mediating effects of relational capabilities on three causal relationships were 
analysed, these being 1) inter-personal relationship and alliance performance; 2) inter-
organizational trust and alliance performance; 3) asset specificity and alliance 
performance. Regarding this, eight control variables were identified and examined in 
each model: firm size, inter-firm duration length, previous alliance experiences, alliance 
project types, sub-industries, supplier dependency and HR distance, with the results of 
bootstrapping being shown in Table 5.6.  The results of the bootstrapping analysis of 
mediation effects are reported in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8. 
Overall, only two control variables would appear to have a significant effect on alliance 
performance. That is, in the first model, previous alliance experiences has a significant 
positive impact on operational performance (β  = 0.4380, p < 0.01) and strategic 
performance (β = 0.6130, p < 0.01), whilst alliance project type experiences does so on 
strategic performance (β = 1.1281, p < 0.01). In the second model, previous alliance 
experiences has a significant positive impact on operational performance (β = 0.3738, p 
< 0.01) and strategic performance (β = 0.5995, p < 0.01), whereas alliance project type 
experiences has this result regarding strategic performance (β = 1.1232, p < 0.01). In the 
third model, previous alliance experiences has a significant positive impact on operational 
performance (β = 0.3969, p < 0.01) and strategic performance (β = 0.5404, p < 0.01). 
Moreover, alliance project types experiences has a significant positive impact on strategic 
performance (β = 1.2730, p < 0.01).  While this is not a main contribution or even an 
initial focus of this study, these findings highlight the notable effect that these control 





Table 5.7 Control variables of inter-personal trust 
Control variables Operational performance Strategic performance 
          β             t        β      t 
Inter-firm_length -0.0504      -0.5327 -0.0965 -0.8444      
Alliance_length -0.0131      -0.1385 -0.0544      -0.4779      
Supplier dependency 1.3125 1.4502      -0.4050     -0.3709      
HR Distance 0.2686      1.2392      -0.4175      -1.5969      
Firm size 0.3154      0.4710      0.0175      0.0217      
Project types 0.5538      1.6433 1.1281**      2.7751      
Sub-industries -0.6366      -1.1433      0.1934      0.2880      
Previous alliance 
experiences 
0.4380**      4.7338 0.6130**      5.4918      
*p < 0.05, **p< 0.01 
Table 5.8 Control variables of inter-organizational trust 
Control variables Operational performance Strategic performance 
         β t        β      t 
Inter-firm_length -0.0837      -0.9003      -0.1038      -0.9023 
Alliance_length 0.0022      0.0242      -0.0513      -0.4513      
Supplier dependency 0.7808      0.8848 -0.5142     -0.4712      
HR Distance 0.3671      1.7322      -0.3970      -1.5148      
Firm size -0.1075      -0.1634      -0.0706      -0.0868      
Project types 0.5365      1.6354      1.1232**      2.7686      
Sub-industries -0.5742      -1.0573      0.2077      0.3093      
Previous alliance 
experiences 
0.3738**      4.0856      0.5995**      5.2990      
*p < 0.05, **p< 0.01 
Table 5.9 Control variables of asset specificity 
Control variables Operational performance Strategic performance 
        β              t        β       t 
Inter-firm_length -0.0229      -0.2385      -0.0505      -0.4500      
Alliance_length -0.0302      -0.3138      -0.1080      -0.9603      
Supplier dependency 1.0190      1.1232      -0.6688     -0.6310      
HR Distance 0.2892      1.3293      -0.4237      -1.6671      
Firm size 0.3280      0.4854      0.2539      0.3216      
Project types 0.6642      1.9515      1.2730**      3.2014      
Sub-industries -0.6710      -1.1992      0.1970      0.3014      
Previous alliance 
experiences 
0.3969**      4.1611      0.5404**      4.8492      




However, other control variables, including including firm size, HR distance, duration of 
inter-firm relationship, industries, alliance project duration and supplier dependence, 
have no significant impact on either operational performance or strategic performance. 
The significant effects of alliance project types and previous alliance experiences as well 
as the non-significant impact of the other control variables are discussed further in the 
next chapter.  
Table 5.10 Bootstrapping for mediation effects of relational capabilities on 
operational performance 
BC – Bias corrected, CI – confidence interval; 5,000 bootstrap samples 
Table 6.7 shows that in case of inter-personal trust, the specific indirect effects through 
knowledge sharing routines, complementary capability and effective governance 







(BC 95% CI) 
 (IV) (M) (a*b) Lower Upper 
1 Inter-personal trust Knowledge sharing 
routines 
0.2220* 0.0930 0.4889 
  Complementary capability 0.0091 -0.0598 0.3007 
  Effective governance 
capability 
0.0031 -0.3246 0.0106 





0.1472* 0.0465 0.3407 
  Complementary capability 0.0105 -0.0034 0.2043 
  Effective governance 
capability 
0.0030 -0.2102 0.0068 
  Total indirect effect 0.1607* 0.0670 0.2953 
3 Asset specificity Knowledge sharing 
routines 
0.1365*     0.0642      0.3048 
  Complementary capability 0.0110 -0.0189 0.1821 
  Effective governance 
capability 
0.0026 -0.2272 0.0101 




0.2220, 0.0091 and 0.0031, respectively. Moreover, the total indirect effect through 
relational capabilities is significant with a point estimate of 0.2342 and a 95% CI of 
0.0847 to 0.4440. Taking into account each mediating variable is important for 
understanding the significant difference between the indirect effects of the relational 
capabilities components, the indirect effects through complementary capability and 
effective governance capability are found to have zero within the results range, with BC 
95% CI {-0.0598, 0.3007} and {-0.3246, 0.0106}, respectively, which leads to rejection 
of hypotheses 6a and 7a. In contrast, regarding the specific indirect effect through 
knowledge sharing routines it is found that no zero is contained in the BC 95% CI 
{0.0930, 0.4889}. Therefore, knowledge sharing routines has a mediating effect on the 
relationship between inter-personal trust and operational performance, which supports 
hypothesis 5a. 
In the case of inter-organizational trust, the specific indirect effects through knowledge 
sharing routines, complementary capability and effective governance capability on 
operational performance are significant with point estimates (a*b) of 0.1472, 0.0105 and 
0.0030 respectively. Moreover, the total indirect effect through relational capabilities is 
significant with the point estimate of 0.1607 and the 95% CI of 0.0670 to 0.2953. In 
relation to the indirect effects through complementary capability and effective 
governance capability it emerges that zero covered for both, with BC 95% CI {-0.0034, 
0.2043} and {-0.2102, 0.0068}, respectively, which results in the rejection of hypotheses 
9a and 10a. Whereas for the specific indirect effect through knowledge sharing routines 
no zero is contained in the BC 95% CI {0.0465, 0.3407}, which therefore indicates that 
knowledge sharing routines has a mediating effect on the relationship between inter-
organizational trust and operational performance, thus providing support for hypothesis 
8a. 
With respect to asset specificity, the specific indirect effects through knowledge sharing 
routines, complementary capability and effective governance capability on operational 
performance are significant with point estimates (a*b) of 0.1365, 0.0110 and 0.0026, 
respectively. Further, the total indirect effect through relational capabilities is significant 
with a point estimate of 0.1501 and a 95% CI of 0.0410 to 0.2663. Regarding the indirect 
effects through complementary capability and effective governance capability it is found 
that zero is contained, with BC 95% CI {-0.0189, 0.1821} and {-0.2272, 0.0101}, 




hypotheses 12a and 13a. Whereas for the specific indirect effect through knowledge 
sharing routines no zero is contained in the BC 95% CI {0.0642, 0.3048}, which infers 
that knowledge sharing routines has a mediating effect on the relationship between asset 
specificity and operational performance, thus supporting hypothesis 11a. 
According to Table 5.11, the total indirect effect of inter-personal trust through 
knowledge sharing routines, complementary capability and effective governance 
capability on strategic performance is significant with a point estimate of 0.2837 and CI 
of 0.1186 to 0.5199. The BC 95% CIs for the specific indirect effect through knowledge 
sharing routines and effective governance mechanisms are {-0.1586, 0.2666} and {-
0.2148, 0.1358}, respectively. As zero is contained in this interval, the specific indirect 
effect through these two mediators is not significant, which thus provides no evidence to 
support hypothesis 5b and 7b. However, the specific indirect effect through 
complementary capability is significant with a point estimate of 0.2264 and a CI of 0.0715 
to 0.2093. Therefore, inter-personal trust has a significant indirect effect on strategic 
























(BC 95% CI) 
 (IV) (M) (a*b) Lower Upper 
1 Inter-personal trust Knowledge sharing 
routines 
0.0375 -0.1586 0.2666 
  Complementary 
capability 
0.2264* 0.0715 0.5494 
  Effective governance 
capability 
0.0198 -0.2148 0.1358 





0.0162 -0.1289 0.1880 
  Complementary 
capability 
0.1361* 0.0410      0.3456 
  Effective governance 
capability 
0.0077 -0.1396      0.0872 
  Total indirect effect 0.1600* 0.0352 0.3247 
3 Asset specificity Knowledge sharing 
routines 
0.0171     -0.1984 0.1294 
  Complementary 
capability 
0.1255*      0.0188      0.2462 
  Effective governance 
capability 
0.0107     -0.1643      0.0882 
  Total indirect effect 0.1553*     -0.0475      0.1860 
BC – Bias corrected, CI – confidence interval; 5,000 bootstrap samples 
 
After testing for the indirect effects of inter-organizational trust through knowledge 
sharing routines and effective governance capability on strategic performance, the 
confidence CI values are found to be in the range of {-0.1289, 0.1880} and {-0.1396, 
0.0872}, respectively. As zero is within these two confidence intervals, the specific 




be significant, which means that hypotheses 8b and 10b fall. However, the specific 
indirect effects of inter-organizational trust through complementary capability on 
strategic performance is significant with a point estimate (a*b) of 0.1361 and a CI of 
{0.0410, 0.3456}, which does not contain zero. This means that inter-organizational trust 
has a significant indirect effect on strategic performance through complementary 
capability and hence, hypothesis 9b is accepted.  
In case of asset specificity, the specific indirect effects through knowledge sharing 
routines and effective governance capability on strategic performance are not significant, 
with point estimates (a*b) of 0.0171 and 0.0107 and CIs of {-0.1984, 0.1294} and {-
0.1643, 0.0882}, respectively, both of which contain zero. This can be interpreted as that 
knowledge sharing routines and effective governance capability both have no mediating 
effects on the relation between asset specificity and strategic performance, whereby no 
support has been found for hypotheses 11b and 13b. In fact, complementary capability is 
the only specific mediator of asset specificity and strategic performance, given it has a 
point estimate (a*b) of 0.1255 and zero is not contained in the confidence interval 
{0.0188, 0.2462}. Hence, the bootstrap findings provide evidence to support hypothesis 
12b. 
5.4 Chapter summary  
In this chapter the statistical analysis of the data collected for the purposes of this thesis 
have been presented. Initially, they were subjected to a number of preliminary analyses 
to examine the assumptions related to the proposed statistical testing. Regarding this, 
confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to remove the less important items in the 
constructs of the theoretical framework. Moreover, the Pearson correlation coefficient is 
used to find out the bivariate correlation between the different variables, with the validity 
and reliability of the measures are also being examined. The hypotheses put forward in 
chapter 3 were then thoroughly investigated. To this end, Bootstrapping based multiple 
mediation analysis was used to examine the multiple mediation effect of relational 
capabilities on the relationship between the inter-organizational factors, namely, inter-
personal trust, inter-organizational trust and asset specificity, and alliance performance. 
The empirical findings relating to the antecedents of relational capabilities support 
hypotheses 1, 2, 3, but not hypotheses 2b regarding the relationship between inter-




distance is a barrier of relational capabilities is also rejected. Moreover, the empirical 
outcomes in relation to the indirect effect of the relational and economic dimensions on 
alliance performance through knowledge sharing routines and complementary capability 
support the hypotheses 5a, 6b, 8a, 9b, 11a and 12b. However, the rest of hypotheses 
pertaining to the expectation that effective governance capability is a mediator on those 
relationships are rejected. A summary of the results of the hypotheses is presented in 







































 Hypotheses Results 
 
H1a The higher the level of inter-personal trust in strategic alliances, 
the higher the level of knowledge sharing routines. 
Supported 
H1b The higher the level of inter-personal trust in strategic alliances, 
the higher the level of complementary capability 
Supported 
H1c The higher the level of inter-personal trust in strategic alliances, 
the higher the level of effective governance 
Supported 
H2a The higher the level of inter-firm trust in strategic alliances, the 
higher the level of knowledge sharing routines. 
Supported 
H2b The higher the level of inter-firm trust in strategic alliances, the 
higher the level of complementary capability 
Supported 
H2c The higher the level of inter-firm trust in strategic alliances, the 
higher the level of effective governance 
Not supported 
H3a The higher the level of asset specificity, the higher the level of 
knowledge sharing routines. 
Supported 
H3b The higher the level of asset specificity in strategic alliances, the 
higher the level of complementary capability 
Supported 
H3c The higher the level of asset specificity in strategic alliances, the 
higher the level of effective governance 
Supported 
H4a The higher the level of HR distance between alliance partners, 
the lower the level of knowledge sharing routines. 
Not supported 
H4b The higher the level of  HR distance between alliance partners, 
the lower the level of complementary capability 
Not supported 
H4c The higher the level of  HR distance between alliance partners, 











 Hypotheses Results  
 
H5a Inter-personal trust affects operational performance 
through knowledge sharing routines 
Supported 
H5b Inter-personal trust affects strategic performance through 
knowledge sharing routines 
Not supported 
H6a Inter-personal trust affects operational performance 
through complementary capability 
Not supported 
H6b Inter-personal trust affects strategic performance through 
complementary capability 
Supported 
H7a Inter-personal trust affects operational performance 
through effective governance mechanisms 
Not supported 
H7b Inter-personal trust affects strategic performance through 
effective governance mechanisms 
Not supported 
H8a Inter-organizational trust affects operational performance 
through knowledge sharing routines 
Supported 
H8b Inter-organizational trust affects strategic performance 
through knowledge sharing routines 
Not supported 
H9a Inter-organizational trust affects operational performance 
through complementary capability 
Not supported 
H9b Inter-organizational trust affects strategic performance 
through complementary capability 
Supported 
H10a Inter-organizational trust affects operational performance 
through effective governance mechanisms 
Not supported 
H10b Inter-organizational trust affects strategic performance 
through effective governance mechanisms 
Not supported 
H11a Asset specificity affects operational performance through 
knowledge sharing routines 
Supported 
H11b Asset specificity affects strategic performance through 
knowledge sharing routines 
Not supported 
H12a Asset specificity affects operational performance through 
complementary capability 
Not supported 
H12b Asset specificity affects strategic performance through 
complementary capability 
Supported 
H13a Asset specificity affects operational performance through 
effective governance mechanisms 
Not supported 
H13b Asset specificity affect strategic performance through 








This researcher has extended the relational capabilities approach (Dyer and Kale, 
2006) by analysing three dimensions of relational capabilities, including: knowledge 
sharing routines, complementary capability and effective governance mechanisms. 
Predictions were made regarding the antecedents that facilitate or hamper relational 
capabilities, as well as the mediating effects of these capabilities on performance 
outcomes in the context of strategic alliance projects between MNE subsidiaries and local 
suppliers in the Thai manufacturing sector.  









Overall, the results provide strong support for the argument that trust and asset specificity 
facilitate relational capabilities. The findings also show that alliance performance depends 
on the extent to which firms use their relational capabilities to integrate inter-
organizational trust, inter-personal trust and asset specificity to create value in strategic 
alliance projects and hence to gain superior alliance performance. Discussion on the 
findings of the study contained in this chapter is structured as follows: section 6.2 
considers the antecedents and barriers of relational capabilities, whilst section 6.3 































discusses the mediation effects of these capabilities on alliance performance. Section 6.4 
presents the effect of the control variables on relational capabilities and alliance 
performance, whereas section 6.5 discusses the results in the context of the research 
settings, which cover strategic alliance projects and MNE subsidiaries in the Thai 
manufacturing sector. Finally, section 6.6 summarizes the chapter. 
6.2 Antecedents and barriers of relational capabilities 
In support of the second hypothesis, a significant positive link between relational 
dimension, including inter-personal trust, inter-organizational trust, and relational 
capabilities has been found. That is, the levels-of-analysis issue continues to be an 
interesting topic of discussion, and more explicit extensions to group and organizational 
levels are warranted (Schoorman, Mayer, Davis, 2007). Past research has often treated 
trust as a uni-dimensional construct taking the form of a one-way relationship between 
trust and relational capabilities. This study extends the current knowledge on the subject 
by introducing the distinction of two levels of trust and analyzing their differential impact 
on relational capabilities. According to the strategic alliance literature, scholars have 
found that alliance experiences (Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007; Schilke and Goerzen, 
2010) and alliance dedicated functions (Kale et al., 2002) are sources of alliance 
management capabilities. The outcomes of this research extend the literature by providing 
evidence that relational and economic conditions in strategic alliances are antecedents of 
relational capabilities. That is, relational capabilities emerge when alliance partners have 
high levels of trust and asset specificity. 
 6.2.1 Inter-personal trust and relational capabilities 
This current study makes an important contribution to the literature by producing for the 
first time empirical evidence of the relationship between inter-personal trust and relational 
capabilities. That is, it has been elicited that inter-personal trust has positive results for all 
three dimensions of these capabilities. This finding is in line with Felin et al. (2012) in the 
sense that individuals have an influence on organizational behaviours in that inter-
personal trust fosters people to share knowledge and information because of the positive 




develop stable expectations of each other that routinize their interactions and make them 
predictable and reliable. Furthermore, evidence emerged that inter-personal trust is a 
source of complementary capability. To be precise, in order for organizations to have the 
capability for real synergy among their members, leading to the development of tacit 
knowledge that cannot be translated into rules or routines, individuals must have inter-
personal trust. This is because it promotes the kind of intense interpersonal cooperation 
and synergistic relationships discussed above. The tacit knowledge that results from real 
synergy is often taken for granted by organizational members. Hence, inter-personal trust, 
that is embedded in alliance project staff, plays an important role as a facilitator of 
complementary capability. This is in line with Janz and Prasarnphanich (2003) and Miller 
(1992), who found that high interpersonal trust, which is based on previous experiences 
with another colleague in repeated interactions, tends to result in the decision of 
commitment to cooperate, which will, in turn, lead to complementary resources and 
capabilities from the collaborations being disseminated among project staff. 
The reason is that exchanges are fundamentally generated from informal negotiation 
between individuals in the alliance projects. Effective governance mechanisms involve 
personal ties in the negotiation process, i.e. informal meetings, informal information 
sharing and technical support during the on-going project since inter-personal trust 
between contact persons facilitates these collaborative routines. Furthermore, because 
developing trust relies heavily on human relationships, the alliance processes involved 
will tend to be more informal rather than structural. Informal knowledge processes allow 
the verification of inter-personal trust and mutual understanding. Interpersonal transitions 
are obviously made easier by small cooperative events early in the process, which allow 
trust to develop sufficiently for individual participants in the alliance to step out of 
preexisting roles and to redefine these. This, in turn, gives confidence on both the equity 
and adaptability dimensions of reassessment needed to work on the third dimension, i.e. 
to make the alliance design more efficient (Doz, 1996). Hence, the theoretical framework 






6.2.2 Inter-organizational trust and relational capabilities 
This research has elicited that inter-organizational trust is an antecedent of knowledge 
sharing routines and complementary capability. This is in keeping with previous research 
(Griffith, Myers and Harvey, 2006; Nielsen and Nielsen, 2009) that revealed a significant 
relationship between inter-organizational trust and knowledge sharing routines of inter-
cultural alliance partners, because trust can minimize the potential for opportunism and 
develop confidence in partner cooperation (Das and Teng, 1998; Dyer & Chu, 2003). 
Furthermore, the research findings indicate that inter-organizational trust builds 
complementary capability in strategic alliance projects. Moreover, scholars have 
consistently argued that informal relational ties between members of the same 
organization (Hansen and Lovas, 2004) or different organizations (Bell and Zaheer, 2007) 
are superior conduits for knowledge flow between cross-cultural organizations. Such 
relational ties help to overcome cultural differences, whether national or corporate, which 
may exist between organizations (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). This finding is also 
consistent with work by Levin and Cross (2004), who revealed that trustworthiness is a 
critical mechanism underlying complementary resources and capabilities exchanges 
among employees in three companies in Canada, the US and the UK. It is concluded that 
a high level of inter-organizational trust can help firms share knowledge and acquire 
complement resources as well as capabilities from alliance partners.  
Despite the finding that inter-personal trust is a significant facilitator of effective 
governance mechanisms, a positive relationship between inter-organizational trust and 
such mechanisms has not been found, which is contrary to the initial hypothesis. One 
plausible explanation for this non-significant finding is that inter-organizational trust 
decreases transaction cost and opportunistic behaviours (Dyer, 1996; Sako and Helper, 
1998). This is consistent with Hansen et al.’s (2008) study, which showed that the 
opportunism minimization–gain maximization paradox may be resolved by reliance on 
relationship management capabilities coupled with a strong form of trustworthiness. 
Taking into account the context of the current research, it would appear that firms in the 
Thai manufacturing sector deal with opportunistic behaviours and behavioural uncertainty 




which is inconsistent with the TCE perspective.  Similarly, Lado et al. (2008) suggested 
that rather than implementing effective governance mechanisms, exchange parties in high 
inter-organizational trust contexts can foster value enhancing relationships to gain 
strategic advantage. In general, under conditions of high levels of trust the exchange 
parties are likely to establish self-enforcing or implicit contracts (Dyer, 1996; Mayer and 
Nickerson, 2005) rather than formal arrangements in order to safeguard the collaboration. 
 6.2.3 Asset specificity and relational capabilities 
The findings of this study are in line with the notion of complementarity between the 
relational view and TCE in that when there is a high level of asset specificity, firms tend 
to build cooperative behaviours (knowledge sharing routines and complementary 
capability) and safeguard mechanisms (effective governance mechanisms) during 
strategic alliance management. In support of the relational view (Dyer, 1996; Dyer and 
Singh, 1998), the outcomes of this research indicate that a firm’s asset specificity in their 
strategic alliance project is highly associated with value creation capabilities. That is, asset 
specificity increases the degree of economic interdependence between alliance partners 
and hence firms are more likely to devote their routines to coordination and joint learning. 
This is consistent with prior research (Heide and John 1990; Zaheer and Venkatraman 
1995; Joshi and Stump, 1999), which found support for a positive main effect between 
asset specificity and joint actions in the manufacturing sector. The results also concur with 
those of Lorenzoni and Lipparin (1998), who ekicted that under the condition of high asset 
specificity investments, organizations learn how to gain access to complementary 
resources and capabilities across alliances, which enables them to keep pace with 
technological developments within the industry. Hence, an important finding is that asset 
specificity increases inter-dependence and commitment between alliance partners, which 
results in the creation of cooperative capabilities aimed at improved internal routine 
management to ensure better performance.  
In support of TCE research (Williamson, 1991), this study has produced evidence that 
asset specificity requires effective governance mechanisms as the safeguard of this 
investment regardless of the level of trust. This is in line with Poppo and Zenger (2002) 




greater levels of contractual complexity. Similarly, Santoro and McGill (2005) discovered 
that firms use more complex governance mechanisms to control higher levels of 
uncertainty about partners’ opportunistic behaviours arising from relationship specific 
investments. This is because such investments cannot be easily redeployed, which gives 
rise to a safeguarding problem, resulting in potential costs (Artz, 1999; Artz and Brush, 
2000) and requiring governance mechanisms (Santoro and McGill, 2005).  
An important implication of these findings is that they provide support for both the 
relational view and TCE. As such, they are line with Zaheer and Venkatranan’s (1995) 
argument that the economic determinants of governance do not by themselves provide a 
complete understanding of strategic alliances, but rather, a combination of variables both 
economic and relational dimensions are involved. Previous research has employed 
interdisciplinary theory from these two perspectives including studies by Kale et al. 
(2000)’s and Chen and Chen (2003). They found that asset specificity and behavioural 
uncertainty of alliance partners prompts firms to seek more hierarchical control in strategic 
alliances, whilst these firms still need to build cooperative routines and to accept a more 
flexible alliance arrangement in order to access to complementary resources and 
capabilities from their partners. The reason for this being that an integration alliance 
entails a high level of commitment by the partners in terms of investing in the relationship. 
Therefore, increased interdependence by the partners for asset specificity tilts the firms 
towards an integration alliance in which assets are pooled, adapted and integrated for a 
common purpose, whereas effective governance mechanisms are still need to protect the 
economic hostage from opportunistic behaviours.  
Although the result shows that trust and asset specificity, which are regarded as relational 
and economic constraints, facilitate relational capabilities in strategic alliance projects, 
some of the literature contends that these two aspects interact to produce relational 
capabilities. For instance, it has been found that inter-organizational cooperative activities, 
such as knowledge sharing routines, will become more accommodative and improve as 
the focal firm creates a dependence situation by investing high asset specificity in a 
partnership (Aulakh et al., 1996; Luo, 2002). That is, the stronger the resource 




be created from cooperation. This argument was supported by the study of Joshi and 
Stump (1999), which found that interaction terms involving asset specificity and trust 
significantly increased joint actions in manufacturer-supplier relationships. In addition, 
Krishnan et al. (2006) investigated the moderating effect of transaction cost factors on the 
relationship between trust and international alliance performance of Indian manufacturing 
sector. They found that this relationship is more sensitive to alliance partners’ behavioural 
uncertainty than environmental uncertainty.  
Other research has uncovered reverse effects between trust and relational capabilities. For 
example, Suh and Kwon (2006) discovered that specific asset investment decreases the 
level of inter-organizational trust due to a safeguarding problem, which can result in 
potential governance costs. Sarkar et al. (2001) found that inter-organizational trust plays 
a mediating role in the relationship between inter-organizational complementary resources 
and alliance performance. They concluded that these resources can create interdependence 
between alliance partners, which results in motivation to undertake trustworthiness acts 
and higher alliance performance. Hence, trust can be both the antecedent to and the 
consequence of asset specificity. The current study, however, has only dealt with trust and 
asset as independent variables, Future research will require a model that can capture the 
circular relationship between these two phenomena.  
6.2.4 HR distance and relational capabilities 
Further, in examining the barriers of relational capabilities, this researcher expected that 
HR distance would be negatively related. However, in contrast to prior empirical analyses 
(Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Hitt et al., 2006; Luo, 2002; Estrin et al., 2009), no such 
significant relationship between HR distance and cooperation behaviours between alliance 
partners was found. Thus, it can be assumed that HR distance between MNE subsidiaries 
and local suppliers is not a barrier for the firm applying relational capabilities in alliance 
management in these contexts. One possible explanation is that organizational culture may 
provide more signals for employees’ behaviour than does national culture in international 
strategic alliances, because it provides members with an organizational identity and 
facilitates collective commitment (Pothukuchi et al., 2002; Sirmon and Lane, 2004). 




this researcher could not test the relationship between organizational cultural distance and 
relational capabilities with the data collected. Hence, it is recommended that there is future 
research to extend this finding by in-depth investigation of the micro cultural aspects 
towards the study of relational capabilities using a qualitative method. Furthermore, this 
research has only involved examining HR distance as a barrier of relational capabilities, 
but not the other cultural differences measurements in cross-cultural collaborations as 
suggested by previous studies, such as cultural distance (Kogut and Singh, 1989) and 
GLOBE  (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness research 
project)  (House et al., 2002). However, Thailand is not one of sixty-two nations that 
present their cultural orientation scores in GLOBE and hence no data is available for the 
context of this thesis. Moreover, the focus for this research was on the skilled labour and 
education difference between alliance partners as introduced recently by Estrin et al. 
(2009) and not on norms and beliefs.  
In sum, the study outcomes extend the relational capabilities literature by providing 
evidence that the relational and economic dimensions in strategic alliance projects are 
antecedents of relational capabilities. To be precise, it has been found that inter-personal 
trust and asset specificity enhance all three types of relational capabilities while inter-
organizational trust fosters only knowledge sharing routines and complementary 
capabilities. HR distance between alliance partners, however, is not a barrier of relational 
capabilities as hypothesized. Therefore, it is concluded that inter-personal trust, inter-
organizational trust and asset specificity are necessary for successfully implementing 
relational capabilities during alliance project management.  
6.3 Mediation effects of relational capabilities and alliance performance 
This researcher expected that economic and relational conditions in strategic alliance 
projects require relational capabilities to achieve alliance performance. From this 
perspective, superior alliance performance is not achieved primarily through trust and 
asset specificity directly. To be more precise, such performance is achieved by building a 
carefully selected set of capabilities that collectively allow the alliance project to run 
smoothly. This work is in response to a research avenue suggested by Mayer and 




analytic measures of both the nature of the inter-organizational relationships and 
performance. Previous empirical studies have revealed that relational capabilities 
contribute to both alliance satisfaction and competitive advantage (Ling-yee and 
Ogunmoku, 2001; Corsten and Kumar, 2005; Paulraj et al., 2007; Schreiner et al., 2009). 
The superior management practices embodied in these capabilities enable firms to realize 
the relational rents potential in strategic alliances, and thereby achieve alliance 
performance. This study has found that knowledge sharing routines and complementary 
capability are mediators of the relationships between inter-organizational factors, 
including, economic and relational conditions, and alliance performance. However, it has 
emerged that effective governance mechanisms have no significant impact on these 
relationships, a matter discussed in the following subsections. 
6.3.1 Indirect effects of inter-personal trust on alliance performance 
According to the research findings, inter-personal trust increases frequent knowledge 
sharing routines between alliance partners directly and these routines greatly improve 
operational performance. This finding is important because communication is associated 
with the development of inter-personal trust, which in turn, is a strong predictor of 
relationship effectiveness. Indeed, many researchers have argued that one of the sources 
of a firm’s competitive advantage is its organizational capabilities producing implicit 
knowledge embedded in the interactions among staff in teams that contribute to superior 
performance (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Jones and George, 
1998). In previous research, interpersonal trust has been identified as a crucial ingredient 
in the development of trustful organizational behaviour and collaboration in the workplace 
(Dirks and Ferrin, 2001; Kramer and Tyler, 1996). Interdependence at the personal level 
within a strategic alliance provides a solid foundation for shaping interaction processes 
and activities coordination, such as information sharing. It also encourages partnering 
firms to collaborate since the benefits of doing so would appear to be greater than working 
alone. In addition, the continuity of interaction that result from a high quality relationship, 
provides staff ongoing opportunities to identify unclear information that is hampering the 




organizational capabilities is an organization's ability to create the conditions that allow 
its members to experience inter-personal trust. 
Furthermore, it has emerged that inter-personal trust has an indirect impact on strategic 
performance through complementary capability. This capability requires individuals 
representing both organizations to engage in close interactions that allow them to observe 
and learn from each other. This crucial role of individuals and their interactions in 
enabling inter-organizational learning is emphasized by the classic literature on boundary 
spanners, which views them as the conduits of, or sensors for learning and knowledge 
(Salk and Simonin, 2003: 260; see also Aldrich and Herker, 1977; Jemison, 1984; Keller 
and Holland, 1975). Inter-personal trust is an essential condition of a functioning 
organization, because it creates the necessary commitment and confidence in the 
acquisition and dissemination of knowledge. In particular, it is posited that ‘close and 
intense interaction between individual members of the concerned organizations’ is an 
effective mechanism for identifying complementary resources and capability across 
organizational boundaries (Inkpen and Dinur, 1998; Kale et al., 2000). This means that 
the higher the level of interpersonal trust, the greater the tendency for alliance team 
members to acquire complementary resources and capabilities from alliance partners. In 
sum, the key benefits of inter-personal trust are cooperation and teamwork that promote 
high performance and competitive advantage. 
6.3.2 Indirect effects of inter-organizational trust on alliance performance 
The research findings support the argument that the firm which has a high level of inter-
organizational trust toward their alliance partners requires knowledge sharing routines and 
complementary capability in order to achieve operational and strategic performance, 
respectively. This result is also supported by Smith and Barclay (1997) and Yli-Renko et 
al.’s (2001) observations that perceived trustworthiness and alliance performance are 
antecedents and consequences of cooperative behaviours in the context of buyer-supplier 
relationships. This outcome also suggests that inter-organizational trust is not the key 
variable for achieved alliance performance; it is only important in the early stage of 
relationships in terms of presenting commitment between alliance parties and is supported 




relationship trust is the only factor that drives commitment between business partners. 
Consequently, commitment to maintain good relationships between firms (as a result of 
inter-organizational trust) enhances cooperative activities, such as knowledge sharing 
routines and complementary capability, thereby, improving alliance performance. These 
mechanisms are discussed in detail next. 
To begin with, this research found that inter-organizational trust impacts on operational 
performance through knowledge sharing routines, which is in line with Dyer and 
Nobeoka’s (1998) finding that such routines in the collaborations have been a critical 
factor in explaining why Toyota has been so dynamic that it has constantly maintained 
productivity and quality advantages over its competitors. Moreover,  the current study has 
elicited that a certain level of involvement and commitment resulting from a high quality 
of relationship between organizations is essential for knowledge to be shared effectively. 
Highly interdependent partnering firms have been found to be more willing to 
communicate, trust and commit, as pointed out by previous studies (Hansen, 1999; Das 
and Teng, 2003; Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Wei et al., 2012). This is because under 
conditions of high task, reward and goal interdependency, partnering firms tend to work 
collectively, because they depend on each other to conduct and manage their business 
activities effectively. Such inter-dependency improves the partners’ willingness to 
communicate openly and trust each other, thereby increasing the commitment to a 
cooperative relationship. That is, it encourages intensive interactions and sharing of 
knowledge between alliance parties. In addition, alliance partners that accumulate inter-
organizational trust are likely to be free from the fear of opportunistic behaviour, because 
the openness and transparency associated with this promotes honest knowledge exchange 
(Doz and Hamel, 1998). Kale et al. (2000) Kotabe et al. (2003), also found that dense ties 
between organizations enable the quick and accurate movement of potentially useful and 
important information through the collaborations and has a positive impact operational 
performance. Furthermore, strategic alliance projects involve ongoing mutual adjustment 
between the alliance partners’ design and production operations, whereby knowledge 
continually shared in order to solve problems as well as enhance products and processes, 




Furthermore, the results of this study reveal that inter-organizational trust enhances 
strategic performance through complementary capability. This was not unexpected as one 
of main reasons why firms decide to form alliances is so that they can acquire the 
necessary complementary resources and capabilities from in anticipation of performance 
that will them competitive advantage in terms of market share and cutting edge innovation. 
Cullen et al. (2000) have noted that when two or more firms combine their resources for 
strategic reasons, such as complementary skills and economies of scale, then they are 
expected to control and organize their joint resources through effective management of a 
strategic alliance relationship. In particular, the firms then have incentives to adapt their 
business activities and boundaries in order to take advantage of what they have learned 
(Dussauge, Garrette and Mitchell, 2000).  
In addition, the result regarding complementary capability is supported by Şengün’s 
(2010) study of goodwill trust and inter-organizational learning during alliance practice. 
He discovered that informal commitment is strongly tied to the concept of goodwill trust, 
because such efforts are considered to be a sign of benevolence. That is, when confidence 
in a partner’s good intention increases, there is more open information exchange and a 
deeper commitment between partners. In this respect, trusting a knowledge provider to be 
benevolent should increase the chance that the learner will learn effectively from the 
interaction (Levin and Cross, 2004). Also, when learners seek knowledge, they become 
dependent and vulnerable to the benevolence of the knowledge provider (Lee, 1997). 
Similarly, Kale et al. (2000) found that relational capital (i.e. inter-organizational trust and 
commitment) enables the quick and accurate movement of potentially useful and 
important information through the collaborations. Moreover, firms that accumulate inter-
organizational trust with alliance partners are likely to be free from the fear of 
opportunistic behaviour. That is, if knowledge seekers believe a knowledge source may 
want to harm them, they will be reluctant to learn from any transferred knowledge, for 
fear that it might be wrong or misleading (Levin and Cross, 2004). Under dependence 
conditions, such as in the current research, the type of trust needed to mitigate risk of 
vulnerability is benevolence (Sheppard and Sherman, 1998). In general, inter-
organizational trust takes precedence under such conditions due to its role in reducing the 




commitment for the trustor. One of the primary benefits is the possibility for partners to 
acquire from each other tacit knowledge in an area where their own organizations 
encounter deficiencies, thereby reinforcing both firms’ competitive advantage. Evidence 
of such trust-based performance improvement was found by comparing supplier 
relationships in the auto industry in Japan and in the U.S. (Barney and Hansen, 1994; 
Dyer, 1996). They elicited that Toyota's relationships, when compared to U.S. 
counterparts, are more deeply embedded in long-standing networks of relational and 
economic conditions that are characterized by higher levels of trust and a lower fear of 
opportunism. Consequently, this company and its suppliers have felt freer to engage in 
very specialized routines, which have boosted alliance performance more than 
competitors (Parkhe, 1998).  
6.3.3 Indirect effects of asset specificity on alliance performance  
Strong support emerged for the hypothesis that asset specificity has an indirect effect on 
operational performance through knowledge sharing routines, which could be due to the 
nature of relationships in manufacturing industry, whereby buyer and supplier firms have 
been found to  exchange information on a continual basis (Prahinski and Benton, 2004; 
Paulraj et al., 2008). In particular, informal interactions at multiple levels will assist in 
communicating data between the alliance partners and as shown by Dyer and Nobeoka 
(2000), such knowledge sharing routines inferred in the information exchange construct 
result in operational improvement. Consequently, economic hostage (i.e. asset specificity) 
leads to enhanced cooperative behaviour in order to maintenance performance, as 
supported by observations from Parkhe (1993), Molm (1997), Cravens et al. (2000) and 
Lui et al. (2009). That is, when both partners invest more in a specific asset, they are 
locked firmly into the relationship that increasingly intensifies. Hence, as there is less fear 
that the other can walk away from the partnership, they may engage in more reciprocal 
actions. In addition, asset specificity is related to partnership performance through 
generating cooperative behaviours rather than reducing opportunistic ones. McCarter and 
Northcraft (2007) demonstrated that frequent interactions strengthen the relational ties 
among strategic alliance partners and promote cooperation so that positive outcomes may 




if they have the confidence that the information will not be misused and exploited. The 
intention of the supplier to be flexible and not holding the buyer to contractual terms is 
important to maintain the undisrupted flow of information for business profits. That is, 
communication increases the likelihood of alliance success since it offers an opportunity 
to elicit promises of cooperation. 
The outcomes of this research also infer that asset specificity is beneficial for strategic 
outcomes when it is accompanied by complementary capability. This result indicates that 
collaborative relationships contribute to the realization of benefits by creating truly 
productive and profitable relationships. To be precise, high levels of economic 
commitment enable optimized planning for material flows and coordination of 
information exchange leads to a higher level of goal achievement and value creation. 
Some researchers argue that complementary capability is an important source of 
competitive advantage for strategic alliances, because this is a learning mechanism that 
can be used to understand and acquire complex complementary resources and capabilities 
from alliance partners (Dyer and Kale, 2007; Mesquita et al., 2008). Moreover, this 
research outcome is consistent with the finding of Zajac and Olsen (1993) and Corsten et 
al. (2011) that asset-specific investments provide strong incentives for firms to work with 
alliance partners on joint value creation initiatives. Madhok and Tallman (1998) argued 
that alliances where partners have the potential to create synergy by integrating 
complementary resources have the highest probability of producing value. This is because 
complementary resources and capabilities make it possible for firms to gain economies of 
scope, create synergies and develop new resources as well as subsequent skills (Ireland et 
al., 2002). In other words, there is the possible existence of a mediating role for 
complementary capability between asset specificity and strategic performance. In sum, 
such alliances create a co-operative environment that encourages learning experiences so 
that the transfer of complementary resources and capabilities to alliance partners can be 
achieved (Sambasivan et al., 2013). In other words, asset specificity investments in 
alliance projects are more likely to result in competitive advantage when task activities 





6.3.4 Effective governance mechanisms and alliance performance 
The findings have shown that inter-personal trust, inter-organizational trust and asset 
specificity have no indirect effect on alliance performance through effective governance 
mechanisms. This implies that although effective governance mechanisms are essential to 
safeguard asset specificity, they are not necessary to achieve alliance performance. This 
result was unexpected when compared with earlier studies on the outcomes of formal and 
informal governance functions in strategic alliances (Dyer, 1996; Poppo and Zenger, 
2002; Mesquita et al., 2008; Lee and Cavusgil, 2006). According to TCE, partners that 
have invested more in specific assets tend to engage in a higher level of opportunistic 
behaviours with alliance partners, because these cannot be easily redeployed for other 
purposes apart from the project itself. Consequently, to protect their own investment, firms 
require effective governance mechanisms to monitor inter-organizational exchanges 
(Williamson, 1991). As discussed previously in subsection 6.3.1, inter-organizational trust 
does not have a significant impact on effective governance mechanisms and therefore this 
capability does not have a mediating affect between the former and overall alliance 
performance. Given the high level of trust-based relationships in Thai manufacturing 
sector, this can act as a substitute for governance mechanisms in this context owing to 
finding regarding the latter’s insignificant mediating role. In such situations, where there 
is high inter-organizational and inter-personal trust between alliance partners, governance 
mechanisms may be less effective in alliance management as explained in more detail 
next.  
Trust is the expectation of similar behaviour that recognizes and protects the interests of 
other people in order to increase willing cooperation and expand ultimate benefits within 
a joint endeavour or economic exchange (Hosmer, 1995). This is in line with Bromily and 
Cummings (1993), who argued that trust not only reduces the cost of monitoring 
performance, but also eliminated the need for installing control systems. Moreover, 
transactions with high potential gains, even in the face of high information asymmetry and 
transaction specific investment, will be pursued vigorously because of potential gains 
from trade. Having two strong trustworthy partners that pursue relationship management 




greatest net value creation without needing formal governance mechanisms (Hansen et al., 
2008). This effect can be found in Japan where intense horizontal and vertical alliances 
coexist and consequently networks play a greater role as conduits of information about 
partners’ behaviour than in many other countries (Lazzarini et al., 2008). In addition, trust 
in contractual relations may reduce behavioural uncertainty and complexity, thus 
rendering bounded rationality less harmful and less salient (Chiles and McMackin, 1996).  
It is also possible that firms with repeat alliances may avoid some contractual negotiation 
costs by incorporating into the contract some provisions already included in earlier mutual 
contracts. Regarding this, Ryall and Sampson (2003) have shown that when firms are 
engaged in multiple alliances with the same partner, some common terms, such as 
arbitration clauses, are identical across alliance contracts over time. Moreover, when high 
relational capabilities are expected companies may use law firms or other intermediaries 
in the contracting process (Ruer and Ariño (2007), thus avoiding some governance costs. 
In sum, the formal controls characteristic of formal contracts in certain contexts, can be 
supplanted by informal self-enforcing agreements, which rely on trust and reputation 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998). Under these circumstances, mutual trust between alliance 
partners decreases transaction and negotiation costs by reducing or eliminating both ex 
ante and ex-post opportunism (Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Dyer, 1997). Thus, 
managers of firms that have a strong form of trustworthiness may respond to governing 
asset specific investment much differently, as it would appear is the case in Thailand. 
However, in terms of generalization these results should be treated with caution, for in 
other contexts the institutional environment can be very different, with being a strong 
expectation of formal arrangements in buyer-supplier relationships (Li et al., 2010). 
6.3.5 Relational capabilities and alliance performance 
This research has extended the literature by testing the different consequences of relational 
capabilities with respect to operational and strategic performance, with the findings 
revealing the different dimensions of relational capabilities bring about different alliance 
outcomes. These outcomes are in line with Villena et al.’s (2011) work, which showed 
that alliance performance is a multidimensional construct in that different factors are 




discovered that while operational performance can to a large degree be explained by 
knowledge sharing routines, strategic performance depends on the ability to access 
complementary resources.  
As suggested by Inkpen and Currall (1997), firms’ operational level involves those 
individuals who provide the linking mechanism across organizational boundaries. In their 
operational role, they carry out the tasks of the collaboration and are responsible for the 
everyday implementation of the alliance agreement. These authors gave an example of a 
strategic alliance in an automotive firm where it is the partners’ engineers, not senior 
management, who are delegated to carry out the joint task of designing a car. In contrast, 
a firms’ strategic level  is the responsibility of executive managers who have the power to 
influence the overall strategic direction of the corporation, including its cooperation 
strategy. As strategic decision-makers, executive managers play a crucial role in the 
formation of new strategic alliances (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999), in particular those 
geared towards innovation (Tyler and Steensma, 1995). For example, it is the management 
teams representing the prospective partners that engage in the negotiations prior to 
entering a cooperative relationship (Ariño et al., 2001). They also frame their firm’s 
strategic intentions with respect to the alliance (Salk and Simonin 2003) and play a 
dominant role in designing and manipulating its structural context, i.e. the border 
conditions and parameters of the alliances (Oxley and Sampson, 2004; Ring and Van de 
Ven, 1994; Janowicz-Panjaitan and Noorderhaven, 2009). 
According to the findings, knowledge sharing routines have a direct impact on operational 
performance, probably because these activities focus on day-to-day operations, whereas 
complementary capability leads to strategic performance since this type of capability is 
aimed fulfilling the strategic purposes of the alliance (Saxon, 1997). In particular, 
improvement in buyer performance is as a result of collaborative relationships that may 
occur along the operational dimensions of product design, process design, reduced lead 
time and improved quality. Consequently, buyer-supplier alliances with more personal 
and organizational communication will be more favourable to buyer improvements in 
quality, delivery speed, reliability and flexibility (Krause et al., 2007; Paulraj et al., 2008). 




personal levels increases information volume and diversity, thus allowing for better 
planning, goal setting, problem solving and adjustments that, in turn, improve buyer 
performance (Lawson et al., 2008). Moreover, Mesquita et al. (2008) found that firms’ 
relational resources and relational capabilities develop suppliers’ production efficiency in 
operational performance that can effectively manage conflicts and solve problems 
especially when unforeseeable changes arise. The current research finding implies that the 
quality of knowledge sharing routines between partners may not directly affect how well 
a product sells, but it does provide essential information for operational performance. 
Thus, firms that are able to foster knowledge sharing routines in partnerships are more 
likely to achieve operational effectiveness rather than strategic performance since these 
routines involve people-based activities in the exchange process, which is controlled at 
the operational level.  
The finding that complementary capability increases strategic performance, but has no 
significant impact at the operational level, confirms the view that this capability influences 
profitability, market growth and innovation directly. In addition, it has been elicited that 
complementary capability allows one partner to access or replicate that of the other to 
generate competitive advantage which they have limited ability to do in isolation. That is, 
with a combination of complementary resources and capabilities, this enables a firm to 
realize its full competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). Moreover, consistent with previous 
research (e.g. Deeds and Hill, 1996; Saxton, 1997; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Rothaermel, 
2001; Hansen et al., 2008; Schreiner et al., 2009), the effect of complementary capability 
from this empirical study, clearly demonstrates that firms aim to acquire resources and 
capabilities that they lack in order to fulfil strategic goals. Furthermore, complementary 
capability is a driver for firms to adapt their strategies in response to the ever present 
competitive and dynamic environment. For example, Apple has begun developing 
strategic alliances with several other computer firms, including IBM and Microsoft, which 
may the firm to develop the resources and capabilities they need to remain competitive in 
the personal computer industry over the next few years (Barney, 1995).  
To summarize, the relational dimension (set in terms of inter-personal trust and inter-




role in fostering relational capabilities in alliance management amongst MNE subsidiaries 
in Thailand. These capabilities, in turn, allow the partners to run their partnership 
smoothly and achieve alliance performance both at operational and strategic levels. In 
particular, the outcomes of this research highlight the role of knowledge sharing routines 
and complementary capability in linking trust and asset specificity with alliance 
performance. The relational capabilities perspective, therefore, offers a theoretical 
explanation for how relational and economic dimensions in dyadic relationships influence 
strategic alliance project performance in certain settings. 
6.4 The effects of control variables  
This researcher is aware that other factors may influence alliance performance. Thus, 
several control variables were used in the analysis, including firm size, industry dummies, 
inter-organizational relationship duration, alliance project duration, supplier dependence, 
HR distance, previous alliance experiences and alliance project types. However, most of 
these (firm size, industry dummies, inter-organizational relationship duration, the alliance 
project duration and supplier dependence) were found not to be statistically significantly 
with regards to their impact on relational capabilities and alliance performance. The 
insignificance of firm size and industry effects may be due to the similarities among the 
four industry categories from which the strategic alliance projects were drawn. That is, 
because the four categories all belonged to a broadly defined manufacturing sector, there 
was some degree of homogeneity in the products and competitive situations (Park and 
Ungson, 1997). Moreover, the reason may be because these factors are constructs 
measured at the organizational (firm size, industry dummies, inter-organizational 
relationship durations, supplier dependence) and national (HR distance) levels, whereas 
the research context was strategic alliances at the project level. Thus, this researcher 
concludes that the relational capabilities and alliance performance of the sample firms 
appear to be driven by project level factors, and not so much by the organizational and 
national ones.  
Despite the non-significant effects of several control variables, this study has elicited two 
that have a positive impact on relational capabilities and alliance performance, namely, 




alliance experiences, in line with previous research, it has been found that organizations 
are more likely to establish dedicated alliance functions within the firms as the cumulative 
number becomes greater (Kale et al., 2002; Heimeriks and Duysters, 2007; Schilke and 
Goerzen, 2010). That is, if the firms have already tried some of the types of cooperative 
activities in the form of alliances, they will have learned lessons and hence, will try to 
transform these experiences into practice in order to achieve better alliance performance. 
Regarding alliance project types, this researcher expected that the more complex of the 
projects the likely organizations would build capabilities distinct to the project, such as 
alliance management capability and alliance evaluations (Dosi and Marengo, 1993). In 
addition, a positive significant effect of the alliance project types was only present for 
strategic, but not operational performance. One plausible explanation for this is that 
strategic performance depends on the complexity of the project (Belderbos et al., 2004) in 
that the  greater this is, the more firm aims to compete with competitors so as to gain 
strategic advantage from the alliance, through increasing market share and innovation, 
rather than simply pursuing operational effectiveness. 
6.5 Research settings  
6.5.1 Strategic alliance project management 
In the strategic alliance literature, issues related to strategic alliance management at the 
portfolio level of MNEs have received considerable attention in recent years (e.g. Kogut, 
1988; Pisano and Teece, 1989; Pisano, 1990; Gulati and Singh, 1998). Such research, on 
the other hand, has had much less to say about the lower-level project organization issues 
of jointly conducted new product development. Exceptions to this are studies by Mayer 
and Argyres (2004), who examined the relation between learning and contract at the 
project level and Mayer and Nickerson (2005), who explored project-level determinants 
of governance and performance. A shift in focus from alliance portfolio to the project 
level allows the researcher to observe much narrower aspects of the collaboration. 
Regarding which, this study has examined antecedents and barriers of relational 
capabilities and their mediating effect in explaining alliance management at the project 
level, which has thus helped enrich relational capabilities approach literature. Concerning 




identified by Poppo and Zenger (2002) and Mayer and Teece (2008), who called for 
research on the specific provisions of business contracts rather than relying upon standard 
measures of contractual complexity. Furthermore, scholars has suggested that the 
antecedents and consequences of relational capabilities are best studied at the level of 
individual alliances (Parkhe, 1993; Ethiraj et al., 2005; Mayer and Teece, 2008), which 
has been the case in this work. This research has also verified the importance of the key 
dimensions, which were proxies for two types of commitment in strategic alliance projects, 
namely economic and relational dimensions which can be summarized in the following 
manner.  
Inter-organizational constraints, such as economic and relational dimensions between 
alliance partners, are the key success factors of alliance project performance since these 
conditions represent commitment between organizations and facilitate project 
management. The process of bringing new projects on stream and into the market imposes 
demands on established organisations and necessitates different management techniques 
from those required to maintain day-to-day operations. This view is supported by Munns 
and Bjeirmi (1996) and Mayer and Teece (2008) in that alliance partner firms will be 
involved in the project by sharing resources and capabilities. These inter-organizational 
conditions, in the current work, were observed to facilitate or hamper the partners’ 
learning about the environment of their alliance, how to work together to accomplish the 
alliance task, their respective skills, and each other's goals. The firm may also exercise a 
controlling influence over the project in determining alliance outcomes, such as 
profitability, market share, quality and scope of service. In addition, its towards the project 
is important and the commitment and support of a parent organisation is a vital 
requirement for project success. The project team will be responsible for the planning and 
control of the use of these resources, consequently the parent organisation will be 
interested in the success of the project management process. That is, the team will be 
accountable for their use of these resources, and if they fail to be effective they must 
expect to give an account for their actions, because firms want a return on their allocation 
of resources to alliance projects. Moreover, agreements in alliance projects serve many 




facilitating learning between partners, knowledge sharing routines, joint decision-making, 
and so on. 
Secondly, this research has determined that two types of relational capabilities, namely, 
knowledge sharing routines and complementary capability, are significant drivers of 
positive alliance project outcomes. That is, knowledge sharing routines increase the 
amount of communication required by partners for the effective coordination and control 
of alliance activities. This outcome is in line with Zoilo et al. (2002), who claimed that 
prior ties improve alliance project partners' interactions and help them coordinate their 
alliance by refining their understanding of each other’s cultures, management systems, 
capabilities, weaknesses, and so forth. According to Ruer and Ariño (2007), successive 
collaborations can deepen inter-partner communication as well as the tacit development 
of troubleshooting procedures. They also noted that such routines can develop with 
frequent interactions, even at low levels of deliberation or intentionality. Regarding 
complementary capability, this has been defined in this research as a function pertaining 
to the identification and learning regarding complementary resources and capabilities 
from alliance partners in strategic alliance projects. For example, consider a firm that is 
developing a new product, but lacks the capability to produce a highly unique and highly 
valuable component or tool in-house. While the complementary capability may be easily 
assembled from relatively generic assets and easily obtained in the marketplace, the time 
to develop or acquire this capability internally may be considerable and hence 
complementary resources will prove invaluable. This finding is also consistent with 
Ethiraj et al. (2005), who discovered that complementary capability was acquired through 
deliberate and persistent investments in infrastructure and systems to improve a particular 
firm’s software development project.   
The research findings also reveal the importance of personnel who are involved with the 
alliance projects both at the top-level and operational level. In most alliance projects, 
generally only one key individual, often the founder or a top-level manager, manages all 
the firms' alliances. In order for top management to make the right decisions, first they 
will need to communicate with the partner to get the needed information, to clarity some 




characteristics, the industry within which the alliance's project is embedded is suggested 
to largely determine the required intensity of communication between project partners. 
For example, Oxley and Sampson (2004) tested an empirical study utilizing a sample of 
R&D alliance projects involving companies in the electronics and telecommunications 
equipment industries, where profitability depends critically on firms' abilities to create and 
commercialize new technologies quickly and efficiently. At the operational level Shah 
and Swaminathan (2008), determined that this includes the specific personnel directly 
associated with the alliance whose individual energy and emotional stress capture the 
opportunity costs of alliance personnel in terms of the time and energy that could be 
devoted to other organizational endeavours.  
 6.5.2 MNE subsidiaries and local suppliers in the Thai manufacturing sector 
The thesis provides the evidence that trust and asset specificity contribute to alliance 
performance through knowledge sharing routines and complementary capability in the 
context of the Thai manufacturing sector. Regarding to the effect of trust, it has been found 
that this at the inter-personal and inter-organizational levels plays a dominant role in this 
context in that they form the foundations of relational capabilities, which is consistent 
with previous studies in the Thai manufacturing context. For instance, Kasuga et al. (2005) 
discovered that the network type administered structure, in which mutual trust relations 
are developed from the top management to the factories through strategic alliances are 
effective in that country, in the sense that they are able to make best use Japanese MNE 
subsidiaries’ human relations. Furthermore, Kohpaiboon (2010) found that inter-personal 
participation is required to create effective and efficient coordination in the Thai 
automotive industry, since the inter-personal contact facilitates inter-organizational 
communication in several respects, including solving problems as well as the 
effectiveness of trial and error experiments.  
In addition, this research has elicited that HR distance between alliance partners does not 
hamper relational capabilities in alliance projects with regards to the focal context. This 
result is supported by several studies, including Reus and Lamont (2009), Xin and Pearce 
(1996) and Luo (2001), who argued that national distance between firms is a double-edged 




learning between alliance partners, because strong efforts are made to ensure a high level 
of communication between international alliance partners, with the objective being to 
smooth the collaboration and hence achieve alliance performance. As such, this positive 
effect of HR distance may offset the negative effect on relational capabilities.  
The finding is also in line with previous studies about inter-personal attachment in other 
research settings. For instance, Luk et al. (2008) found that informal personal relationships 
(Guanxi) have three benefits: enhancing organizational innovativeness; influencing the 
effectiveness of strategic innovativeness, and enhancing business performance, in the 
context of China. Furthermore, some researchers have argued that Chinese business, 
compared with that in the West, is characterized by high trust in family-like relationships 
(Chua et al., 2008) and low trust in society (Parkhe, 1998). These authors concluded that 
citizens of lower trust societies, such as Italy, China, and France, tend to avoid people who 
are not part of their immediate families, thus crippling attempts to build large, private 
business organizations. Whereas high trust societies, such as Japan, benefit from their 
lower costs in forming alliances, low trust societies confront higher costs that impede the 
formation of such collaborations. These differences can be crucially important for cross-
cultural alliances managers, whereby persons from low- versus high-trust countries are 
likely to focus on subtle but important differences in the criteria focused upon whilst 
carrying out partnerships. Regarding this, persons from low-trust societies tend to 
emphasize alliances more on person-specific trust, where socio-psychological factors play 
a greater role (Parkhe, 1998). Since Thailand has similar cultural orientation of 
collectivism and low-trust society, the research findings, thereby, were affected by this 
country specific factor. More specifically, trust-based relationships between alliance 
partners in the Thai manufacturing sector dominate effective governance mechanisms for 
safeguarding behavioural uncertainty of alliance partners, which in turn deliver superior 







6.6 Chapter summary  
Chapter 6 considered the findings of the empirical study in context of the research 
questions and the relevant extant literature. Two dimensions of strategic alliances, 
relational and economic have been found to be antecedents of relational capabilities, while 
HR distance between alliance partners has emerged as not being a barrier to these 
capabilities. Since economic and relational conditions represent commitment between 
alliance partners to create value in the collaboration, relational capabilities, knowledge 
sharing routines and complementary capability, play an important role as mediators for 
achieve alliance performance. More specifically, with inter-personal trust, inter-
organizational trust and asset specificity in strategic alliance projects, firms are likely to 
achieve improved operational and strategic performance through knowledge sharing 
routines and complementary capability, respectively. Finally, effective governance 
mechanisms have been found to have no significant impact on alliance performance, 
because such project management in the context of the Thai manufacturing sector is 
















CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
7.1 Introduction 
The chapter concludes the thesis by summarizing the outcomes for the key objectives of 
research, theoretical contributions and managerial implications in the context of strategic 
alliance projects between MNE subsidiaries and local suppliers in the Thai manufacturing 
sector. This study has explored the antecedents and consequences of relational capabilities 
by integrating relational and economic dimensions in the theoretical framework. The 
chapter is organised as follows: section 7.2 discusses the academic contribution of this 
study; the managerial implication of the study is presented in section 7.3; potential 
limitations and the future research direction of this study is discussed in section 7.4; and 
section 7.5 presents the concluding remarks.  
7.2 Academic contributions 
A strategic alliance is considered to be a strategy to acquire resources and capabilities 
from others in order to create value and share investment risks (Dyer and Kale, 2007). 
Strategic management scholars have been interested in studying such alliances for two 
decades, because of their importance for the growth of the firm in an uncertain business 
environment (Inkpen, 2009) and hence their goal has been to find the ways to make them 
successful. To this end, different theories have been devised to explain and predict the 
motivations and performance of alliance, with the key influential ones being TCE 
(Williamson, 1975), RBV (Penrose, 1959; Barney, 2001), organizational learning (Hamel, 
1991) and social exchange theory (Blau, 1964). Firms need to consider the cooperation 
between two parties in order to achieve strategic alliance performance, however, 
traditional theories focus on inward looking views (Lavie, 2006) and hence, the relational 
capabilities approach has been developed to address this gap.  
The relational capabilities approach is derived from the relational view (Dyer and Singh, 
1998), which focuses on relationship-oriented inter-organizational management, and is 
integrated with the dynamic capabilities perspective (Teece, 2007). This approach 




technological and financial resources, in acquiring resources and capabilities from alliance 
partners (Dyer & Kale, 2007). Previous studies (e.g. Kale et al., 2000; Heimeriks, 2004; 
Kale and Singh, 2007; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010) have suggested that the firm’s 
resource-based factors, such as alliance experiences and functions, are sources of 
relational capabilities in strategic alliances at the portfolio level. Therefore, strategic 
scholars have called for research to consider additional conditions for relational 
capabilities that have as yet not been identified   as well as the challenge of firms applying 
relational capabilities in the context of cross-cultural alliances. In addition, although the 
relational capabilities approach has been studied in the context of portfolio level, there is 
scant literature regarding this approach for strategic alliances at the project level and 
consequently, this research has focused on the processes underlying the development of 
relational capabilities at this level (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). That is, by accounting 
for heterogeneity in the form of variance in capabilities of each individual alliance project, 
the findings from this study help enrich the relational capabilities literature.  
This thesis has involved investigating the processes which lie at the root of a firm’s 
abilities to develop and modify capabilities through inter-organizational dimensions, 
namely, trust and asset specificity. More specifically, three different, yet complementary, 
approaches of relational capabilities, trust and TCE have been drawn upon, which the 
researcher has combined in an interactive manner, to explain the mechanisms that underlie 
inter-organizational relationship dimensions and ultimately impact on strategic alliance 
performance. The findings of this study reveal that trust and asset specificity have an 
indirect effect on alliance performance through the mediating influence of knowledge 
sharing routines and complementary capability. The results from investigating alliance 
projects between MNE subsidiaries and local suppliers in Thai manufacturing, imply that 
with a high level of relational and economic constraints, relational capabilities effectively 







7.3.1 Contributions to the relational capabilities approach  
The results of this thesis extend the work of Dyer and Singh (1998) by providing 
an in-depth understanding of the relational capabilities regarding trust at two levels, inter-
organizational and inter-personal, as well as with respect to the TCE approach. The 
outcomes provide robust evidence to address two research questions: what are the 
antecedents of relational capabilities in cross-cultural alliance projects?; and what is the 
role of relational capabilities in strategic alliance management to achieve alliance 
performance in cross-cultural alliance projects? From a broader perspective, and 
referring to the main conclusions of this study, a number of contributions can be identified.  
This findings support the idea that both the firm’s relational and economic conditions, 
namely trust and asset specificity, play an important part in the formation and development 
of relational capabilities with alliance partners in strategic alliance projects. More 
specifically, this research has elicited the construct of relational and economic dimensions 
promotes inter-dependence and commitment to positive outcomes for such projects. 
Moreover, alliance conditions are impacted upon by inter-organizational relationships. 
That is, these are determined by the relational and economic dimensions, which comprise 
the characteristics of the partner firms and hence have an impact on relational capabilities. 
Furthermore, this study has found that the three alliance condition variables, inter-personal 
trust, inter-organizational trust and asset specificity, constitute the pre-conditions for 
relational capabilities to come into effect.  
According to Gray and Wood (1991) and Combs and Ketchen (1999), neither relational 
nor economics-based perspectives adequately explain collaborations and hence both 
perspectives are needed. This integration is important as these sets of theoretical 
arguments together can provide complementary insights into this theoretically and 
empircally important phenomenon. (Combs and Ketchen, 1999). This research has been 
motivated by this research has been movated by this call to integrate economic and 
relational perspectives, thereby identifying a hybrid form of relational capabilities. In 
particular, this thesis provides new knowledge regarding the antecedents and 
consequences of such capabilities covering both perspectives by combining the relevant 




strategic alliance literature, because although few studies have been able to explain how 
inter-organizational factors can be translated into alliance management capabilities (Kale 
et al., 2002; Simonin, 1997), none, as far as this researcher is aware, have investigated 
both the inter-personal and inter-firm dimensions.  
1) Relational dimensions 
The results of this study show that inter-personal and inter-organizational trust play 
critical roles in the development of relational capabilities in strategic alliances. In 
particular, they indicate that these two levels of trust represent the relational 
interconnectedness across organizational boundaries. At the dyadic level, a firm and its 
partner can protect co-developed and shared resources from external imitation by relying 
on isolating mechanisms, such as high levels of trust and causal ambiguity (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998; Gulati et al., 2000). These findings extend current insight into why firms are 
willing to share resources and capabilities against the risk from opportunistic behaviours 
of alliance partners. In particular, they highlight the idea that strategic dyads potentially 
provide participating firms with access to information, resources, markets, and 
technologies, with advantages from learning, scale, and scope economies (Gulati, et al., 
2000), which allow firms to achieve operational effectiveness and strategic objectives. 
Based on the research findings, a firm should develop mechanisms that ensure 
appropriation of relational rents when accessing the complementary resources of an 
alliance partner. 
In line with Doney and Cannon (1997) and Zaheer et al. (1998), the research findings 
reveal that inter-organizational and inter-personal trust are formed in the context of 
strategic alliances. That is, buyer firms do not consider only organizational traits, but also 
personal traits to pursue the alliance projects. The alliance partner must be willing to 
demonstrate a long-term commitment to the partnership through a continuing provision 
of resources on informal terms, for a high-trust strategy requires a great deal of time and 
effort to nurture the relationship. In addition, the research findings indicate that inter-
personal trust has a positive impact on relational capabilities, which indicates that the 
routines and capabilities are built upon individual emotions and cognition. Crosssan, Lane 




organizational learning and elicited that there is a sequence and progression to these 
processes through different levels, during which some spillover is possible from level to 
level. Regarding this, the process begins at the individual level with a buyer’s 
representative interpreting the behaviour of the supplier and if their view is favourable 
then this will eventually become embedded at the firm level (Crosssan et al., 1999).  
Consequently, a common language, which is a basic interpretive process, from an 
interactive conversations will have been developed. Subsequently, a the inter-
organizational relationship naturally outgrows its ability to use interactions exclusively to 
interpret, integrate, and take concerted action, the relationships become formalized and 
routines develop. Furthermore, Hodgkinson and Healey (2011) provided explanation for 
the linkage between the inter-personal and inter-organizational levels by integrating 
psychological foundations with a dynamic capabilities approach. They suggested that the 
creation of business opportunities originated from the cognitive and emotional disposition 
of top management, for these factors are likely to determine, to a significant degree, how 
the firm responds to a dynamic environment. In order to build on this fundamental insight 
that relational capabilities at the organizational level are driven by individual emotions 
and feelings through the form of inter-personal trust, this researcher calls for qualitative 
research that explores the micro mechanisms and processes that link psychological 
foundations, such as the relationship between managers’ cognition and emotions and 
relational capabilities.  
2) Economic dimensions 
Combining relational capabilities and TCE perspectives to explain strategic alliance 
management has revealed two opposite effects of asset specificity in strategic alliance 
projects. According to the literature, economists tend to focus on using asset specificity to 
facilitate exchange by preventing opportunism (Shelanski and Klein, 1995), while under 
the relational view the concentration is on trust and resources as well as the capabilities to 
promote collaborative exchanges in dyadic relationships (Dyer and Singh, 1998). The 
current research outcomes have confirmed both the relational view and TCE assertions. 
More specifically, it has emerged that with a high level of asset specificity, firms tend to 




and safeguarding mechanisms (effective governance mechanisms) into alliance project 
management. This is implies that firms are aware of opportunistic behaviours from asset 
specificity investment, but they are committed to pursuing value creation from this asset.  
That is, the findings support the position of  Subramani and Venkatraman (2003) that asset 
specificity leads to interactions between alliance partners and hence, benevolent attitudes 
toward the other alliance parties. This is also in line with Heid and John’s (1990) work, 
who noted that if the alliance partners invested in specific assets, they are likely to increase 
the level of joint action and sustain expectations of continuity as well as put in safeguard 
mechanisms to protect behavioural uncertainty from alliance partners.  
One assumption of TCE, namely bounded rationality, has accentuated the economic man 
assumption in that the focus has been on the choice of mode of economic governance that 
minimizes transaction costs, arising in part from an inherent tendency of exchange parties 
to behave opportunistically (Williamson, 1985, 1993). By contrast, the assumption of trust 
implies the heroic man since trust plays an important role in promoting and maintaining 
value-enhancing collaborations (Zaheer et al., 1998). Consequently, another contribution 
of this research is with regards to this dilemma regarding the TCE and trust perspectives 
in explaining in that both have been integrated into the same theoretical model, rather than 
being considered separately. That is, adopting both perspectives to explain the inter-
organizational exchange phenomenon has enhanced the explanatory power of the devised 
model as suggested by previous research (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Young-Ybarra and 
Wiersema, 1999; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; McEvily et al., 2003; Lado et al., 2008). 
Clearly a relationship exists between trust and bounded rationality in inter-organizational 
collaborations, which may lead to information exchange that is more accurate, greater 
receptivity to influence by others and relaxation of controls on others. As a result, this 
effect reduces behavioural uncertainty, which, in turn, economizes on bounded rationality.  
Moreover, Verbeke and Greidanus (2009) found that the joint adoption of bounded 
rationality and trust as behavioural assumptions in the context of MNEs, explained why  
individuals have the propensity to fail on commitments. Most failures to fulfill a 
commitment owing to self-interest do not lead to automatic relationship termination. 




performance and to corrective action in order to avoid similar failures in the future. In 
sum, this research has illustrated the relative ease with which asset specificity and trust 
can be incorporated into the applicable and completed picture of strategic alliance 
projects.  
3) Relational capabilities approach 
This study makes a number of contributions that are fundamental to the theory of RBV, 
the relational view and the relational capabilities approach. From an academic standpoint, 
when examining hypotheses in relation to these at the conceptual level, a fundamental 
assumption in strategy research, especially from the resource-based view, is firm 
heterogeneity (Barney, 1991). That is, under RBV it is argued that firm specific 
capabilities differentiate successful firms from failing ones and that those unique 
resources and capabilities drive performance differences (Peng, 2009). The findings of 
this research, which support this theory, will allow firms to identify and exploit resources 
and capabilities that contribute to their competitive position. More specifically, the 
outcomes of this research extend RBV to answer a fundamental question of strategic 
alliances as to why some firms are more successful with these than others. Moreover, the 
findings support the idea that the search for the source of resources and capabilities should 
extend beyond the boundaries of the firm, thereby providing RBV with a more insightful 
perspective. In addition, this internal organizational principle is still valid for 
interconnected firms, for it requires not only organization of internal activities, but also 
configuration of inter-organizational activities when alliances are formed. This is 
consistent with Lavie’s (2006) contention that the value-creation effect of a strategic 
alliance can be attributed to the ability of the firm to leverage external resources, create 
synergies by combining them with internal resources, and eventually internalize them 
through: learning, sharing and governing.  
Furthermore, this research has adopted the relational capabilities approach (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998) to explain how firms gain relational rents when they apply these in strategic 
alliances. More specifically it contributes to the relational capabilities literature by 
conceptualizing and validating their antecedents and consequences. That is, to gain 




have relationship-specific assets, knowledge-sharing routines and complementary 
capabilities established with the alliance partners. As such, the research findings are 
consistent with previous studies in that the attainment of relational capabilities in strategic 
alliances will enable the firm to improve its operational and strategic performance (Ariño, 
2003; Kale and Singh, 2007; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010).  
In addition, this research contributes to the strategic alliance literature by demonstrating 
the effectiveness of a multiple mediation analysis technique. Although the causal steps 
approach (Baron and Kenny 1986) and Sobel test are widely used methods for testing 
hypotheses about variable effects, they have often been criticized for detecting the 
intervening effects (Fritz and MacKinnon 2007, MacKinnon et al., 2002). In this study the 
bootstrapping technique has been used to test the hypothesized multiple 
mediation/indirect effects of relational capabilities on the relationship between inter-
organizational dimensions, namely trust and asset specificity, and alliance performance. 
The multiple mediation analysis technique used in this study is more robust than the 
aforementioned most popular methods (Hayes 2009), and therefore, the findings of this 
study can be interpreted with greater confidence. 
7.2.2 Contributions to strategic alliance management in the Thai 
manufacturing sector 
The thesis has revealed that inter-personal trust as part of relational capabilities 
contributes to alliance performance in the context of the Thai manufacturing sector. That 
is, this form of trust, which is a factor at the individual level, plays a dominant role as an 
antecedent of relational capabilities, which is consistent with previous studies in this 
context. For instance, Kasuga et al. (2002) found that the network type administered 
structure, in which mutual trust relations are developed from the top management to the 
factories through strategic alliances, thus making best use of the characteristics of human 
relations that Japanese companies resort to, would be very effective in the Thai context. 
Furthermore, Kohpaiboon (2010) asserted that inter-personal participation is required to 
create effective and efficient coordination, since the contact person facilitates inter-
organizational communication in several ways, including solving problems, which can for 




finding regarding inter-personal trust is in line with research in other settings. For instance, 
Luk et al. (2008) found that informal personal relationships (or Guanxi) in China have 
three benefits: enhancing organizational innovativeness; influencing the effectiveness of 
strategic innovativeness, and enhancing business performance. Furthermore, Chua et al. 
(2008) contended that Chinese business, when compared with that in the West, is 
characterized by trust in family-like relationships. In sum, this contribution of the thesis 
shows that it is important for MNEs to devote greater attention to developing closer ties 
with local suppliers in the Thai manufacturing sector in order to strengthen their abilities 
to achieve superior alliance performance. 
7.3 Managerial implications 
This thesis provides three managerial implications for management scholars and 
practitioners with regards to: relational capabilities and competitive advantage, alliance 
project management and trust-based relationships in the Thai manufacturing sector. As a 
result, it is hoped that the framework and findings presented here stimulate relational 
capabilities-based research on the determinants of alliance project management, as well 
as on the conditions under which their presence is likely to have a positive impact on 
strategic alliance performance. In particular, it is hoped that purchasing managers of MNE 
subsidiaries and local suppliers’ representatives in the manufacturing sector will take the 
opportunity to learn from the evidence presented in this research.  
7.3.1 Strategic alliance project management  
Drawing upon the empirical findings of the relational capabilities approach in this thesis, 
there are several managerial implications for alliance project management. First, the 
outcomes emphasize the importance of these capabilities as a source of competitive 
advantage of the firm. That is, a relational capabilities perspective provides new insights 
for project managers who are proponents of the resource-based view of the firm, for a 
comprehensive view of a firm's relational rent-generating resources not only includes 
elements such as brands, technological capabilities, management talent, and so forth, but 
would also include these capabilities. The outcomes of this research imply that firms that 




because of access to better information and opportunities than those that are more isolated. 
Therefore, since the firm is an entity with a limited range of capabilities based on its 
available routines and intangible and tangible assets, routines and capabilities could be 
thought of as a unique and inimitable asset (Gulati et al., 2000). According to Leonard-
Barton (1992), core capabilities refer to a set of differentiated skills, complementary 
assets, and routines that provide the basis for a firm’s competitive capacities and 
sustainable advantage in a particular business. Hence, relational capabilities should also 
be seen as core capabilities for firms and consequently this researcher urges managers to 
build this set of capabilities as the basis for a firm’s competitive capacities and sustainable 
advantage in a particular business. Furthermore, the most important action to be taken by 
the firm’s purchasing department in order to build a successful supplier alliance is to 
dedicate their organizational capabilities, including complementary capability and 
knowledge sharing routines, to utilize trust and asset specificity. That is, building these 
capabilities can help managers in the Thai context determine in advance if a potential 
relationship is one that will result in competitive advantages that are worth the time and 
resources required to sustain them.  
Second, this research provides evidence that economic and relational constraints are pre-
conditions of relational capabilities in alliance projects, i.e. they are potential factors for 
building such capabilities in these projects. An organization’s management may arrive at 
the required level of relational capabilities through deployment of those economic and 
relational commitments that are within its control and, in so doing effectively 
manipulating them in its favour during alliance projects. This researcher calls on firms to 
develop trust and invest in asset specificity when undertaking strategic planning for these 
have been found to be drivers of these capabilities. The findings also suggest the need for 
managers to create and shape an inter-organizational context that continually fosters 
cooperation activities between the exchange parties, while simultaneously guarding 
against the potential hazards of opportunism (through trust-based relationships). 
Third, this research has identified the effective mediators, namely, knowledge sharing 
routines and complementary capability, between inter-organizational constraints and 




of the mediating model provides important intermediate markers regarding the nature of 
the capabilities that enhance development (Leonard-Barton, 1992). That is, if relational 
capabilities mediate the effects of inter-organizational conditions of a partnership, then 
managers may need to audit them continuously to ensure that the effects of these features 
have been fully assimilated into the collaborative process in order to ensure the expected 
outcomes. In particular, it is the job of the alliance manager to decide what investments 
are to be made, what assets are to be purchased, and how complementarities are to be 
achieved so as to guarantee that there is sufficient organizational support for leveraging 
economic and relational constraints in strategic alliance projects. More specifically, 
alliance managers have to ensure that knowledge sharing routines and complementary 
capability are created inside the firm in order to maximise the potential benefits regarding 
trust and asset specificity. 
Fourth, this study moves forward the debate on relational capabilities by showing that 
considering the nature of the different types of alliance performance, allows for more 
precise predictions about the appropriate choice of such capabilities to adopt for a 
collaboration. That is, understanding the impact of both direct and indirect factors as 
provided in the model will help firms to improve their alliance project performance. More 
specifically, the key direct factor is relational capabilities, which mediate the inter-
organizational dimensions of asset specificity and trust and hence the latter two are 
positively indirectly related to a firm’s alliance performance. Moreover, firms can 
improve strategic performance by focusing on complementary capabilities with alliance 
partners as well as enhancing operational performance by focusing on knowledge sharing 
routines. However, having decided on their strategic goals, managers need to be aware of 
these causal links to ensure that they follow the correct path so as to achieve them.  
Furthermore, the study outcomes show that taking a relational capabilities approach when 
considering appropriate alliance partners can enhance the likelihood of effective 
collaboration and hence, lead to fulfilment of desired operational and strategic 
performance. At the individual level, this researcher suggests that firms that select alliance 
partners with reliable contact persons are more likely to be successful. At the 




firms’ reputation regarding reliability, but also their attitude towards maintaining a good 
relationship with their business partners. That is, firms that put high store in buyer-supplier 
relationships are likely to be good alliance partners since they are more willing to dedicate 
their resources and capabilities to making the best from collaborations.  
Last but not least, since strategic alliance projects actually are a conduit for learning to 
improve the firm in the future (Mayer and Argyres, 2004), this researcher encourages 
alliance project managers to redeploy relational capabilities and alliance experiences from 
completed projects. This learning can help to improve subsequent strategic alliance 
management at the portfolio level and this particular finding of the link between project 
and portfolio levels provides support for Ethiraj et al. (2005) and Pisano’s (1994) work 
that also discovered this to be the case. Moreover, as relational capabilities have been 
shown to require relational and economic commitment in order to develop, the use of these 
capabilities between alliance partners can be expected to evolve across subsequent 
projects. Increasing efforts to codify knowledge and creating systems to disseminate 
information between alliance managers across projects and time are possible mechanisms 
for the development of an organizational memory that can be leveraged in subsequent 
alliances. For example, Child (2001) noted that one kind of learning in a strategic alliance 
involves the accumulation of mutual experience with and knowledge about how to 
manage inter-organizational cooperation. Regarding this, the findings of this study 
showed how the firms were learning how to work together in terms of how to implement 
knowledge sharing routines and identify complementarities that exist with assets currently 
not owned by the firm. By so doing, this was helping the firms to achieve strategic fit 
(Porter, 1996), not just with internally controlled assets, but also by taking advantage of 
the capabilities of alliance partners.  
Finally, the research outcomes indicate the important role of alliance managers and project 
staff in the sense that they are key players in the success of alliance projects. 
Consequently, it is recommended that alliance project managers should take care to 
appoint suitably qualified staff, be capable of correctly planning the activities for the 
project, know how to ensure the appropriate levels of information flows and be motivated 




Moreover, according to Augier and Teece (2009), firms engaging in strategic alliances 
require a different breed of manager, who should be highly skilled employees with the 
capacities to combine and integrate resources. In particular, they must act 
entrepreneurially, think strategically, and execute flawlessly if they are to lead their 
organizations successfully. Finally, the alliance manager must articulate goals, help 
evaluate opportunities and mitigate barriers during the on-going projects. 
7.3.2 Trust-based relationships 
Many of the relational capability practices established in Asian business environments are 
being adopted by MNE subsidiaries seeking to benefit from a “relationship-oriented 
strategy”; a new term which many executives are discussing (Cousins et al., 2006). The 
results of this research, which were derived from MNEs, have provided evidence that most 
of these purchasing managers have applied the trust-based relationship and relational 
capabilities approach to manage their alliance projects and gain competitive advantage in 
the context of the Thai manufacturing sector. Based on these findings, the overriding 
recommendation for MNE managers of any country of origin is to take into account 
context the context of alliance projects in that trust and relational capabilities play a greater 
part in some than in others. In particular regarding the context of this research, despite the 
notion of globalization suggesting a convergence of impersonalized business practices, 
inter-organizational and inter-personal trust still matter very much in the Thai 
manufacturing sector because trust facilitates relational capabilities in strategic alliances, 
as would appear to be the case in other East Asian countries, but not so much in the West. 
Therefore, when alliance managers spending time-consuming efforts drafting contracts in 
such Asian contexts, regardless of their home country should not ignore these informal 
relational capabilities aspects as these when nurtured well can have a positive impact on 
performance. 
Finally, sales managers representing supplier firms need to recognize their additional role 
as relationship managers. Regarding which, this study has identified the importance of 
their understanding the behaviours and expectations of purchasing managers, whether 
spoken or unspoken, during alliance projects. In particular, by understanding expectations 




a long term relationship built on collaborative effort. Also, the supplier’s reputation 
regarding trustworthiness and reliability is an important aspect of building a relationship 
with their customers. Likewise, high levels of inter-organizational and inter-personal trust 
will result in reliable information exchange between buyers and suppliers which creates 
positive relations experiences and positive expectations for future engagement. In 
particular, such personal interaction helps develop common values and norms for the 
alliances (Das and Teng, 1998; Michailova and Hutchings, 2006). In sum, contact people 
should be sensitized to the nature of the social process underlying interpersonal 
relationship development.   
7.4 Limitations and Future research 
Although this study has provided considerable insights that contribute to the 
strategic alliance management literature, it has theoretical and managerial limitations that 
prompt the need for future research.  
 
7.4.1 Theoretical limitations 
There are three theoretical limitations in this research regarding relational capabilities 
and relational rents, different characteristics of trust and different characteristics of 
transaction cost factors. 
1) Relational capabilities approach  
Even though in this thesis it has been contended that relational capabilities facilitate inter-
organizational development, in some situations they can be a hindrance for those 
developed for specific purposes have rigidities characteristics (Leonard-Barton, 1992). 
That is, previous research has raised the concern that relational capabilities can play a 
negative role in alliance performance (Li et al., 2008; Villena et al., 2011) because those 
developed capabilities sometimes cannot respond to the rapid changing environment. 
Given this perspective, it could be the case that the current research is restricted by having 
focused on relational capabilities to the detriment of other factors that can enhance or 
hinder alliance performance. Taking this into account, it is recognised that it is important 




safeguards, because these control devices interact with each other, whereby MNE 
subsidiary managers must make decisions based on a simultaneous consideration of these 
interdependent exchange elements. They should weigh costs and benefits of relationship-
oriented management with their local suppliers and carefully apply appropriate strategies 
to achieve effective knowledge sharing between parties. Similarly, Argyres and Zenger 
(2007) argued that a desire to generate unique capabilities may influence the canonical 
make-or-buy decision as well as the governance choices that impact on the efficiency of 
capability formation. Therefore, future research should treat relational capabilities 
considerations as inextricably intertwined with transaction cost logic, and should seek to 
analyse this complex interaction. Furthermore, relational rents are jointly generated from 
specific assets firms dedicate to alliance relationships and from complementarities 
between their resources and those of their partners (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006; 
Mesquita et al., 2008). However, this researcher has only investigated the role of private 
benefits in strategic alliance projects, namely operational performance and the strategic 
performance of the firms. Therefore future research should distinguish between private 
and common benefits to determine the contributions of relational rents among alliance 
partners.   
2) Different characteristics of trust 
This study extends relational capabilities literature by having identified the antecedents 
and outcomes of relational capabilities in the context of MNE subsidiaries and local 
suppliers in the Thai manufacturing sector. That is, the outcomes have provided evidence 
that a firm can benefit from developing long-term relationships and close ties with specific 
suppliers and these relationships are likely to ensure that key resources will still flow in at 
a moderate cost. However, inter-organizational relationships have a potential dark side 
and may lock firms into unproductive ties or prevent partnering with other capable firms 
(Gulati et al., 2000; Villena et al., 2011). Consequently this researcher notes that future 
study should investigate alternative relationships in conjunction with the potential 
negative impacts of trust on relational capabilities and alliance performance. Also, it is 
suggested that firms seeking to optimize alliance performance should carefully assess 




alliance experiences. That is, it may be advisable to sample from a broad set of experiences 
with diverse partners, while taking alliance-based competitive dynamics into account (e.g. 
Anand and Khanna, 2000; Silverman and Baum, 2002).  
Furthermore, for this study only two levels of trust, namely inter-personal and inter-
organizational trust, have been focused upon. However, according to Rousseu et al. 
(1998), there are multiple dimensions (e.g. individuals, dyads, groups, networks, firms, 
and inter-firm alliances) that are related in strategic alliance management, which may play 
different roles in the interaction. This researcher, therefore, calls for studies that take into 
account multilevel perspectives on trust in and between organizations in order to advance 
theory. Furthermore, this research has only considered goodwill trust between alliance 
partners.  There are other types of trust in the literature, such as calculative, cognitive, 
competence and institutionalized based trust (Doney and Cannon, 1997; Sako and 
Helpers, 1998; Chua et al., 2008; Parkhe, 1998). Further research should probe these 
various types of trust since they may have different antecedents and outcomes.  
3) Different characteristics of transaction cost factors 
This researcher has investigated only the effect of two specific transaction cost factors that 
influence relational capabilities: asset specificity and HR distance. Hence, it would be 
beneficial to assess the influence of additional transaction cost variables on relational 
capabilities, e.g. different types of asset specificity, institutional voids and alternative firm 
specific factors. To begin with, the nature of asset specificity can be distinguished into 
two categories: tangible and intangible asset (Joshi and Stump, 1999). Likewise, 
Subramani and Venkataman (1995) defined the different characteristics between tangible 
asset specificity (e.g. plant and machinery) and intangible asset specificity (e.g. know-
how and business process) in relation to vertical relationships between buyers and 
suppliers in the Canadian manufacturing sector. Hence, future research should consider 
examining the impact of different types of asset specificity on the relational capabilities 
approach. In addition, some of this variation in transaction cost factors certainly arises 
from contextual factors that were not modelled for the current study, such as country of 
origin, technological uncertainty, and plant size. Regarding which, the level of inter-




2003), i.e. legal system effectiveness, the availability of competent human resources and 
cultural sensitivity (Skarmeas et al., 2002) as well as institutional variance in the host 
country (Peng et al., 2009) and different alliance management practices among Asian and 
Western MNEs (Dyer and Chu, 2000). Clearly, substantial further research is required to 
unpack the idiosyncratic role of contextual factors in relation to their varying impacts on 
alliance performance.  
 7.4.2 Methodological limitations 
Although the findings of this thesis advance the relational capabilities approach, this 
research also has methodological limitations, in terms of measurement, sample size, 
generalization and the fact that it was not longitudinal study. To begin with, this research 
involved adopting subjective constructs of relational capabilities (Kale et al., 2000; Dyer, 
1997; Mesquita et al., 2008) and asset specificity from previous studies (Subramani and 
Venkatraman, 2003; Zhou and Poppo, 2010). Therefore, this researcher calls for future 
research to collect these data using objective measurements, such as number and length 
of contacts between buyers and suppliers or the monetary value of asset specific resources 
(e.g. Corsten and Kumar, 2005). Moreover, although this research has involved using 
multi-level variables, at the individual, organizational and country levels, HR distance 
which was that chosen for the lattermost was found to have no impact on relational 
capabilities. Therefore, it is proposed that future study should consider HR distance by 
using Likert scales to assess attitudes towards this factor by respondents in different 
organisations directly. Further, although the relational capabilities approach at the alliance 
project level has been investigated, it is acknowledged that some important project-based 
control variables that may impact on these capabilities as well as performance, such as 
perceived project novelty, team size (Regans et al., 2004), project size and complexity and 
staff team size (Ethiraj et al., 2005), have been omitted. Therefore, it is recommended that 
future research relating to alliance management at the project level should include these 
control variables. 
For this research primary data were collected to test the theoretical framework, although 
usually secondary data is considered most reliable. However, given the researchers’ 




no robust secondary data on the focal issues has been published.  Unfortunately, the 
primary data collected could not be controlled in terms of the timing of the reporting 
regarding the chosen variables. That is, the respondents may well have been providing 
information that pertained to different time periods and consequently this may have 
affected the outcomes regarding the antecedents and hence the relational capabilities 
findings, which there was not easy way to avoid. In addition, Shaver (1998) noted that 
firms choose strategies based on their attributes and industry conditions and therefore 
strategy choice is endogenous and self-selected. In the current research, many managers 
reported that they put great store in relational capabilities, because they believed that these 
enhance performance and eschew alternative strategies which may be equally effective or 
even better. These potential biases were not catered for in this investigation and hence it 
is recommended that future work takes these into account when testing relational 
capabilities so as to avoid the endogeneity problem (ibid). In addition, Harman’s one-
factor test, which was used in this research, has limitations, especially, its well-known 
insufficient sensitivity to detect moderate or small levels of common method variance 
(CMV) effects (Kemery and Dunlap, 1986; Podsakoff et al., 2003; Maholtra et al. 2006). 
That is, as the number of latent factors increases, one factor is less likely to account for 
the majority of the variance in the manifested variables. Consequently, these authors have 
recommended another peer technique to detect the CMV problem, the marker-variable 
technique and this researcher concurs with this view that an alternative to Harman’s one-
factor test is preferable.  
Regarding to the context of the research, this study employed the perspective of a single 
firm and not the dyad or network, and as a result of the analysis, which was one-sided, 
may not have accounted for the overall impact of the relationship on the partner firms. 
Moreover, even though country-specific studies have added valuable and novel insights 
into the stock of global management knowledge, they on the whole unable to provide 
generalizability regarding the findings. Hence, future research needs to extend such 
investigations to the suppliers’ perspective on relational capabilities as well as using larger 
samples and different business/country contexts to increase the possibility of 
generalizability of the outcomes (e.g. Asian and non-Asian MNEs). Finally, in this study 




value, rather than dynamic ones that evolve over the duration of strategic alliances (Reuer 
and Ariño, 2002). Therefore, analysis of how these factors impact on relational 
capabilities would prove a beneficial extension of this research. 
7.5 Final remarks 
This research extends alliance management literature by integrating three complementary 
theories: relational capabilities approach, the concept of trust and TCE. Employing a 
sample of 156 alliance projects between MNE subsidiaries and local suppliers in the Thai 
manufacturing sector, several hypotheses have tested in order to address the two main 
research questions and subsequently several theoretical contributions have been 
identified. First, this work advances the relational capabilities approach by confirming its 
antecedents and consequences. That is, the importance of the relational and economic 
dimensions between organizations as they seek to enhance their relational capabilities and 
relational rents of strategic alliance at the project level has been confirmed. Second, it has 
been elicited that different types of relational capabilities provide different alliance 
outcomes. More specifically, knowledge sharing routines and complementary capability 
enhance operational performance and strategic performance, respectively. Finally, the 
thesis has provided empirical evidence that aligns with the relational capabilities literature 
that knowledge sharing routines and complementary capability, are idiosyncratic and 
difficult for competitors to imitate. As a result, firms that dedicate time and effort to 
developing these capabilities are likely to achieve competitive advantage in the context of 
cross-cultural alliance projects. Bearing in mind the limited empirical research available 
in combining the relational capabilities approach and research methods, this study is 
important in paving the way for further comprehensive research on strategic alliance 
projects. The researcher encourages firms to apply the research results to their alliance 
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APPENDIX A: Cover letter 
Buyer-Supplier Alliance of Multinational Enterprise Subsidiaries in Thai 
Manufacturing Sector 
I am conducting a survey of “Buyer-Supplier Alliance of Multinational Enterprise 
Subsidiaries in Thai Manufacturing Sector” as part of doctoral research within the School 
of Management, University of Bath, UK.  All responses to the survey will be treated as 
confidential.   
Instruction  
1. This survey has two set of questionnaires. The questionnaire No. 1 has 2 pages for 
purchasing director and the questionnaire No. 2 has 4 pages for another key informant.  
2. Please select one important strategic alliance project with one Thai supplier in the 
last 3 years (2008 – 2010).  
3. The example of the alliance project includes joint ventures, R&D partnerships, 
affiliation in research consortia, franchising, contractual agreements, 
management/marketing service agreements, know-how licensing contracts and technical 
training.  
4. The focal alliance will be used as the focal basis of the information. Please complete all 
sections of the survey by ticking the relevant box for each question. 
5. After you have completed the questionnaire No.1, please forward the questionnaire No. 
2 to a key person who has been involved with the project (i.e. project manager, alliance 
manager, engineer) to complete it. 
6. Kindly return the two completed questionnaires by November 2011. Please attach your 
business card, if you would like to have the summary of findings of this research.  
 
Definition 
The strategic alliance project means an agreement between your company and a local 
supplier to share resources in specific project related to the critical products and process 
in your manufacture in order to gain mutual benefits. 
A Thai supplier means a Thai company which has supplied critical component products 
in the manufacturing process of your company for more than 3 years. 
 
Thank you for your kind cooperation. 
Rapeeporn Rungsithong 




APPENDIX B: Questionnaire for purchasing managers 
Questionnaire No.1 
Part 1: Sourcing practice and alliance experiences of your company (in the division under 
your responsibility) 
 
1. What percentage of the sales of your company are exported from Thailand? 
(  ) 0%  (  ) < 25%  (  ) 25% - 50%       (  ) 50% - 75%  (  ) 75% - 100% 
 
 
5. Please, indicate the approximate percentage of sourcing of materials/components the 
following supplies? 
 
6. To what extend do you disagree or agree with following statements on sourcing? 
 Strongly 
Disagree     
     Strongly 
Agree 
Your company is experienced in inter-
organizational collaboration 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has learned how to handle inter-
organizational relations through previous alliances 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company previous experiences have guided 
you in structuring and governing this alliance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
You think it is troublesome to cooperate since you 
have limited previous experience.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Part 2: Information about company and the focal alliance with Thai supplier 
Instruction: Please select one important strategic alliance with one Thai supplier in the last 3 years 
(2008 – 2010).This important alliance project refers to an agreement between your company and 
a Thai supplier to share resources in a project related to critical products and process in your 





2. Approximately, how many persons are working on purchasing in your 
company? 
3. Approximately, how many expatriates from the parent company are 
working on purchasing in your company?      
4. Approximately, how many expatriates from the parent company are 
working in your company?      
 
 % 
Sourcing from affiliated companies in Thailand  
Sourcing from affiliated companies overseas  
Sourcing from independent suppliers in Thailand   





7. What is the form of this alliance?   
(  ) Equity ownership  (  ) Non-equity ownership 
7.1) If the form of the alliance project is equity ownership, please specify the percentage of the 
capital of your company and the Thai supplier.  Your company…….. %   The supplier ….. %     
7.2) If the form of the alliance project is non-equity ownership, please specify the form of the 
project. (Please select only one answer) 
(  ) Cooperation agreement (  ) Licensing agreement (  ) Buyer-seller contract   (  ) Other……… 
 
8. What is your company’s main motive for the alliance with this supplier? (Please select only 
one answer) 
       (  ) New product and process development         (  ) Joint purchases    
       (  ) Total quality management                   (  ) Lot size optimization techniques program 
       (  ) New machine set up techniques programs    (  ) Supply chain management and logistics 
       (  ) Joint R&D project for new product development    
       (  ) Joint R&D project for new process development ( ) Others (Please specify ......................) 
9. In what year was the alliance was formed? ……………………………. 
10. Has the alliance project be terminated/ended?  
(  ) No, it is still operating          (  ) No, it is expected to end in the year............................ 
(  ) Yes, it was ended in the year........................................ 
11. To what extend do you disagree or agree with following statements on the characteristics of 
this supplier?    
 Strongly 
Disagree     
     Strongly 
Agree 
This supplier is trustworthy. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
This supplier has always been even handed in its negotiation 
with your company. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
This supplier never uses opportunities that arise to profit at your 
expense.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company is not hesitant to transact with this supplier when 
the specifications are vague. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company trust that confidential/proprietary information 
shared with the supplier will be kept strictly confidential by the 
supplier's sales and engineers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company provided recent detailed cost data to the supplier 
(e.g., a break- down of your cost structure which estimates 
exactly what it will cost you to manufacture a specific 
component) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company share information with the supplier on your long-
term production plans, capital investments, and capacity 
utilization 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A comprehensive set of norms of action has been well developed 
whilst cooperating 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
A binding set of rules for both firms has been created (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Both firms have a mutual understanding of each other’s 
organizational culture, values and operations  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Both firms share a common vision and ambition for the 
cooperative venture 






Part 3: Information about the alliance performance 
 
12. What percentage of the alliance project in which the original goals were realized? 
(  ) 0%   (  ) < 25%     (  ) 25% - 50%   (  ) 50% - 75%   (  ) 75% - 100% 
13. To what extend do you disagree or agree with following statements on the alliance project 
performance with this suppliers in the last three years? 
     
  Strongly 
Disagree     
     Strongly 
Agree 
Your company has continued to improve product design 
performance through this partnership  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has continued to improve process design 
through this partnership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has continued to improve product quality 
through this partnership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has continued to reduce lead time 
through this partnership inquiries after the alliance.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has continued to increase the reliability 
of our products delivery times 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has continued to lower the total cost of 
our products 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has continued to reduce our product cost
  
       
Your company has continued to improve our 
manufacturing flexibility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has continued to introduce new 
generation of products 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has continued to extend product range  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has continued to open up new markets  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has continued to enter new technology 
fields  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has continued to learn about customers 
and markets for your products 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Part 4: Please complete the following that describe your characteristics. 
14. Your position in the company…………………………………………….........  
    How many years have you worked for the company? ……………………….......... years 
15. Gender     (  ) Male                         (  ) Female 
16. Age (  ) between 21 – 30    (  ) between 31 - 40       (  ) between 41 –50     (  ) more than 50 
17. Education 
(  ) Vocational school    (  ) Undergraduate (  ) Postgraduate (  ) Other (Please specify….) 
 








APPENDIX C: Questionnaire for purchasing staff 
Questionnaire No.2 
Part 1: Information about the supplier in the alliance project 
 
1. What is the nationality of this supplier?   
(  ) Thai independent supplier       (  ) Joint venture independent supplier  
(Please specify the nationality.............)      
2. Is this supplier your affiliated company?      (  ) Yes                 (  ) No  
3. How many years has your company been sourcing from this supplier?    …… years  
4. To what extend do you disagree or agree with following statements on the importance of the 
supplier based on the last three years? 
 Strongly 
Disagree     
     Strongly 
Agree 
This supplier is a very large company (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
This supplier is the industry’s biggest supplier of this 
product 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
This supplier is a small player in the market (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
If your company decided to stop purchasing from this 
supplier, your company could easily replace the volume 
with purchases from other suppliers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
There are many competitive suppliers for these 
components 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your production system can be easily adapted to using 
components from a new supplier 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dealing with a new supplier would only require a limited 
redesign and development effort on your part 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
5. To what extend do you disagree or agree with following statements on the relationship between 
your company and the supplier based on the last three years? 
 Strongly 
Disagree     
     Strongly 
Agree 
The business practices and operational mechanisms of the 
supplier are very similar to yours. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
The corporate culture and management style of the 
supplier is very similar to yours.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Just for your company this supplier is willing to 
customize its products. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Just for your company this supplier is willing to change 
its production process. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Just for your company this supplier is willing to change 
its inventory procedures. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Just for your company this supplier is willing to change 
its delivery procedures.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Just for your company this supplier is willing to invest in 
tools and equipment. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
This supplier shares proprietary information with your 
company. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
This supplier will share confidential information to help 
your company.  




Part 2: Information about the routines in the alliance project between your company and 
the supplier  
 
6. To what extend do you disagree or agree with following statements on the differences between 
your company and the supplier within the alliance in this alliance project? 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree     
     Strongly 
Agree 
There is high complementary between the 
resources/capabilities of the two partners       
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
There is high similarity/overlap between the core 
capabilities of each partner                     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
The organizational cultures of the two partners are 
compatible with each other                  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
The management and operating styles of the partners are 
compatible with each other  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company learnt or acquired some new or important 
information from the partner  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company learnt or acquired some critical capability 
or skill from the partner             
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
This alliance has helped your company to enhance its 
existing capabilities/skills 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
 
7. To what extend do you disagree or agree with following statements on specific assets which 
have invested between your company and the supplier in this alliance project only? 
  
 Strongly 
Disagree     
     Strongly 
Agree 
Your company has changed the location of the 
distribution facilities used in supplying your company 
receiving points 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has changed your manufacturing 
equipment and machinery. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has changed your inventory and 
warehouse. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has changed your software and 
applications used (e.g., billing, inventory management, 
EDI etc.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has changed your administrative and 
operating procedures used (e.g., vendor selection, cost 
accounting procedures, shipping procedures etc.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has changed the skill levels of your 
employees working on the focal carrier's business 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has changed the extent of training 
needed for staff 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company has difficulty to redeploy people and 
facilities serving the alliance 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
It is important that this alliance  continues, as  
termination will result in financial losses due to your 
investments  






8. To what extend do you disagree or agree with following statements on information and 
knowledge sharing with this supplier in this alliance project?  
 
 Strongly 
Disagree     
     Strongly 
Agree 
Your company and this supplier conducted a ‘collective 
review’ to assess the progress and performance of their 
strategic alliances. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company and this supplier participated in forums 
such as committees or task forces to take stock of their 
alliance management experience and practices.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company and this supplier participated in forums 
such as meetings, seminars, or retreats to exchange 
alliance-related issues (e.g. buyer and this supplier’s 
employees jointly participated in someone else’s 
programs) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company and this supplier engaged in informal 
sharing and exchange of alliance-related information 
and know-how with peers or colleagues within the 
organization.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company shared confidential/proprietary 
information related to this project (such as cost and 
proprietary technology)with the supplier 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
9. To what extend do you disagree or agree with following statements on the governance which 
has been conducted in the alliance with this supplier in this alliance project? 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree     
     Strongly 
Agree 
The formal contract/agreement is highly customized 
and required considerable legal work 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
The formal documents (i.e. balance sheet, monthly 
report, service level agreements) are highly used in 
monitoring the performance of the supplier   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Face-to-face meetings at the top management level are 
highly used in monitoring the performance of the 
supplier 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Disagreements between your company and the supplier 
will be only resolved with the formal contracts or 
agreements   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Disagreements between your company and the supplier 
will be only resolved with informal meeting between 
cooperation managers or project groups  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company and this supplier keep each other 
informed relative to production plans,  
schedules and demand forecasts 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company and this supplier extend technical 
support during emergencies and breakdown and/or 
onsite support for implementation of improvements   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your company and this supplier promote ‘fair 
sharing’ of cost savings and benefits arising out 
of joint efforts. 




Part 3: Information about the contact person of the supplier in this alliance project  
Instruction: Please select one contact person (i.e. sales representative, engineer, technician, etc.) 
whom you have worked most closely in this alliance project from the supplier side. This person 
will be used as the focal basis of the information in this part. 
 
10. How long has this contact person been in contact with your company? ………… years  
    What is nationality of this contact person? (  ) Thai ( ) Other (Please specify …………)  
 
11. To what extend do you disagree or agree with following statements on the characteristics of 
the contact person of this supplier in the alliance project? 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree     
     Strongly 
Agree 
The contact person of this alliance has always been 
even handed in negotiations with you 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
You know how your contact person is going to act. 
S/he can always be counted on to act as you expect. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Your contact person is trustworthy. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
You have faith in your contact person to look out for 
your interests even when it is costly to do so. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
You would feel a sense of betrayal if your contact 
person's performance was below your expectations. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
12. To what extend do you disagree or agree with following statements on the relationship between 
you and the contact person of this supplier in the alliance project? 
 Strongly 
Disagree     
     Strongly 
Agree 
This person is friendly. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
This person is always nice to us.   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
This person is someone we like to have around. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
This person shares similar interests with people in our 
firm.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
This person has values similar to people in our firm. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
This person is very similar to people in our firm. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
This person frequently visits our place of business. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
This person takes a lot of time learning our needs. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
This person spends considerable time getting to know 
our people. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Part 4: Please complete the following that describe your characteristics. 
14. Your position in the company …………………………………………………. 
How many years have you worked for the company? ……………………….......... years 
15. Gender     (  ) Male                         (  ) Female 
16. Age            (  ) between 21 – 30    (  ) between 31 - 40       (  ) between 41 –50     (  ) more 
than 50 
17. Education  
(  ) Vocational school         (  ) Undergraduate (  ) Postgraduate  (  ) Other (Please specify….) 
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